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ABSTRACT
Hurricanes, tsunamis, and terrorism, are visible catastrophes that disrupt
continuity for many organizations. Yet behind the curtain, there are multitudes of smaller
events that cause supply chain disruptions. For example, quality issues, shipping delays,
information system malfunction, demand spikes, and inventory mismanagement can
quickly ripple from one supply chain to another. Practitioners work feverishly to contain
small interruptions, while large disruptions can upset the supply chain for multiple
organizations and depress an organization’s financial valuation by up to 40%.

This study extends risk management thinking by exploring behavioral-based
practices, rather than buffer inventory, redundant capacity, or financial countermeasures,
as these behavioral tactics affect employees and emanate from the culture of the
organization. We specifically, research competencies that improve an organization’s
structure and orientation. Internal integration, information sharing, and training reflect
antecedent competencies that provide structure and encourage internal connectedness.
Common vision, supply chain disruption orientation, organizational learning, and routine
rigidity represent competencies that influence the organization’s orientation, a proxy for
culture. Previous operations research has investigated these antecedents, but rarely have
they viewed them from a risk management perspective.

We also determine how organizations use risk management capabilities to
understand supply chain disruption. To do this, we develop a conceptual disruption
management framework that seeks to align the probability of disruption and the
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predictability of consequences with an organization’s supply chain strategy. The model
should help practitioners select an appropriate supply chain strategy from among several
alternatives. The output is a risk management strategy grounded in supply chain
flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, agility, or resilience.
We also operationalize two new risk management measures: warning and
recovery capability. Warning capability refers to an organization’s ability to scan for and
communicate information about potential and actual supply chain threats. When properly
developed, this capability should enable organizations to better identify supply chain
threats. Recovery capability represents an organization’s pre-emptive and reactive
response capacity. Developing these capabilities allows practitioners to effectively
position and utilize resources to speed up supply chain recovery.

The evidence indicates that organizations can develop behavioral-based
competencies and capabilities as a method to better anticipate and combat supply chain
risk. When studying orientations that influence the culture of an organization, we found
that managers should develop their common vision, supply chain disruption orientation,
and organizational learning competencies as a way to address supply chain risk. The
evidence tells us that each competency positively influences the organization’s risk
management capabilities and overall performance. Additionally, the data implies that
organizations must manage their routine rigidity and information quality levels;
otherwise, they may experience a degradation of their risk management capabilities.
Structurally, we found that internal integration and training affect an organization’s
warning and recovery capabilities and leads to improved performance. While recovery
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capability directly improves performance, we find that an organization’s warning abilities
affect performance only when recovery serves as an intermediary. The benefit of this
approach is that managers develop the employees and the organization itself, rather than
investing in resources that may never be used.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Hurricanes, tsunamis, and terrorism, are visible catastrophes that disrupt
continuity for many organizations. Yet behind the curtain, there are multitudes of smaller
events that cause supply chain (SC) disruptions. For example, quality issues, shipping
delays, information system malfunction, demand spikes, and inventory mismanagement
can quickly ripple destructively from one supply chain to another. Practitioners work
feverishly to contain small interruptions, while large disruptions can upset the SC for
multiple organizations and depress an organization’s financial valuation by up to 40%
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). Organizations need to develop less resource intensive
tactics to manage and mitigate supply chain risk.
To address SC risk, organizations develop strategies to lower the probability of
occurrence, reduce the impact of disruption, and improve recovery times so a SC can
quickly return to a steady state. While risk management requires comprehensive
strategies, we find most academic research addresses SC risk with redundant inventory
and/or capacity. If overdone, these mitigation techniques are costly and force
organizations to idle valuable resources, which they will not effectively turn until the next
SC disruption.

This study extends risk management thinking by exploring behavior-based
practices, rather than buffer inventory, redundant capacity, or financial countermeasures.
Behavior tactics affect employees and emanate from the culture of the organization
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(Zsidisin, 2003; Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi, 2010). This research follows
the advice of experts who suggest that risk management tactics be embedded in day-today activities as part of the organization’s culture (Simchi-Levi, 2010). Albeit, few
researchers have empirically tested these behavior-based strategies within current
literature.(Sohdi, Son & Tang, 2012). Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) focused on the
magnitude and the probability of supply disruption within the automotive industry and
Tucker (2004) categorizes the dimensions of failure within the nursing environment.
While informative, neither research investigates capabilities and competencies
simultaneously. To fill this gap, we operationalize two risk management capabilities,
warning and recovery, and test empirically the antecedent competencies that enhance
organizational risk management capabilities.

In this research, we investigate whether organizations can develop behavior-based
competencies and capabilities to reduce SC risk and the resulting disruption
consequences. We specifically research competencies that improve an organization’s
structure and orientation. Structural competencies include internal integration,
information sharing, and training. These structural antecedents encourage internal
connectedness. Orientation competencies encompass a common vision, SC disruption
orientation, organizational learning, and routine rigidity. These antecedents influence the
organization’s orientation, a proxy for culture.

We also determine how organizations use risk management capabilities to
understand SC disruption. To do this, we operationalize the warning and recovery
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capability measures proposed, but never tested, by Craighead et al. (2007). Warning
capability refers to an organization’s ability to scan for and communicate information
about potential and actual SC threats (Craighead et al., 2007). When effectivley
developed, this capability should enable organizations to better identify potential and
actual SC threats. Recovery capability represents an organization’s pre-emptive and
reactive response capacity (Craighead et al. 2007). Developing these capabilities allows
practitioners to effectively position and utilize resources to speed up SC recovery.

By developing measures for warning and recovery capabilities and then
investigating how they relate to antecedent competencies and organizational
performance, we provide practitioners a new way to think about and manage SC risk.
Rather than buffering with costly resources, we advocate behavior-based risk
management tactics. These practices enhance the organization and the practitioners
running the processes, save money, and broaden the tactics used to manage supply chain
risk.

Approach

Using three essays, this research investigates (1) how to align the SC and risk
management strategies, (2) measure an organization’s warning and recovery capabilities,
and (3) develop antecedent competencies to mitigate SC disruption. This offers a
practical approach for managing SC risk, which helps reduce costs and improve the
interconnectedness and culture within an organization.

3

The first essay develops a conceptual disruption management framework that
seeks to align the probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences with an
organization’s SC strategy. We believe disruption consequences are an important
component of SC disruption that has been overlooked by previous research. Most risk
management models focus on risk sources or the cause of a disruption as part of their
strategy (e.g. Norrman and Jansson, Kleindorfer and Saad,. Knemeyer et al.'s). Since
disruptions, with a common cause, can manifest in many different ways, this approach
lacks depth. Alternatively, by focusing on disruption consequences, managers can
address many SC threats more effectively. Specifically, our model helps practitioners
select an appropriate SC strategy from four quadrants (Figure 1). The output is a risk
management strategy grounded in SC flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, agility, or
resilience. We also incorporate warning and recovery capabilities into the framework and
discuss how an organization can leverage these capabilities to improve it’s overall risk
management process.
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Figure 1: Disruption management framework
The second essay develops psychometrically valid measures for risk
warning and disruption recovery capabilities. Craighead et al. defined these capabilities
in 2007; however, no one has developed measures or a measuring instrument, as of today.
Following Noar’s (2003) validation procedures, which provides a roadmap from
literature review to validity testing, we developed new valid and reliable measures.
Evidence from this study will help practitioners understand the relationships between
four organizational orientations (common vision, SC disruption orientation,
organizational learning, routine rigidity), the proposed capabilities (warning and
recovery), and performance. (See Figure 2)
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In addition, we also test the effect of a mediating variable, information quality on
competency-capabilities relationships. This includes the direct linkage between common
vision and the warning capabilities construct (1A), the direct effect between common
vision and recovery (1B), and the indirect relationship of common vision and recovery,
which is mediated by warning capabilities (1C). Additionally, hypothesis 1D, 2C, 2D,
3C, and 3D test the moderating effect of information quality on the relationships between
the four competencies and the two risk management constructs. Practitioners can use the
new measurement tool to benchmark their own risk management capabilities and assess
the preparedness of their organization to counter a SC disruption.

Figure 2: Proposed model for dissertation essay 2
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The third essay investigates the effectiveness of structural competencies as a
method to improve internal connectedness and communication. Similar to essay 2, we
leverage Craighead et als’ definition of warning and recovery capability and test a new
model with the newly validated measures. Specifically, we develop and test a model that
examines the relationships between the three organizational competencies ( internal
integration, information sharing, and training), two risk management capabilities
(warning and recovery), and performance (Figure 3). The model is tested using data from
the healthcare industry. The healthcare industry provides an excellent research venue, as
most organizations are actively seeking ways to improve service and cut costs, especially
given that 40% of a hospital’s budget is dedicated to SC expenditures (Sweet, Hamilton,
and Willis, 2005). We also investigate a moderating relationship, which represents an
interaction between training and organizational size. Licensed beds (BEDS) is a proxy for
organization size. Hospital managers and SC professionals should use the new measures
to enhance their connectedness and improve the organization’s disruption management
capabilities.
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Figure 3: Proposed model for dissertation essay 3

In all three essays, we leverage high reliability theory (HRT) as it describes how
organizations can design and develop highly reliable supply chains to stave off accidents
and the consequences of disruption (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick &
Roberts, 1993). Unlike other operations management theories, HRT encourages
organizations to value simultaneously both safety and profitability. By studying SC risk
and SC management with this lens, we illustrate how organizations can improve their
internal competencies and organizational risk management capabilities by learning from
environmental cues and then transforming the that knowledge and existing resources into
new capabilities.
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Each essay fills a gap within the existing SC and risk management literature. Our
disruption management framework ( essay 1), provides a new perspective concerning the
mitigation of SC disruption. Existing models focus on the sources of risk or seek to
differentiate between the causes of disruptions. In 2012, Sohdi, Son, and Tang asked
researchers to clarify and seek consensus around the SC risk management definition. By
studying disruption consequences, rather than just the cause alone, we add depth to and
help clarify the SC risk management definition. In addition, Manuj and Mentzer (2008)
stated that there was limited research into risk management moderators. By conducting
research on the moderating and mediating affects within the risk management paradigm,
we fill an existing gap.
Lastly, the second and third essays investigate mediating and moderating effects.
the second and third essays provide empirical evidence about behavior-based risk
management techniques within organizations. Sohdi, Son, and Tang (2012) argue that
there is a dearth of empirical SCRM research within OM literature. Our research,
therefore, is designed to provide empirical evidence concerning the linkages between the
antecedent competencies, newly operationalized risk management capabilities, and
performance. This evidence should assist managers as they develop a more
comprehensive SC risk management strategies. Besides inventory and/or capacity, we
envision that organizations will enhance connectivity and develop the organization’s
culture as a means to combat SC risk.
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Methodology

To understand the effectiveness of the proposed behavior-based risk management
practices, we employ both exploratory and confirmatory techniques. This allows us to
triangulate our findings and improve their nomological validity. Initially, we examine
existing SC risk and risk management literature. This provides a foundation from which
we build the disruption management framework and the two structural models used
within essay 2 and 3. We also explored complementary topics including crisis
management, SC resiliency, SC agility, and disruption management. Each topic provides
insight on how to combat threats and recover once a disruption occurs.

We then used an item-to-construct sorting procedures (Q-sort) and asked
respondents to link survey questions to latent construct definitions (Menor and Roth,
2007, p 831). During the Q-sort process, respondents also indentified incomplete
definitions and misleading concepts. This process allowed us to establish construct and
face validity for the proposed models and the two survey instruments (Anastasi, 1988).
We developed questions and definitions, for each competency, capability, moderator,
mediator and performance construct.

To corroborate construct measures, the primary author then conducted interviews
with SC and risk mangement professionals. The interview protocol was discovery
oriented and focused on the appropriateness of the proposed model, construct definitions,
and survey questions. We also asked interviewees to review the survey instrument. The
primary investigator directed these interviews and asked clarifying questions. We
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recorded the interviews and made changes to the final survey instrument based on the
experts’ input.
For the confirmatory phase, we collected pilot, pretest, and two full data sets, as
suggested by Noar (2003). The primary investigator collected pilot data from professional
MBA students (evening program) and pretest data from procurement directors associated
with university hospitals. We then collected the final data set for essay #2 from
procurement professionals across industries. Data for essay #3 was collected from
material managers within US hospitals. Multiple data collections from several
demographics improves both the validity and reliability of the survey measures.

We then used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the scale’s
unidimensionality, construct reliability, and criterion validity. While most data
characteristics were within acceptable parameters, we found that data for essay #2
exhibited common method bias. This occurred because we collected only one respondent
per organization. Once identified, we controlled for this bias in subsequent analysis using
a method factor. We also found that the warning and recovery capabilities constructs
within essay #2 did not exhibit discriminant validity. Thus, we amended the conceptual
model to reflect a single multidimensional construct called disruption sensing and
response capability (See Figure 4). The new construct reflects four risk management
dimensions: scanning, communication, proactive response, and reactive recovery.
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Figure 4: Amended model for essay 2
Managerial Implications

As supply chains expand and become more complex, organizations must realize
that the probability of disruptions also increases. To offset an inevitable disruption,
managers must develop risk management tactics that lower occurrence probabilities,
reduce potential impact, and/or shorten recovery times so a SC can return to a state of
normalcy. In this study, we suggest that behavior-based risk management techniques
enable managers to embed risk management competencies and capabilities into the
organization’s culture.
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This research helps practitioners in three ways: first, by developing new measures
for warning and recovery capabilities, organizations have a method to quantitatively
measure and benchmark their SC risk management capabilities. Second, by investigating
the antecedent competencies of the warning and recovery capabilities, we help
practitioners understand how behavior-based competencies can bolster an organization’s
risk management capabilities. Specifically, we provide guidance as managers develop
both organizational orientations and internal connectedness structures. Third, by teasing
out the effects of information quality and organization size, we illustrate the importance
of moderators and mediators on competency and capability development. From this
research, we anticipate that mangers will include behavior-based competencies and
capabilities in their arsenal of SC risk management tools.

13

References
Anastasi, A. (1986). Evolving concepts of test validation. Annual review of psychology,
37(1), 1-16.
Craighead, C.W., Blackhurst, J., Rungtusanatham, M.J., R.B. Handfield. (2007). The
severity of supply chain disruptions: design characteristics and mitigation
capabilities. Decision Sciences. 38(1): 131–156.
Hendricks, K. B., & Singhal, V. R. (2005). An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Supply
Chain Disruptions on Long‐Run Stock Price Performance and Equity Risk of the
Firm. Production and Operations Management, 14(1), 35-52.
Manuj, I. and Mentzer, J.T., (2008) Global supply chain risk management strategies.
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management. 38(3):
192-223.
Menor L. J., A.V. Roth. (2007). New service development competence in retail banking:
Construct development and measurement validation. Journal of Operations
Management. 25(4): 825-846.
Noar, S. M. (2003) The role of structural equation modeling in scale development,
Structural Equation Modeling 10, pp. 622–647.
Simchi-Levi, D. (2010). Operations rules: delivering customer value through flexible
operations. The MIT Press.
Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, P., Simchi-Levi, E., (2010). Designing and managing the
supply chain. Concepts, strategies, and case studies. second ed., Boston.
Sodhi, M. S, Son, B-G, and Tang, C. S. (2012). Researchers' perspectives on supply
chainrisk management. Production and Operations Management 21(1) 1{13.
Zsidisin, G.A., (2003). A grounded definition of supply risk. Journal of Purchasing and
Supply Management 9 (5/6), 217–224.

14

INCORPORATING THE PREDICTABILITY OF CONSEQUENCES INTO A
DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Abstract
We introduce a disruption management framework that incorporates both the
probability of disruption and predictability of the resulting consequences. The resulting
model prescribes one of four supply chain strategies: flexibility, risk and loss mitigation,
agility, and resilience. We also discuss how organizations can exploit warning and
recovery capabilities to improve the selected supply chain strategy. Managers can
leverage our framework within a comprehensive risk management process to develop
tactics aligned with risk management, supply chain, and overall operating strategies to
overcome a range of disruption consequences.
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Introduction
Researchers recommend developing a risk management strategy that includes the
consequences associated with supply chain disruption (Greenberg & Cramer, 1991). Yet,
existing models focus primarily on the sources of supply chain (SC) threats. Managers
generally identify the source of a risk in the early stages of the risk management (RM)
process, which allows them to categorize threats for further assessment. This approach
fails to incorporate the consequences of disruption into either the assessment and
mitigation processes or even the broader organizational RM strategy. Hence, practitioners
should consider not only the source of a disruption, but also the resulting consequences
when evaluating SC risk.
When evaluating SC disruptions based on the predictability of the consequences,
practitioners are better able to select appropriate mitigation tactics. For instance, the
Chinese New Year holiday is a predictable SC disruption, which shuts down production
facilities for a specified period. Managers confidently select countermeasures, as they
know how and when the consequences will manifest. i.e. the organization can reasonably
estimate inventory shortages. Early shipments and temporary inventory buffers are
logical and financially prudent. This strategy is preferred, as it will generally cost less to
fund preventative countermeasures, rather than responding to the disruption afterwards.
On the other hand, a hurricane (risk source) is unpredictable because it is difficult
to articulate when a storm will appear or where it will actually make landfall. Further, a
hurricane can manifest into a Katrina-type disaster (category 4), or alternatively a
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category-one storm, with little aftereffect. Experts need to understand wind intensity,
expected rainfall, and the inland storm surge, before assessing these risk sources. Yet,
consequences of different grades of hurricanes can be better calculated. i.e. insurance
companies are able to predict the probability of loss for various hurricane types.
There are also situations where consequences overlap or stem from multiple
sources of risk. For example, a machine may shut down due to a shortage of raw
materials, a break in the electrical current, or a component within the machine actually
failing. In this case, vendor failure, an electrical outage, and component breakage are the
sources of a risk, while the machine shutting down is the actual consequence. The
consequence is predictable, because practitioners can determine the time between failures
and the time associated with repair (e.g. mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-time-torepair (MTTR)). With this knowledge, managers are able to identify countermeasures,
such as inventory or redundant capacity, which keeps the production line up and running.
This also streamlines the RM process, because one safeguard, rather than three, can
mitigate the consequence of a disruption.
Existing RM frameworks emphasize risk identification, probability assessment,
countermeasure evaluation, and countermeasure deployment (Knemeyer, Zinn & Eroglu.
2009). Researchers design these models to balance the probable losses of an identified
threat with the financial costs of countermeasures. To compute potential losses,
assessment algorithms multiply the probability of disruption by the loss estimates of a
corresponding SC disruption. With this equation, the annual losses associated with
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frequent minor disruptions can theoretically equal the losses of a low
probability/infrequent disruption with severe consequences.
Our framework accounts for the predictability of consequences, so practitioners
can better understand the manifestations of a SC threat. We propose a disruption
management framework that evaluates the probability of disruption and the predictability
of consequences, to prescribe a SC strategy that fits best with the risk characteristics of
disruption threats faced. We also incorporate warning and recovery capabilities into the
framework and discuss how to leverage these capabilities to improve an organization’s
comprehensive RM process. When taken together, practitioners can use our framework to
align the organization's SC, RM, and overall operating strategies.
After reviewing existing supply chain risk management (SCRM) frameworks, we
find three gaps worth investigating. To address these deficiencies, this article proceeds in
the following manner. First, we review the dimensions of existing SCRM frameworks.
We appraise the seminal RM frameworks to understand their contributions and limitation.
This includes defining and assessing the four key terms relevant to most RM models: risk
identification, assessment, mitigation, and responsiveness. Second, we introduce our own
disruption management framework, which includes both the probability of disruption and
the predictability of consequences. We discuss four SC strategies: supply chain flexibility,
risk and loss mitigation, agility, and resilience. We illustrate the utility and advantages of
our framework through representative examples. Third, we discuss how warning and
recovery capabilities support the SC strategies derived from our model. This includes a
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discussion on how our framework addresses the gaps identified within the SC and RM
literature. After reviewing the appropriate gaps, we predict how managers may use our
model to mitigate SC risk, whereby consequence assessment versus risk cause
assessment, can help organizations save money, reduce inventory levels, as well as
induce better preparation for SC disruptions.

Key Contributions of Existing Supply Chain Risk Management Frameworks
When reviewing current SC risk and business continuity planning (BCP)
frameworks, we find five key contributions to be particularly informative. Together, these
models delineate areas important to models of risk preparation, impact reduction,
developing SC partners, BCP, and response best practices. We illustrate the contribution
of each model, as well as highlight how each alone might leave a gap because they focus
on the sources of SC risk rather than disruption consequences. Accordingly, we provide
our model, predicated on the latter later in this paper.
To start, Norrman and Jansson (2004) offer a framework that advocates a
proactive RM process. This suggests that organizations develop a RM process before the
actual disruption occurs. In their research, Ericson, a Swedish telecom company,
develops a multi-step process that combines risk identification, assessment, treatment,
monitoring, incident handling, and contingency planning. Utilizing this framework,
Ericsson has been able to improve communications with its supply base during both
preparation and post incident stages. While, we embrace the proactive nature of this
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model, it focuses on the cause or sources of risk (Norrman and Jansson, 2004, p 438). By
adding a step that proactively assesses disruption consequences, managers can develop
specialized RM tactics. We expect both mitigation and response activities to be different
for a category 1 versus a category 5 hurricane.
Next, Kleindorfer and Saad (2005), in one of the most cited RM models,
describe two risk categories: risks associated with the uncertainty of supply and demand
coordination and risks linked to events such as terrorism and natural disasters. Within this
model, they propose that organizations engage in a two-front battle when managing SC
risk. First, managers should work to reduce the frequency and severity of all types of SC
risk. Second, both the organization and its SC partners need to improve their capacity to
handle uncertainty. This represents a call to arms, which demands that organizations
focus on the entire SC, not just their own facilities. However, the first step of their SAM
model (S)pecifies that manager should seek out risk sources and vulnerabilities by
thinking about operational contingencies, natural hazards, and events such as political
instability and terrorism (p 54).
By incorporating, a process to identify how consequences manifest themselves,
we argue that managers could improve the SAM model. For example, Kleindorfer and
Saad use the August 14, 2003 grid blackout as an example of an equipment failure. We
believe that an organization, along with its SC partners, would prepare for a large-scale
blackout, like the August 14 event, much differently that they would a small transistor
that knocks out the electricity for a single building. The only way to (A)ssess and

20

(M)itigate (the last two steps of the SAM process) these differences is to discuss different
disruption manifestations. We put forth, that mangers can improve the overall SAM
process by assessing the consequences associated with a SC disruption.
Third, Handfield, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Craighead (2008) compare
executive responses to benchmark risk and mitigation practices. By studying the actions
taken during actual disruptions, the authors identify best practices to manage and mitigate
threats. Their key takeaway is that organizations may have to redesign the SC or pursue
external partnerships to overcome certain risks.
While the Handfield’s. framework focuses on discovering pinch points where a
SC disruption could occur, it does not call out either the source or the consequences of a
SC disruption. Specifically, the article urges managers to screen for vulnerabilities and
then quantify an organization’s level of SC risk. What is interesting is that within the
formula for SC risk are parameters for revenue loss and the cost to stabilize the SC
disruption. We assert that managers will need to understand the consequences associated
with a SC disruption in order to generate these estimates. For example, the revenue loss
estimates for a category 5 hurricane should be significantly higher than for a category 1
storm. By including a step to screen for disruption consequences, managers should be
better informed when attempting to quantify the level of risk for a specific SC node.
Fourth, the Knemeyer et al. (2009) catastrophic risk framework encourages
organizations to manage disruption even when they have low occurrence probabilities.
Their work offers insight into implementation issues and suggests five alternative
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approaches to countermeasure selection (1) assume the risk, (2) purchase insurance to
offset the potential losses, (3) dependency reduction, (4) invest in a location to minimize
the consequence of disruption, or (5) relocation of targeted facilities. This framework
contributes to our understanding of RM by considering low probability threats.
Within this process, Knemeyer and colleagues argue that managers need to
initially identify the location of potential threats” (p 147) and then estimate the
probability and dollar loss associated with a location-disruption combination. Managers
should discuss potential disruption consequences during the identification process to
improve their estimation process. This can be achieved by working through possible
consequence scenarios early in the assessment process.
Finally, Zsidisin, Melnyk, and Ragatz (2005) offer a framework to helps
practitioners develop business continuity plans (BCP) as a mechanism to manage
catastrophic risks. The authors draw from case studies and build a BCP framework by
thinking about low probability and difficult to predict events. Key to this article is that
practitioners should create awareness towards risk and threat prevention within the
organization. Stated differently, managers can develop organizational countermeasures,
competencies and capabilities, to mitigate catastrophic supply risks.
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Dimensions of a Supply Chain Risk Management Framework
While the above models use a number of different categories in their RM models,
there are essentially four common elements within existing RM frameworks: risk
identification, assessment, mitigation, and responsiveness (Sodhi, Son, and Tang, 2012).
In their conclusion, Sodhi and colleagues suggest that organizations should incorporate
these steps into any comprehensive RM process. Accordingly, we provide a more
detailed review of each term as it is typically defined and applied by SC practitioners, and
the possible limitations of such applications. Whereby, in contrast, a model predicated on
disruption consequences, our model, might fill the gap the standard risk-source
predicated model leaves.

Risk Identification
During the initial step within most RM processes, the management team identifies
a list of threats or sources of risk, which they believe threaten the supply chain, i.e., risk
identification. This includes risks such as machine breakdowns, vendor failures, labor
strikes, fires, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Practitioners should use the risk
identification step to identify potential threats to their organization and extended SC. In
order to improve the identification process, risk-mapping methods such as event tree
analysis and fault tree analysis are available (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). However,
generally speaking, identifying risks is difficult, and therefore, managers avoid making
decisions about risky events when possible. Bounded rationality describes how humans
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employ simple models to make decisions when unclear or unfamiliar information is
present. This is the case, since the managers involved throughout the identification
process tend not identify risks proactively, logically they may also not foresee or
comprehend the consequence associated with a SC disruption.
We envision the risk identification step alternatively. To populate our disruption
management framework, team members, should identify both the source of and the
consequences associated with a SC disruption. For example, the management team may
identify a logistic provider’s labor issues (possible Fed Ex strike) as a potential threat. In
this case, the source of the disruption is the labor issue, while the resulting consequence
is the lack of overnight transportation services. By including information about the
resulting consequences, managers can utilize our disruption management framework and
select an appropriate SC strategy that complements the resulting mitigation tactics. We
believe this qualitative process benefits from brainstorming sessions and SC disruption
experience. The outcome of this initial step is list of risk sources and consequences that
the RM team believes can threaten the organization’s SC. With a broad list of SC threats
and potential consequences, practitioners have the information necessary when working
through the balance of the RM process.

Assessment
Traditionally, the next step in RM includes assessment, whereby managers
analyze information about threats identified in the first portion of the RM process and

24

create a priority ranking based on their understanding of the probabilities and disruption
likelihood. Regardless of how robust an assessment process is, organizations typically
attend to only the low-impact, recurrent risks and ignore catastrophic events with low
probabilities (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004). This occurs, because the individuals participating
in the assessment process struggle to envision or understand the probabilities associated
with ambiguous risks. Stated differently, managers are reluctant to utilize objective data
such as probability estimates to evaluate infrequent risks. In addition, there is also
evidence that the RM process itself may push managers towards a conservative tack.
Barth (2010), for example, identifies several barriers to risk assessment, including a lack
of resources and the management’s reluctance to invest in events that may never
materialize. Further, when analyzing the statistical probabilities associated with a
disruption event, most practitioners have been trained (in a good number of basic
statistics and Master of Business Administration (MBA) classes) to remove outliers from
the analysis.
To overcome the conservative bias, some organizations use a catastrophic risk
management matrix (Figure 1) to assess the probability of a disruption event (Knemeyer
et al., 2009). Frameworks such as these are important because not considering
catastrophic risk creates a host of issues within the assessment process. Consider for
example 100-year floods. Generally, managers will exclude these outliers from a
comprehensive flood-plain analysis and bias the probability estimates.
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Figure 1: Catastrophic Risk Management Matrix – Adopted from Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu,
2009

We recommend a revision of the assessment step that introduces a more
calculable predication of disruption consequences. We argue that such a model is more
effective in preparing organizations for all types of risks, but also eliminates the more
difficult mathematics of risk probability (consequence size assessment is simply easier as
it is more predicatble), and in turn, risk assessment improves, saving the organization
money overall. Using our framework, practitioners evaluate the consequences associated
with a SC disruption scenario and then create a priority list. Practitioners should exploit
the assessment process to evaluate how an identified risk will affect an organization and
the extended SC (Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004). Initially, information feeds
a quantitative analysis process and provides probability estimates on the frequency and
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impact of various disruptions. Only then can topic experts superimpose qualitative
information into the analysis process to improve understanding.
Managers assess the predictability of the resulting consequences along with the
probability of occurrence. With these dimensions, the assessment team can draw different
conclusions than they would with a traditional framework that focuses on the cause of a
SC disruption. For example, a traditional analysis will consider a financially unstable
vendor to be a significant source of risk. In addition, if the vendor happens to be a large,
by either volume or dollar spend, the analysis team will assign a large
impact/vulnerability factor and further increase the threat priority. However, with our
framework, the assessment team teases out the predictability of the consequences and can
theoretically draw different conclusions. Using the example of a financially unstable
vendor, the consequence associated with the threat is the shortage of specific raw
materials, not the vendor’s financial instability. It is predictable, because the focal
organization can specify the items and quantity needed. With this new information,
managers are able to reduce the level of uncertainty and the priority ranking associated
with a specific SC consequence. In addition, information about the resulting
consequences should make future decisions about countermeasures and mitigation tactics
easier to comprehend. Specifically, a backup supplier could be qualified. By identifying
the consequences associated with a SC threat rather than just a broad risk cause,
practitioners should be better able to understand SC risk. This occurs as practitioners
think about previous SC experiences and develop a SC disruption orientation.
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Mitigation
The third step common to existing RM processes is the mitigation procedure,
which practitioners employ to evaluate the functionality and cost associated with risk
reducing or recovery efforts, including countermeasure evaluation and selection. For
example, when the RM team has prioritized quality issues of a specific supplier, it has a
number of options to address the risk source.
1. The focal organization can incentivize the supplier to inspect 100% of all
outbound shipments.
2. The receiving organization can sample and inspect a percentage (<100%) of
all inbound shipments from the failing vendor.
3. The focal organization and supplier can work together and develop a better
production system at an alternative location.
4. Qualify and employ an alternate vendor.
While not a complete list of alternatives, the objective is to evaluate various safeguards to
determine if any are an appropriate method to mitigate the prioritized risk source. Below
we discuss various mitigation tactics: operational, financial, and organizational
countermeasures.
Operational countermeasures, such as inventory buffers and redundant capacity,
allow organizations to offset the impact of many categories of disruption. Most
practitioners and academics consider operational tactics appropriate when risks and
decisions about the various options are understandable. Research indicates that
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operational countermeasures facilitate mitigation of catastrophic risks when both the
probability of disruption and the estimated losses are high (Knemeyer et al., 2009). (e.g.
The American Red Cross prepositions drinking water and medical supplies before large
hurricanes make landfall) Such mitigation tactics are appropriate and commonplace
within many industries.
Second, financial countermeasures specify monetary compensation for lost sales
resulting from a SC disruption. Within the agriculture industry, farmers regularly
purchase crop insurance to guarantee revenues against wind and hail damage. While less
common than operational countermeasures, financial mitigation techniques provide
insurance within certain contexts.
Third, RM experts argue that certain organizational practices may be useful as
mitigation techniques (Simchi-Levi, 2010). This strategy suggests incorporating a SC
disruption orientation into daily work routines and purposefully aligning an
organization’s business and RM strategies. For instance, a recent study found the use of
training, quality certification programs, and long-term alliances helped reduce supply
uncertainty within purchasing organizations (Smeltzer & Siferd, 1998). By employing
organizational countermeasures, executives are able enrich their organization by
developing internal competencies and external capabilities, rather than investing in RM
countermeasures that may never be used.
We recommend that risk managers should evaluate each mitigation tactic to
determine its utility as a risk-reducing mechanism against both the risks and
consequences evaluated in the assessment step. We argue the mitigation phase needs to
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be robust enough for use with both major and minor disruption scenarios and allow
practitioners to mitigate various threats with three types of countermeasures: operational,
financial, or organizational.
Using our proposed methodology, practitioners should evaluate each ranked
consequence against the disruption management framework. For example, a manager
would categorize a disruption such as a machine breakdown (risk source)/line down
(consequence) in the risk and loss mitigation quadrant because both the probability of
occurrence and the predictability of the consequences are high. After categorizing the
various threats, practitioners may address the risks and consequences individually or as a
group. For example, if seven out of ten threats align with the agility quadrant, managers
may assess and select a mitigation strategy simultaneously for the subgroup of seven.
Grouping threats by consequential outcome allows mangers to identify generic
countermeasures that are applicable to multiple disruption scenarios. This would include
countermeasures such as a command center, satellite phones, or robust emergency
response protocols.
We expect that most organizations will have ranked consequences that fall into
multiple quadrants within our framework. When this occurs, managers should adopt
multiple SC strategies. For example, safety stock can offset regular power outages, while
production flexibility can mitigate scenarios such as floods. Production lines, locations,
or divisions within a company may require separate SC strategies. Further, in some case a
single facility may require multiples strategies.
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Responsiveness
In a typical risk management process Response or Responsiveness represents the
last step, during which organizations develop methods to respond to disruptions once
they occur and to reduce the amount of time the supply chain is affected (Sodhi et al.,
2012; ). Practitioners use responsiveness or response capabilities to coordinate and
deploy resources to overcome the slowing or stoppage of operations (Craighead,
Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). As an illustration, switching from
foreign to local suppliers, when a disruption has slowed the SC, allows organizations to
move, raw materials quickly into production and reinstate operations. Some companies
do not develop their recovery capabilities proactively, because they do not plan for SC
consequence, but instead only focus on risk sources, and thereby oversee the options in
terms of consequence response.
Consequently, we agree that when organizations develop their response
capabilities, they should be able to reduce the amount of downtime due to a disruption.
Utilizing our framework, the RM team will have explained the various disruption sources
and consequences in detail. Practitioners then can utilize our enhanced disruption
management framework to choose an appropriate SC strategy that is directly based on the
probabilities and resulting consequences of various disruption scenarios. Therefore,
respondents can develop procedures in advance and refine them with practice and
feedback. For example, when employing a strategy of SC flexibility, organizations must
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learn how to move production capabilities between locations. Practitioners can practice
change-outs (movement between lines) to determine the most cost effective and efficient
method.
After reviewing the four key steps found within most RM processes along with
the contributions of seminal articles covering SC risk and BCP, we propose a model to
manage and mitigate SC disruption risk. In particular, our framework investigates how
the predictability of consequences affects the supply chain strategy utilized to offset
disruption risk. Adding this dimension to a RM framework is important, because, while
the sources of a risk may be predictable based on available probability estimates, the
variation associated with the consequences may render specific mitigation tactics
ineffective. For example, the United States Army Corps of Engineers built levees around
New Orleans based on the size of potential hurricanes (risk source), not the tidal surge
(disruption consequence). With insight into the consequences of flooding, the Corps of
Engineers may have developed a different disruption management strategy.

Disruption Management Framework
We introduce a disruption management framework that incorporates both the
probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences (Figure 2). While the
probability of disruption is standard amongst many RM models, the predictability of
disruption consequences (vertical axis) represents the inherent variation of consequences
that result from a SC disruption. By incorporating these two dimensions within a single
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framework, we evolve the conventional RM model and encourage practitioners to learn
about the manifestations of a SC disruption and then incorporate that perspective into
future countermeasure selection and mitigation processes.
Managers can then navigate between the two dimensions (probability of
disruption and the predictability of consequences) and select one of four SC strategies:
supply chain flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, supply chain resilience, and supply
chain agility.

Figure 2: Proposed disruption management framework.
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Supply Chain Flexibility
Supply chain flexibility explains how organizations react and change the direction
of operations without affecting (or minimally affecting) the amount of time, effort, or
performance required (Upton, 1994). This definition suggests that practitioners can
quickly reconfigure SC to support new offerings, partnerships, and market demands.
In our model, the upper left quadrant of our framework reflects scenarios where
the probability of disruption is low and the predictability of the resulting consequences is
high. Examples of such disruptions sources include a flood or the failure of a commodityproviding vendor. Both events result in consequences such as the closing of a distribution
center or the shortage of key components. When the probability of disruption is low,
practitioners regularly take a conservative tact towards RM and may avoid making
decisions about mitigation tactics. Committing resources to offset infrequent events is
inherently risky from a financial perspective. There is a good chance that managers are
wasting both time and money to assess and deploy countermeasures, since the mitigating
resources may never be used.
However, because managers can predict the consequences of disruption,
organizations are able to develop flexible back-up systems that engage only when
needed. In a situation such as a flood (risk source), managers are able to accurately
discern the consequences to an organization’s supply chain. For example, if flooding is a
concern for a production facility, the resulting consequence is that production may have
to cease if a flood occurs. Likewise, if flooding is a concern for a distribution center then
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trucks will be unable to pick up products and deliver them to customers. In both
situations, the consequences are predictable, that is specific items will be unavailable for
a limited amount of time (we assume that most floods are short-term events). With this
knowledge, managers can build flexibility into the SC and maintain a smooth flow of
goods. Research has shown that a small amount of flexibility helps the SC garner much
of the benefits of 100% flexibility (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2009). Honda does this by
building the Civic at their Alliston, Ontario and East Liberty, Ohio production plants
(Niedermeyer, 2008). Even if one of the locations is more economical, the redundancy
allows Honda to protect the production capabilities of one of their best selling
automobiles.
The failure of a commodity supplier is also a type of disruption suitably addressed
by SC flexibility. In this situation, the probability of failure is lower for a commodity
supplier than for an innovative supplier, yet the consequences associated with the
disruption are more predictable. That is, practitioners need to replace commodity
products. When the focal firm creates SC flexibility, by qualifying alternate vendors, it is
able to regain quickly a smooth flow of the part.
Demand shaping represents a marketing driven form of flexibility used to offset
the consequences of a SC disruption. Specifically, when an organization runs short of
inventory, customer service representatives incentivize customers towards the
manufacturers’ interests. Computer companies, for instance, will offer a deal on an
alternate component, such as a larger hard drive, rather than pushing the delivery date
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out. Following this logic, we argue that flexibility is the best strategy for SC facing a low
probability of disruption and a high predictability of the consequences. The practitioner’s
conservative stance towards mitigation changes when the predictability of the disruption
consequences is included within the risk evaluation process. As managers are able to
better discern how the SC will be impacted by a disruption, they can justify investing in
certain countermeasures, such as flexibility, with relative confidence.

Risk and Loss Mitigation
(Knemeyer et al., 2009) used the term risk and loss mitigation to describe
activities designed to mitigate catastrophic disruptions. While we like this application, we
also believe that risk and loss mitigation tactics are appropriate for less severe SC
disruptions. There is precedence within the RM literature that supports mitigating threats
with lower probabilities. Norrman and Jansson (2004) affirm that mitigation is
appropriate when the degree of risk is “medium” or “high," not just “very high.” The
elevated probabilities imply that the disruptions and the resulting consequences occur
frequently enough to establish probability estimates. Disruptions such as machine
breakdowns, power outages, and raw material shortages have predictable consequences
within an organization’s SC.
We advocate the risk and loss mitigation strategy when both the probability of
disruption and the predictability of the consequence are high. We argue, however, that
this mitigation strategy is also applicable to minor disruptions such as erratic demand. To
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address these frequently occurring and highly predictable situations, we suggest that
organizations need to adopt a SCRM process that encourages managers to collect and
analyze previous disruption data. Accordingly, our framework’s upper right quadrant
characterizes situations where both the probability of disruption and the predictability of
the resulting consequences are high. Because the probability of disruption is high,
information and frequency data about disruptions is available. Therefore, managers can
evaluate various safeguards (e.g. inventory and/or redundant capacity) and choose
countermeasures that support the organization’s risk management strategy. In addition,
since managers can better predict how the consequences will manifest, they can
confidently choose the types and quantities of specific countermeasures’. In the case of a
machine breakdown, information about uptime and downtime allows practitioners to
calculate appropriate buffer levels, which enable machines to achieve both service level
and production cost targets. Many SC textbooks offer strategies to establish exact safety
stock targets (Bowersox, Closs & Cooper, 2002). With a SC strategy focused on risk and
loss mitigation, an organization is able to address various threats as well as consequences
and develop a highly efficient system simultaneously. Thereby, managers can change the
way we prepare for frequently occurring disruptions.

Supply Chain Agility
Supply chain agility refers to “the ability to cope with unexpected challenges, to
survive unprecedented environmental threats, and to take advantage of changes as
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opportunities.” (Sharifi & Zhang, 1999). From the RM paradigm, organizations should
use SC agility to cope and adapt to environmental changes created because of a SC
disruption. We suggest that when operating in the agility paradigm, managers should
account for disruption consequences. Although, the consequences of disruptions are also
unpredictable, taking them into account means forcing organizations to design systems
and processes so they can be amended when the environment changes. Furthermore,
training activities should empower and encourage employees to adjust systems and
amend processes when necessary.
Therefore, we recommend that SC agility is an appropriate strategy when the
probability of disruption is high and the predictability of consequences is low. An
unplanned information technology (IT) outage represents a risk source, while
email/communication interruptions, delayed orders, and poor customer service are the
resultant consequences. When the probability of disruption is high, practitioners
confidently commit resources to offset specific disruption consequences, since
information about the frequently occurring events is readily available. Frequency data
enables managers to evaluate the costs and benefits of specific safeguards.
To address these unpredictable consequences, we also argue that organization
should invest in generic countermeasures and organizational adaptation capabilities.
Backup generators and redundant communication systems are generic safeguards, while
practices such as integration and cross training enhance adaptation capabilities. Dell
Computer uses integration to connect with customers and learn about their needs rather
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than invest in redundant inventory (Magretta, 1998). Integration, by way of agility,
allows organizations to link with partners and learn about customer needs from the
relationship.

Supply Chain Resilience
The lower left quadrant of our framework exemplifies situations where both the
probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences are low. Cyber attacks,
mad cow disease, and terrorist attacks are examples of rare unforeseeable risks that can
decimate an organization or negatively affect an entire industry. In these situations, it is
difficult to predict any sort of resulting consequence (try to identify the consequences of
the 9/11 terrorist attack).
To address these unforeseeable and unpredictable consequences, experts suggest
that organizations engage in a high level of cooperation and collaboration, i.e., to share
risks with other SC partners (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Such partners might include
government agencies and direct competitors, not just suppliers and customers. In 2008,
when the craft brew industry faced a worldwide shortage of hops (a main ingredient used
in beer production), the Boston Beer Company established a hop sharing program,
whereby the company sold hops at cost to the competition(Kroph, 2011). This
collaborative relationship supported a budding industry through a potentially devastating
period.
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When both the probability of disruption and the predictability of the resulting
consequences are low, mitigation evaluation techniques fail, as costs will likely surpass
any perceived benefits. Therefore, managers will rarely invest in inventory buffers or
redundant capacity, since the safeguards may never be used. We believe both the low
occurrence probabilities and consequence unpredictability will undermine practitioner’s
decision confidence.
Recent literature suggests that SC resilience may be the appropriate methodology
to address unforeseeable risks, as traditional RM techniques struggle to deal with hard to
predict vulnerabilities (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). To illustrate, during a cyber
attack, an organization may have to muster both internal employees and external
contractors to restore a severely damaged SC. Resilience is the appropriate approach
since managers may not understand where or how to deploy countermeasures
(proactively or reactively) within the supply chain.
Following this logic, we assert that SC resilience is a preferred strategy when both
the probability of disruption and the predictability of consequences are low. The term
resilience reflects the ability of a SC to bounce back or quickly adapt to a new standard
after a disruption (Rice & Sheffi, 2004). The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that
damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor constitutes such a disaster that wreaked
havoc for numerous supply chains. Resiliency is favored since these types of disruption
will occur infrequently and when they do, it is difficult to predict the effect of the
resulting consequences. The disruption characteristics, both infrequent occurrences and
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uncertain consequences, create a dearth of information about how to mitigate these
disruptions. To address, we argue that managers should develop organizational
countermeasure and incorporate a RM perspective into daily work activities. An
orientation towards disruption prevention and recovery, prepares employees for the
unknown. By purposefully aligning the business and RM strategies, the organization can
reinvent itself around its core values (Christopher & Peck, 2004).

Discussion
Turbo-Charging the Disruption Management Framework: Warning and Recovery
Capabilities
To improve the fit between the recommended SC strategy and the organization’s
overall RM policy, we suggest leveraging warning and recovery capabilities to
complement our framework’s prescribed SC strategy. Warning and recovery are two risk
management capabilities that enable an organization to mitigate the impact of a
disruption, altogether eliminate a threat, or potentially capitalize on opportunities that
develop because of a SC disruption (Craighead et al., 2007).

Warning Capabilities
Warning capabilities represent the ability both to identify a threat and to
communicate information about potential or actual disruptions to appropriate parties
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(Craighead et al., 2007). Each dimension, identification and communication, requires
specific resources and practices to enable the capability. Identification involves scanning
the horizon for the sources of a risk or the consequences resulting from a disruption. In
certain circumstances, practitioners can identify threats months or years in advance. For
example, most organizations that import goods from China are aware of and have plans
to mitigate the effects of the 2-week long national Spring Festival (Chinese New Year).
The dates of this annual event are set in advance allowing practitioners to plan around
this disruption. When an extended warning period is present, existing RM frameworks
perform well.
However, other threats, such as a hurricane, are identifiable only days in advance,
if at all. The real test for an organization’s identification acumen is to recognize a threat
and its consequences before the disruption occurs. In December 2009, several US airlines
identified a winter storm (risk source) that threatened the holiday travel season. In this
case, identifying the threat a few days in advance provided the airlines additional time to
assess the situation and devise an appropriate mitigation strategy.
In the best-case scenario, organizations develop identification (identify) abilities
that allow them to categorize risks and consequences before they happen. To increase the
amount of time between identification and disruption, practitioners must identify threats
early by scanning the SC horizon for potential sources of risk. A longer warning period
provides organizations the opportunity to address, in many cases, both the sources and
consequences of a SC disruption. Alternatively, in the worst-case scenario, an
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organization discovers a disruption after it occurs. This is the reality when organizations
cannot preemptively identify disruptions such as a fire or an earthquake. In this situation,
the best possible outcome is to detect the consequences of disruption immediately after it
occurs. Stated differently, the best the organization can do is to shorten the time between
when a disruption occurs and when someone detects it. Advanced detection capabilities
allow an organization time to mitigate the consequences of disruption. Businesses, for
instance, can monitor the bond rating and stock market price of suppliers to determine the
risk of bankruptcy. If managers predict that a supplier has financial difficulty, alternative
vendors can be qualified and selected before the consequences of an actual disruption
affects the SC or its partners.
The second dimension associated with warning capabilities is the ability to
disseminate information (communicate) about a potential threat or the consequences of an
actual disruption to all affected parties. Risk managers must communicate information so
internal and external partners can understand the context of a disruption and initiate
response activities. Internally, organizations need processes and linkages that
communicate decisions about credible threats and mitigating actions to others within the
organization. The objective is to ensure that all employees are working towards the same
goal.
Organizations must also be capable of disseminating information about credible
threats and action plans to customers and external partners. Using the airline/winter storm
illustration from above as an example, most major carriers flying to the region waived
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ticket change fees for customers potentially affected by the storm. In this situation, the
airlines communicated their intentions through postings on their website, network
television announcements, and direct email notifications, when feasible. This allowed
customers to adjust travel plans before the storm actually manifested.
Further, regulatory and other governmental agencies may also require attention
during certain SC disruption. Organizations may need additional resources and
communication processes in place to ensure compliance when the law mandates a
product recall or some such specific action.
By developing appropriate scanning and communication abilities, an organization
can enhance its warning capabilities, which reduces the time it take to address properly
the consequences of a SC disruption. Within the context, we believe that enhanced
warning capabilities, will improve all four SC strategies recommended by our disruption
management framework. Scanning provides information so managers can quickly make
decisions about response activities. Then once a decision has been made, communication
abilities allow managers to communicate with practitioners responsible for mitigation and
recovery.

Recovery Capabilities
Recovery capabilities are either pre-emptive or reactive interventions designed
to return the SC to normal (Craighead et al., 2007). Normal refers to pre-disruption levels
where additional personal and resources are no longer required or when managers
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reconstitute operations into a new steady state. Pre-emptive recovery happens before
consequences actually manifest. For example, in 2002, a labor issue halted operations at
29 west coast ports. When Dell’s management concluded that the port closings were
imminent (risk source), the company’s logistics team chartered eighteen 747-jet liners.
Because Dell reacted earlier than its competitors, the company kept its SC moving at a
cost lower than organizations that did not react as quickly (Breen, 2004. Accordingly,
pre-emptive recovery efforts allow organizations, like Dell, to mitigate disruption
consequences.
Reactive recovery occurs after a SC disruption actually occurs. A good example
of this is when, in March 2000, a small fire (risk source) and the resulting smoke and
water damage (consequences) shut down a plant that supplied microchips to both
Ericsson and Nokia (Norrman & Jansson, 2004). Nokia immediately contracted with
alternate vendors and began re-engineering efforts to accommodate substitute chips.
Ericsson, adopting a different strategy, accepted vendor guarantees that the fire would not
disrupt shipments. Consequently, Nokia was able to minimize the consequence of the SC
disruption and return to a steady state. Ericsson, however, was devastated and could not
return to normal for many months. Here, reactive recovery capabilities enabled Nokia, in
contrast to Ericsson, to assess the disruption scenario and develop a recovery strategy
minimizing the consequence.
When practitioners develop outstanding reactive recovery capabilities, an
organization can quickly activate and deploy resources immediately after a disruption
occurs. Moreover, managers, in some case, may be able to initiate response efforts before
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consequences actually manifest. By deploying the appropriate recovery capabilities,
managers can potentially reduce the time between the actual disruption and full recovery.

Warning and Recovery Timeline
To illustrate how warning and recovery capabilities operate within the RM
continuum we introduce a disruption event timeline (Figure 3). The warning window is
the period between when practitioners authenticate a credible threat and when the
disruption occurs. By identifying threats earlier, organizations can increase the warning
window. This will extend the opportunity to address the sources of risk and/or respond to
the consequences of disruption.

Figure 3: Disruption Event Timeline
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We note that, in certain circumstances, there may be no warning window. For
example, in March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck Japan. In this case, there was
no warning and hence no warning window. Furthermore, an organization may fail to
identify a threat altogether. Similar to the situation above, there will be no warning
window as no one can authenticate the threat before it occurs. In such scenarios, the only
option available to the organization is recovery.
Alternately, we define the recovery window as the time between when the
disruption occurs and when practitioners achieve full recovery. Full recovery is the
threshold where the organization’s operations return to pre-disruption levels or aligns to a
new normal.
We argue that when an organization develops outstanding recovery capabilities, it
can quickly activate and deploy resources after a SC disruption occurs. Managers, in
certain situations, may be able to deploy resources before the consequences of disruption
manifest. In this case, pre-emptive recovery capabilities allow managers to ready
resources and mitigate the consequential affects of a disruption. Further, when
practitioners are unable to muster recovery resources before a disruption event, they can
deploy them immediately following. By positioning the appropriate recovery resources
and protocols, the organization can potentially reduce the time between when an actual
disruption event occurs and when achieving full recovery. Both pre-emptive and reactive
response activities allow organizations to reduce the size of the recovery window.
Hendricks and Singhal (2003 & 2005) have shown that SC disruptions can negatively
affect organizations by up to 40% and linger for years. By developing recovery
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capabilities, managers may be able to show that they quickly returned SC operations to
normal. Hence, they may be able to lessen the disruptions financial impact.

Enhancing the Chosen Supply Chain Strategy with Warning and Recovery
Capabilities
We suggest that managers use our disruption management framework to select
one of four SC strategies: supply chain flexibility, risk and loss mitigation, supply chain
resilience, and supply chain agility. We now describe how managers can enhance their
SC and RM strategies by developing an organization’s warning and recovery capabilities.

Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Flexibility
In the SC flexibility paradigm, organizations face a situation where the probability
of disruption is low and the predictability of consequences is high. This suggests that
disruptions are infrequent events, yet managers have a good understanding of the
resulting consequences. Previously, we indicated that organizations enable SC flexibility
by building alternative states into the production and service systems. This is possible,
because the consequences of disruption are predictable, and therefore managers can
confidently develop redundant capabilities.
Additionally, since the probability of occurrence is low, organizations will prefer
to invest in redundancy across the SC, rather than costly buffers such as inventory. This
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is the case, since the probability of utilizing the buffer is low enough to undermine any
cost/benefit analysis.
Warning capabilities provide organizations a method to identify and categorize
infrequent disruptions/consequences. Practitioners scan reports and the SC horizon for
warning signals indicating that threat is building or an actual disruption has occurred.
Additionally, recovery capabilities, allow the organization to switch production capacity
via standard processes with little loss of time, cost, or performance. Organizations rely on
pre-emptive recovery practices to optimize the activities associated with moving
resources between various states when an actual disruption occurs. Together, both
warning and recovery capabilities strengthen the effectiveness of the flexibility strategy
to counter infrequent disruptions with predictable consequences.

Warning and Recovery with Risk and Loss Mitigation
When the probability of disruptions is high and the resulting consequences are
predictable, our framework recommends a strategy of risk and loss mitigation. In this
state, both warning and recovery capabilities allow organizations to mitigate the effects
of a disruption and reduce the amount of time needed for the SC to return to normal.
Scanning activities such as exception reports provide warning signals specific to potential
risk sources and actual disruption consequences. These reports act as alerts for out of
control conditions and function like a statistical process control system. When warning
signals are unavailable, after-action reports and post mortems provide necessary
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information to improve pre-emptive and reactive recovery efforts. These practices allow
practitioners to accumulate and understand data on the sources of disruption and their
resulting consequences. The frequency data and corresponding probability estimates of
various consequential scenarios allow managers to make investment decisions about
countermeasures and response protocols.
Further, detecting disruption signals is not difficult, due to the relative stability of
various threats and consequences. Manager can tune sensing system to recognize specific
warning signals in both pre- and post-disruption identification scenarios. For example,
the organization can use exception reports and regularly scheduled teleconferences to
identify delivery issues with troublesome vendors.
Recovery capabilities reflect the organization’s ability to utilize resources and
lessen the impact of a disruption and/or reduce the amount of time the SC is affected.
Pre-emptive recovery allows the organization to position inventory at predetermined
levels before disruption consequences manifest. For example, companies regularly shut
down machines to clean and perform maintenance. By pre-positioning buffer inventory,
organizations can maintain sales volume during this planned disruption.
Reactive recovery capabilities enable the organization to respond rapidly to a
disruption and return the SC to a steady state. These abilities are particularly important
when little or no warning period is available. An emergency command center coordinates
on-site recovery activities and maintains communications with various parties, including
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first responders and government agencies. When linked to a policy of risk and loss
mitigation, both warning and recovery capabilities are present

Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Agility
Our disruption management framework suggests an agile SC when the probability
of disruption is high and the predictability of consequences is low. This recommendation
is particularly sage for innovative organizations that frequently introduce new products or
have products supported by novel processes. In this paradigm, the customer’s evolving
requirements and accelerated technological change force organizations to prepare for
uncertainty by embedding agility into the organization’s culture (Sharifi & Zhang, 1999).
To accomplish this task, we argue, that organizations should develop both their warning
and recovery capabilities. Initially, managers should develop efficient processes that
provide end-to-end visibility. Given the unpredictable nature of disruption consequences,
practitioners are unable to tune identification and sensing systems to specific parameters.
Rather, they must design a screening system that captures a spectrum of potential
exceptions that require additional assessment. Once data is collected, analysts can tease
out details and make the information compatible with the organization’s learning and
knowledge transfer systems. This sharing of information allows the organization to
become more synchronized and agile as it replaces buffers with information.
Once organizations enable a spectrum of warning capabilities, then they can
develop recovery capabilities. Key to both pre-emptive and reactive recovery is the
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concept of velocity. As managers identify response strategy, the entire organization may
need to adapt systems and/or quickly deploy resources. To enable this, managers should
convey the message that agility requires personal flexibility and small batches, rather
than economies of scale (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Hamel & Valikangas, 2003).
When embracing a strategy of SC agility, the organization also needs to develop
both their waning and recovery capabilities. However, as agile firms work with
innovative products that may be more prone to SC disruption, we suggest organizations
develop higher levels of warning capabilities as compared to recovery capabilities. This
is the case, as employees will regularly leverage identification and communication
practices as they work to understand what is happening and which recovery actions are
necessary.

Warning and Recovery with Supply Chain Resilience
Our disruption management framework recommends a strategy of SC resilience
when both the probability of occurrence and the predictability of the resulting
consequences are low. We suggest that organizations need both their warning and
recovery capabilities in order to face unpredictable scenarios with unforeseen
consequences.
When faced with low probability disruptions that manifest unpredictable
consequences, organizations should leverage their warning capabilities to identify and
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educate the employees about specific disruption events. Because these events are
infrequent, practitioners will find it difficult to predict the circumstances surrounding the
source of a threat or their resulting consequences, as statistical data is unavailable. In
addition, once identified, risk experts will continue to expend time and resources to
discern the root cause and resulting consequences. Organizations must also utilize their
warning capabilities to communicate information about threats to SC partners. Pertinent
information should be accurate, visible, and accessible to suppliers, customers,
government agencies, and employees throughout the organization (Christopher &Lee,
2004).
Organizations also need to develop and enable a variety of recovery capabilities.
Resiliency experts advocate a strategy where employees continuously anticipate, adjust,
and reinvent the organization based on core values (Hamel &Valikangas, 2003). This
implies that managers marshal financial, physical, and human resources to minimize the
negative impact of the resulting consequences. Taken together, practitioners can bolster
the SC resiliency strategy by developing both warning and recovery capabilities across
the organization. When aligned with the overall operating strategy, managers can
leverage these capabilities to strengthen the resilience tactics and mitigate the effect of
infrequent disruptions with hard to predict consequences.
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Conclusion
After reviewing the relevant SC and RM literature, we identify three gaps
associated SC disruption management. First, practitioners need a framework that
incorporates the predictability of disruption consequences. There is scant reference within
RM literature that explores how disruptions manifest themselves. By including the
consequences of disruption, practitioners are better able to understand threats to their
supply chain.
Second, practitioners need a methodology, which aligns the organization’s risk
characteristics and SC strategies. This follows the advice of several experts who suggest
developing a RM strategy based on the characteristics of the SC environment (Juttner, H.
Peck, & Christopher, 2003; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005, Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). We
believe that by aligning the RM and SC strategies, organizations can better leverage
existing resources.
Third, practitioners can use warning and recovery capabilities to bolster the
organization’s SCRM strategy. Aligning specific RM capabilities with the SC strategy
speaks to the “fit” between the organization’s decision environment and the mitigation
and recovery strategies used throughout the supply chain (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005).
In order to address these gaps and develop a comprehensive SCRM process,
organizations should develop strategies to mitigate the risks associated with a threat and
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reduce the amount of downtime after a disruption occurs. Most models explore SC risk
by investigating the sources of disruption or risk drivers identified. While informative,
these frameworks fail to incorporate a key aspect of SC risk. In particular, few models
seek to understand the consequences associated with the actual SC disruption.
Our framework provides a method to understand SC risk by incorporating both
the probability of disruption and predictability of the resulting consequences.
Practitioners may utilize the model to identify an appropriate SC strategy, which offsets
the inherent nature of uncertainty associated with a specific risk profile. We then discuss
how managers should develop warning and recovery capabilities as a method to improve
the fit between the RM process and the organization’s SC strategy. When incorporated
into a comprehensive RM process, our framework provides guidance on how to approach
disruption threats and helps organizations align their RM, SC, and overall operating
strategies.
If managers work to align their SC and RM strategies and then develop an
organizations warning and recovery capabilities, they will bolster an organizations
overall RM capabilities. In essence, they are creating an organizational culture that
encourages practitioners to consider SC threats and disruptions regularly.
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MEASUREING WARNING AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES: CONSTRUCT
DEVELOPMENT AND MEASUREMETN VALIDATION
Abstract
Risk management experts suggest developing a comprehensive supply chain risk
management strategy that lowers occurrence probabilities, reduces the impact of
disruption, and minimizes recovery times so the supply chain can quickly return to a
steady state. However, after an extensive review of existing risk management literature,
we find most academic research addresses supply chain risk with redundant inventory
and/or capacity. While these buffers are appropriate with some supply chain disruptions,
both practitioners and academics familiar with risk management techniques agree that
organizations should use a variety of techniques to mitigate supply chain risk as threats
manifest in various manners. Besides inventory, redundant capacity, and insurance, the
literature suggests embedding behavior-based risk mitigation tactics into the
organization’s culture.
The purpose of this study is to examine how four behavior-based competencies
affect the organization’s risk management and performance capabilities. We posit that
these antecedent competencies improve the organization’s risk management and
performance capabilities by strengthening the employees’ orientation towards supply
chain risk. We also develop psychometrically valid measures for two new risk
management capabilities: warning and recovery. Using qualitative interviews, a
judgment-based item-to-construct sorting process, and confirmatory factor analysis, we
establish the reliability and validity of the new measures.
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Empirical results indicate that a common vision, organizational learning, and
supply chain disruption orientation enhance an organization’s warning and recovery
capabilities. Therefore, managers should develop these cultural competencies as a method
to improve the organization’s risk management acumen. The evidence also suggests that
managers must manage routine rigidity; otherwise, the competency may undermine the
practitioner’s ability to sense and respond to supply chain disruptions. We also find that
organizations with heightened recovery capabilities have enhanced performance.
Together, this indicates that organizations can develop behavior-based risk management
techniques and include them as part of the overall supply chain risk management strategy.
We argue that this a better way of managing SC risk because it broadens the risk
management approach and works to develop the employees’ abilities, rather than just
investing in rarely used buffers and capacity.
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Introduction
While research supports the use of behavior-based practices (e.g. Choi and Liker,
1995; Krause, 1999; Braunscheildel and Suresh, 2009), we find that most RM literature
leverages mathematical models or conceptual frameworks. Risk management (RM)
experts assert that organizations can use any number of techniques including buffers,
capacity, insurance and/or behavioral tactics to manage and mitigate supply chain risk
(SCR)., whereby each factor has its advantages and limitations, we argue that behaviorbases practices are the most often undervalued, and yet fill a gap that other RM strategies
leave open. Behavior-based practices refer to processes, activities, and management
initiatives designed to lessen a threat’s impact (Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers design the
practices to influence behaviors not outcomes. Basically, a process should incentives
practitioners to seek out operational outcomes that are aligned to a higher-level strategic
objective (Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003).
Experts suggest that academics are reluctant to investigate behavior-based SCR
practices because it is “perceived to be riskier than conceptual or mathematical research”
(Sohdi, Son and Tang, 2012, p11). We explore these behaviors because we believe they
can be used to augment most other RM strategies including ones where inventory and
redundant capacity are not cost effective. For example, a disruption like the 9/11 terrorist
attack is both rare and catastrophic in nature. Here behavior-based RM techniques, as
compared to a buffer such as inventory, enable practitioners to adjust to the
circumstances of specific disruption consequences and drive towards returning the SC to
a steady state.
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We also believe a lack of valid and reliable measures makes it difficult to conduct
behavior-based RM research. Only a few operations management researchers have
developed reliable risk measures, including Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) who
operationalized measures for the magnitude and probability of supply disruption.
Likewise, Tucker (2004) categorized interruption, delay, risk, and losses as dimensions of
failure and measured actions that affect nursing patient outcomes. By developing new
measures, we fill this gap and allow managers to benchmark their RM capabilities against
established targets.
Therefore, we investigate behavior-based competencies and capabilities as a
method to manage SCR. These techniques allow managers to develop the processes and
practitioners associated with SC and RM activities. When properly embedded, these
tactics influence the processes associated with an activity, rather than just the outcome(s)
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Thus, when managers develop their RM strategy they are
investing in the organization’s employees and structures, not just resource intensive and
rarely used measures like inventory or capacity.
We also aim to operationalize two empirically valid RM measures: warning and
recovery capabilities. Warning capabilities speak to the organization’s ability to scan the
SC horizon for threats and then communicate information about those threats to partners
(Craighead et al., 2007). Recovery refers to pre-emptive and reactive response tactics
enabling the organization to return to the SC to normal (Craighead et al., 2007). After
operationalizing the measures, we answer three research questions: First, do warning and
recovery capabilities explain organizational performance? Second, do certain
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competencies affect the behavior-based warning and recovery capabilities? Finally, does
information quality mediate the relationship between the antecedent competencies and
the RM capabilities? By answering these questions, we intend to show that managers can
develop behavior based competencies and capabilities as a means to enhance an
organization’s RM acumen and performance.
To address these questions, we develop measures for warning and recovery
capabilities. We empirically validate the questions and the survey instrument using
qualitative feedback multiple item-to-construct sorting procedure (Q-sort), confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA), and survey data collected from procurement professionals.
Once measures are developed, we examine the linkages between the four
competencies: common vision, supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO),
organizational learning, and routine rigidity, and the two RM capabilities, warning and
recovery. By investigating both the direct and indirect linkages between the internal
competencies and external facing capabilities, we provide evidence about the affect of
specific behavior-based competencies as RM devices. For the indirect effects, we look at
the mediating variable information quality. By researching how the information quality of
messages affects the relationship between the competencies and RM capabilities, we
provide guidance for managers as they communicate with practitioners throughout the
organization.
Lastly, we investigate the relationships between the warning and recovery
capability constructs and organizational performance. Specifically, we establish a linkage
from the four competencies, through the two RM capabilities, to organizational
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performance. This provides evidence about how the RM capabilities affect the overall
organization. Without evidence supporting this relationship, managers may not value
behavior-based practices as part of their RM strategy.

Outline of the manuscript
We review the extant RM, SC, and high reliability theory literature and define our
terms in section 2. In section 3, we introduce an initial model and specific hypotheses.
Within section 4, we attend to the methodology and statistical analysis. In section 5, we
introduce an alternate model supported by concise hypotheses. We devote section 6 to
our research findings and a discussion of pertinent limitations. Finally, in section 7, we
conclude with future research opportunities and predictions of how our theory changes
the culture of SCRM.

Literature Review
In the following section, we establish the theoretical foundation for our study of
behavior based SCRM practices. We introduce high reliability theory and then discuss
risk, supply chain risk, and supply chain risk management. Lastly, we review warning
and recovery capabilities and converse about the various dimensions reflected within the
two RM constructs.
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High reliability theory (HRT)
We leverage high reliability theory (HRT) as our theoretical lens as it provides a
framework on how to operate a complex system such as a SC safely and profitably.
Proponents of HRT theory argue that organizations can stave off accidents indefinitely by
designing and managing systems that emphasize reliability rather than just efficiency.
Rochlin, LaPorte, and Roberts (1987) coined high reliability theory when describing how
aircraft carriers could operate safely in the face catastrophic risks. Early high reliability
researchers investigated aircraft carriers (Rochlin et al., 1987; Weick and Roberts, 1993),
submarines (Bierly and Spender, 1995), and nuclear power plants (Roth, 1997). Now
researchers use the theoretical frame for lean management (Marley, 2006), emergency
decision-making (White, Turoff, and Van de Walle, 2007) and SC safety research
(Speier, Whipple, Closs, and Voss, 2011).
Researchers classify an organization as highly reliable when it is able to maintain
an exemplary safety record over long periods (Roberts, 1990). Hence, highly reliable
organization’s “are complex systems in which many accidents and adverse events that
could occur within those systems or at the interfaces with other systems are actually
avoided or prevented” (Bagnara, Parlangeli , and Tartaglia 2010, 713). While reliability
from an engineering perspective refers to a component or system that performs
repetitively, high reliability focuses on the continuous management of fluctuations
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999). Hollnagel (1993) views this formulation of
reliability as an extension of adaptive human cognition and action research.
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While some advocates stress systems reliability above all else, for most highly
reliable organizations the goal is a combined state of performance and safety (La Porte
and Consolini, 1991). The danger associated with these systems force organizations to go
to great lengths to avoid failure. To achieve this goal, managers design the organization
around resiliency and redundancy, manage in a decentralized manner that encourages
improvisation, and develop a culture that encourages employees to make decisions when
necessary (Weick et al., 1999). In addition, mindful practitioners manage these systems
by learning from errors/near misses and avoiding simple interpretations that lead to
mishaps (Weick et al., 1999).
Several of the theory’s characterizations align with the aims of this investigation.
Initially, we seek to understand how antecedents, such as common vision, supply chain
disruption orientation, organization learning, and routine rigidity, affect the proposed
warning and recovery capabilities. We believe these competencies are similar to key high
reliability theory characterizations. Common vision and SCDO, for instance, speak to the
beliefs the management embed into the organization’s culture. Common vision represents
the management’s view on strategic goals, while SCDO reflects the SC operational
objectives. When embedded correctly, employees derive energy and purpose to pursue
strategic (common vision) and operational (SCDO) objectives (Braunscheidel and
Suresh, 2009).
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Supply chain risk
Before we can talk about SCR, we need to define risk itself. Risk refers to the
probability and significance of a loss that affects an individual or organization (Harland,
Brenchley, and Walker, 2003). Managers should note risks “that can modify or prevent
part of the movement and efficient flow of information, materials and products between
the actors of a supply chain within an organization or among actors in a global supply
chain” (Lavastre, Gunasekaran, and Spalanzani, 2012, p. 830).
Tangential to the notion of risk is the concept of risk taking. Ho (1996)
investigates risk taking to understand how managers perceive risk (risk taking, risk
neutral, or risk averse) when making decisions about manufacturing strategy. Risk taking
reflects the manager’s beliefs about the riskiness of the environment. Similarly,
Jambulingam, Kathuria, and Doucette (2005) measure strategic risk taking in the service
environment. Here, risk-taking represents the manager’s orientation towards taking action
to achieve organizational goals. The researchers, in both investigations, assume that the
risk taking posture of managers influences the organization’s strategy and future
direction. We support this logic and argue that the perceptions of risk, rather than just
objective measures, drives behavior when making decisions about future operations (Ellis
et al., 2010).
Supply chain risk (SCR) refers to unplanned and unpredictable events that
negatively affect one or more parties within a supply chain (Deloitte, 2004). These
variations can affect “the information, material, and product flows from original supplier
to the delivery of the final product for the end user” (Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003,
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p.203). Risks are classified in many forms including natural and manmade (Sheffi, 2009),
low probability-high consequence (Knemeyer, Zinn, and Eroglu, 2009) and internal and
external (Christopher and Peck 2004). Furthermore, some researchers categorize SCR
into risk types: organizational, network, and environmental (Jüttner et al., 2003).
Organizational risks result from information technology, labor, and production
uncertainties. Network risks develop because of poor integration between SC partners.
Environmental disruptions result from natural disasters and socio-political uncertainty.

Supply chain risk management
Supply chain risk management (SCRM), describes how organizations and SC
partners manage risks through a coordinated approach to reduce the impact of threats
(Cranfield,2003). RM experts suggest developing systems that avoid, postpone, mitigate,
hedge, control for, or transfer risk to others (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Organizations
must also account for the risk-seeking or risk-adverse attitude of practitioners managing
SC processes (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Research suggests that risk attitudes affect the
RM strategy selected and the risks taken by an organization. For example, Pablo (1999)
found that managers view and interpret risk differently depending on industry. When
taken together, an organization’s SCRM strategy should attempt to both reduce the
probability of occurrence and the impact of disruptions. After reviewing the extant
literature, we believe there is not a single strategy to mitigate all SC risks. Therefore, we
recommend that managers should develop several strategies that address potential risk,
complexity, and overall SC goals.
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Warning capability
One of the key SC capabilities we focus on in this study is warning capability,
which refers to coordination of resources to scan for, detect, and communicate
information about pending or actual SC disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007). When
practitioners scan for and identify threats, they should use available time to assess the
probability of occurrence and the impact of resulting consequences. Organizations can
then deploy the appropriate mitigation and recovery resources and communicate actions
to other SC partners.
Communication capabilities speak to the organization’s information sharing
abilities. We suppose that communication activities are important as they enable
practitioners to prepare for and recover from a SC disruption. This occurs as the
organization and its SC partners are able to initiate response strategies or communicate
changes about specific actions to partners.

Recovery capability
The second capability pivotal to our study is recovery capability, which reflects
an organization’s ability to mitigate the impact of a disruption and to decrease the time it
takes to return supply-chain functions to normal. Normal refers to a state where
operations return to pre-disruption levels or a new standard brought about by
circumstances and managerial directive. Further, Craighead et al. (2007) divide recovery
capabilities into two components: pre-emptive and reactive. Pre-emptive recovery extols

69

collaboration and coordination efforts before a SC disruption occurs, while reactive
recovery alludes to post-event response efforts.

Pre-emptive recovery
Organizations can identify threats before a SC disruption manifest, which defines
pre-emptive recovery strategies. When this occurs, managers may be able to mitigate the
impact of a disruption or eliminate a threat altogether. We define mitigation as actions
designed to reduce the consequences of a disruption. The reduction potential depends on
the type of disruption, consequences anticipated, resources marshalled, and the amount of
time until the disruption occurs. We note that pre-emptive recovery differs from warning
capability, as the later speaks to identification or communication capabilities..

Reactive recovery
Craighead et al. (2007) define reactive recovery capabilities as the coordination of
physical and human resources to overcome the slowing or stoppage of the supply chain.
After a disruption occurs, we submit that organizations actively work to return their SC
operations to normal. Thus, practitioners will collaborate with SC partners and coordinate
recovery resources, in efforts to minimize recovery times.
The consequences of disruption can occur immediately after a disruption
manifests or after some time has passed. Hurricane consequences, for example, occur in
phases. Initially wind generates damage before the actual storm makes landfall, while
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storm surge inundates the shoreline as the hurricane moves from ocean to land. Finally,
depending on the movement of the storm, additional inland flooding can occur.

Proposed Model and Hypothesis Development
The conceptual tenets of high reliability theory frame the hypothesized
relationships found within our proposed model (see Figure 1).

Figure 1- Base Model
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Theoretical model
We develop a theoretical model that has four antecedent competencies, one
mediating variable, two RM capabilities, and organizational performance. The four
antecedents, common vision, SCDO, organizational learning, and routine rigidity,
represent competencies that inform the organization’s orientation and culture. Warning
and recovery reflect organizational RM capabilities. Information quality mediates the
relationship between the intra-organization competencies and the organizational RM
capabilities. Lastly, organizational performance serves as a proxy for financial and
operational performance.

Proposed relationships
We will now define these terms within the literature to gain a conceptual foothold
to better understand what is to follow, our proposed relationships and mediations between
the competencies, capabilities, and performance.

Common vision (CV)
A common vision is collection of high-level objectives, which provide employees
with purpose and energy to pursue the organization’s goals (Braunscheidel and Suresh,
2009). Executives should embed the common vision into the organization’s culture, so
employees can commit to these high-level objectives without direct incentives. To do so,
executives communicate the common vision and their beliefs about why the vision
important on a regular basis. “Sharing and communicating a common vision is the first
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step in lasting change, but to be more than just words, it must be married with proper
support and regular monitoring” (Dillon, 2010, p. 18).

Supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO)
A supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO) speaks to an attitude or
organizational characteristic concerning how thinking about and managing risks can
minimize downtime and improve performance during SC disruptions. Bode, Wagner,
Petersen, and Ellram (2011) refer to SCDO when describing an organization’s general
awareness, concern for, and recognition of SC disruptions. Pertaining to the warning
construct, SCDO reflects an employee’s alertness and preparedness. This includes the
way practitioners seek out and communicate information about SC threats. For recovery
efforts, SCDO feeds response practices both before and after disturbances occur.

Organizational learning (OL)
Organizational learning refers to the way internal employees learn from
experiences (Sinkula, 1994). Said differently, as positive and negative interactions occur,
organizations use learning routines to transform their experiences into knowledge, so new
understanding alters the way the organization conducts itself in the future.

Routine rigidity (RR)
Gilbert (2005) discusses routine rigidity when decomposing organizational
inertia. The concept suggests that during periods of disturbance, the inertia of the
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organization inhibits adaptation and undermines employee’s response efforts.
Zimmermann (2008), for instance, describes how the New York Stock Exchange
executives refused to change when electronic trading threatened the exchange’s
existence. Zimmermann found that managers clung to traditional routines, rather than
embracing automated electronic trading. Hence, employees entrenched themselves and
adhered to what they knew, rather than developing strategies to address threats. Said
differently, practitioners hesitate as they are uncertain about how to respond, or if they
have the authority to respond.

Information quality
Information quality refers to the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, reliability,
and adequacy of data and/or information (Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, Ragatz, 1998;
Li and Lin, 2006). Instruments measuring information quality seek to understand
message quality as they pass between two entities such as employees (Zhou and Benton,
2007). Research has shown that information quality degrades as time passes between
creation and consumption (Feldmann and Müller, 2003; Mason-Jones and Towill, 1997).
Opportunism drives practitioners to distort, disguise, or otherwise obfuscate transaction
information (Williamson, 1985). “To reduce information distortion and improve the
quality of information shared, information shared has to be as accurate as possible and
organizations must ensure that it flows with minimum delay and distortion” (Li and Lin,
2006, p. 1643).
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The four competencies, common vision, supply chain disruption orientation,
organizational learning, and routine rigidity, reflect organizational orientations and
represent the social learning mechanisms that help align the top management’s view to
lower level operational activities. (Atuahene-Gima and Ko, 2001). With high reliability
theory as our theoretical lens, we suggest managers can manipulate the competencies to
affect an organization’s ability to learn from mistakes and near misses (Weick et al.,
1999). Hence, we submit that managers can direct the organization’s orientation and
influence business outcomes. By extension, we reason that learning enables a positive
change in behavior (Sinkula, 1994).

Formal hypotheses: Relationships with SCRM capabilities
Leveraging the generally accepted paradigm that competencies are antecedents to
capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Roth and Jackson, 1995), we hypothesize that
three competencies, common vision, SCDO, and organizational learning, positively
influence warning and recovery capabilities. We further suppose that routine rigidity
negatively influences both of the organization’s RM capabilities.
Within our model, we include information quality as a mediating variable that
affects the relationship between three antecedent competencies and the proposed RM
capabilities. McDowell and Karriker, (2009) insist that further research is necessary to
understand the mediating effect of information quality, as it is an important component of
communication and performance practices.

75

Lastly, model #1 illustrates how the two RM capabilities positively affect
performance. We put forth that organizations should develop behavior-based RM
capabilities, like warning and recovery capabilities, in order to improve performance. Our
perceptual measures serve as a proxy to performance. We now introduce our formal
hypothesis and the rational underpinning our arguments.

Relationship between common vision and the organizational SCRM capabilities
(H1A-B)
We suppose that the common vision provides guidance on how employees should
conduct themselves. This applies to established routines used during non-disruptive
periods and to situations where practices must be adapted to address an unfamiliar
environment caused by a SC disruption. Thus, we postulate that a well-communicated
and properly embedded common vision will positively affect both an organization’s
warning and recovery capabilities.

Warning capability
When considering warning capability, the common vision should shape how
employees scan for and communicate information about SC threats. By emphasizing
these characteristics in daily activities and messages, employees can commit time and
resources to developing these abilities. However, if managers do not call attention to SC
threat detection within the common vision, then employees will be less invested and lack

76

the capabilities to identify or communicate information about SC disruptions. Hence, we
propose:
H1A-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher warning
capability levels.

Recovery capability
For recovery capabilities, a common vision cultivates the organization’s response
efforts by encouraging employees to return the SC to normal in the shortest possible time.
Additionally, managers should use the common vision to guide employees when they
face unfamiliar conditions that manifest because of a SC disruption. Specifically, if
management emphasizes that recovery is important to the organization, employees will
develop adaptive methods to speed response efforts. This follows Hays and Hill (2001),
who suggest that employees embrace experimentation and risk taking when
management’s guidance is unavailable. High reliability theory proponents highlight the
organization’s resiliency and its ability to adapt during recovery. However, if managers
fail to emphasize response objectives, we believe practitioners will prepare less for SC
disruption consequences. Thus, we propose the following:
H1B-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels will have higher recovery
capability levels.

Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and the
organization’s RM capabilities (H1C-D)
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We investigate information quality as messages pertaining to the organization’s
vision, move from executives to employees. Typically, executives communicate their
beliefs both verbally and in written form (Baum, Locke, and Kirkpatrick, 1998). If the
messages carrying the common vision are high quality, employees will better understand
the organization’s needs both before and after a SC disruption. Prior research indicates
that practitioners will have improved confidence and decision-making capabilities
(Raghunathan, 1999). However, if the common vision conveying message has poor
information quality, then practitioners may misunderstand their directive. This may delay
communication and response activities.

Warning capability
In the warning capability context, high information quality should improve a
practitioner’s understanding of objectives as they pertain to scanning for and
communicating information about SC threats. We hypothesize that managers can
influence an employee’s understanding of goals by improving the quality of the warning
capability messages. In other words, managers can strengthen the relationship between
common vision and warning capability by enhancing the quality of communications.
Hence, we offer the following:
H1C-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and warning
capability.
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Recovery capability
We also put forward that information quality affects the relationship between the
common vision and recovery capability constructs. In this context, recovery capability
speaks to an organization’s ability to respond to a SC disruption. If the information
quality of the recovery messages is high, employees will think about and incorporate
previous lessons learned into future response tactics. With pertinent information about
incidents, practitioners can quicken resource deployment. In addition, clear messages
outline the objective of rebuilding the SC in a timely manner. Hence, employees develop
practices to hasten response. From this foundation, we offer the following hypothesis:
H1D-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and recovery
capability.

Relationship between supply chain disruption orientation and the organizational
SCRM capabilities (H2A-B)
To improve the organization’s ability to deal with SC disruptions, research
suggests that managers should develop a RM strategy that includes an understanding of
the dimensions of SC risk and tune the mitigation approaches to the organization’s
environment and culture (Chopra and Sohdi, 2004; Faisal, Banwet, and Shankar, 2006).
This implies having an orientation towards understanding SC threats and the techniques
to mitigate actual disruption. To embed a SCDO into an organization, managers should
incorporate a SCRM perspective into operational communications and activities. This
includes threat scanning, disruption analysis, and response processes. In addition, the
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SCDO should encourage the organization to develop partnerships to deal with risk
cooperatively rather than take on SC risk by themselves. Like portfolio theory, in which
financiers seek to minimize risk by selecting a variety of offsetting stocks, a group of SC
partners can address risk cooperatively. When viewed through the high reliability theory
lens, this is designing the SC for resiliency and thinking about SC risks.
When an orientation toward considering SC disruption exists, everyone from the
Chief Executive Officer to the mailroom clerk, develops a risk posture and is mindful of
potential disruptions. At high levels of SCDO, organizations are active and strive to learn
from experiences (Daft and Weick, 1984). Proponents suggest that highly reliable
organizations will learn from mistakes by digesting previous experiences and using the
knowledge to prepare for future disruptions (Roberts, 1990). Conversely, organizations
with low SCDO levels are passive and slow to respond to disruption.
Evidence suggests that by developing their SCDO, organizations can improve
their level of preparedness. Bode et al. (2011), for instance, found that a SCDO motivates
the organization to seek out buffering and bridging relationships with SC partners. They
also found that prior disruption experience affects the SCDO level within an
organization. Prior experience refers to the occurrence of a SC disruption within the past
12 months (Bode et al., 2011). Therefore, as the number of events increases, so does the
experience level.
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Warning capability
We argue that when SCDO levels are high, that organizations are motivated to
act. This motivation empowers employees to seek out and make sense of anomalies
within the SC (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). In the warning context, this occurs when
employees communicate regularly with partners or seek to understand information. In
essence, SCDO enhances the organization’s scanning and communication practices.
Hence:
H2A-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher warning capability levels.

Recovery capability
With respect to recovery capability, a SCDO encourages employees to minimize
damage and downtime. From this perspective, we suggest that SCDO allows
organizations to respond and adapt to the resulting consequences of a SC disruption.
Leveraging high reliability theory thinking, practitioners use practice and simulation to
refine emergency protocols. Refinement includes better resource placement and the
identification of timesaving steps within processes. With infrequently used response
processes, practice provides the only hands on experience until an actual disruption
occurs.
A key aspect of high reliability theory is a culture that promotes responsiveness
and vigilance (Weick et al., 1999). We see this cultural imperative similar to the cautious
and observant attitude embodied with the SCDO competency. We believe this posture
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allows organizations to respond to and recover from SC disruptions. Hence, we
hypothesize the following.
H2B-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher recovery capability levels.

The mediating effect of information quality on the relationship between SCDO and
the organization’s RM capabilities (H2C-D)
As the SCDO provides awareness of, concern for, and recognition of SC
disruptions (Bode et al. 2011), managers should develop specific goals and objectives on
how to address certain SC disruption scenarios. This provides employees a standard to
strive for during their daily work activities. Previous research illustrates that when
management addresses specific hazards, the larger organization is willing to think about
and see hazards (Westrum, 1988).
Additionally, managers should state their support for individual improvisation and
employee empowerment. This shows that practitioners can act, without retribution,
during a disruption. “If people are blocked from acting on hazards, it is not long before
their ‘useless’ observations of those hazards are also ignored or denied, and errors
cumulate unnoticed” (Weick et al., 2008, p.37.

Warning capability
In order for practitioners to understand the SCDO, management should regularly
communicate their views about the SC and SC disruption. We state that if the quality of
these messages is high, then practitioners who are mindful will have an enriched
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awareness and distinctive concern for their organization (Weick et al, 1999). However, if
the information quality of these communications is poor, then practitioners may fixate on
routine activities without concern for SC disruptions (Weick et al, 1999). From this
perspective, we offer the following hypothesis:
H2C-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and warning
capability.

Recovery capability
We also put forward that information quality mediates the relationship between
the SCDO and recovery capability construct. In this case, a message of SC resilience
should flow from management to employees (e.g. purchasing, logistics, warehousing,
etc.). We define resiliency as the “capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they
have become manifest” (Wildavsky, 1991, p. 77).
From the high reliability theory perspective, resiliency suggests that organizations
and their extended SC absorb the shock of disruption. Organizations do this by forming
ad-hoc groups that solve problems when they arise. Management activates these informal
groups during periods of uncertainty and allows them to supplement the normal hierarchy
(Rochlin, 1989; Bourier, 1996). These groups “allow for rapid pooling of cognitive
knowledge to handle events that were impossible to anticipate” (Weick et al, 2008, p. 47).
If the resiliency message from management has poor information quality, then
practitioners may fail to form these ad-hoc groupings when necessary. Likewise,
potential members, with specific talents and/or knowledge may hesitate to join.
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Conversely, if the information quality of messages is high, the ad-hoc groups will form
and dissolve as needed. This occurs because employees believe they have management’s
support to improvise and recombine available recourses to address a SC shock. Hence,
we propose the following:
H2D-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and recovery
capabilities.

Relationship between organizational learning and the organizational SCRM
capabilities (H3A-B)
Organizational learning enables practitioners to collect new information and then
use the knowledge to change future behaviors so the organization can survive and
succeed (Klimecki & Lassleben, 1998).When viewed through an high reliability theory
lens, a preoccupation with failure and learning from mistakes/near misses enables
practitioners to prepare for SC disturbances by planning for and thinking about
disruptions. When managers believe that new practices will benefit the organization, the
employee’s organizational learning should be nurtured (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Using
this frame, we argue that organizational learning also represents the ability to modify
behavior, based on new knowledge and/or novel insight.
In the SC disruption context, practitioners leverage organizational learning when
new information about disruptions becomes evident. Simulation and stress tests are
techniques used to gather information about SC disruptions. Managers utilize output of
these tests to develop new approaches for both warning and recovery efforts.
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Organizations also learn from actual occurrences, including mistakes.
Practitioners analyze after-action and post-mortem reports to understand what efforts
worked and what led to suboptimal outcomes. When practitioners analyze these data, the
findings provide information that makes organizations more confident about future
actions (Bell, Whitewell, & Lucas, 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H3A-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning
capability levels.
H3B-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher recovery
capability levels.

The mediating effect of information quality on the relationship between
organizational learning and the organization’s RM capabilities (H3C-D)
The concept of organizational learning suggests that organizations extract
information from the environment, integrate it into the organization, and then change
future behavior. When considering the relationship between organizational learning and
the RM capabilities of warning and recovery, we believe that the level of information
quality will affect both the speed and depth of which an organization learns. When high
information quality is available, we affirm that practitioners can better identify,
communicate information about, and respond to SC threats, because they can confidently
connect data pertaining to a SC disruption from multiple sources. By improving an
analyst’s confidence, they are able to make decisions earlier and provide more detail to
response agents. This affords time to develop and deploy an appropriate response
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strategy, which may mitigate or even eliminate the SC threat altogether. When
information quality is poor, we assert that practitioners will hesitate to amend current
warning or recovery practices. From a high reliability theory perspective, information
quality is an important antecedent to “evidence based decision making” and “individual
improvisation.” Without quality information, practitioners may hesitate at the most
crucial moment. From this position, we offer the following hypotheses:
H3C-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and
warning capabilities.
H3D-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and
recovery capabilities.

We note that the base model also contains additional relationships that we do not
explore at this time. For example, there is a three-path relationship from common vision
to INFOSHR to WARN and then to PERF. Both INFOSHR and WARN mediate the
relationship.

Relationship between routine rigidity and the organizational SCRM capabilities
(H4A-B)
Next, we discuss routine rigidity, a term coined, along with resource rigidity, as a
dimension of organizational inertia (Gilbert, 2005). In this context, routine rigidity
described how practitioners within organizations were unable to change behaviors when
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faced with change (Gilbert, 2005). We extend the concept into our research and suggest
that practitioners, when facing a SC disruption, are exposed to routine rigidity.

Warning capability
We emphasize that routine rigidity inhibits the organization’s ability to identify
and communicate information about threats to SC partners (internally and externally).
This occurs as employees adhere to existing protocols, rather than create unique
approaches when faced with the uncertainty of a SC disruption. From this reasoning, we
offer the following hypothesis.
H4A-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability
levels.

Recovery capability
Recovery capability speaks to how an organization responds to a period of
discontinuity such as a SC disruption. Routine rigidity is present when employees have
difficultly deviating from existing processes. We believe routine rigidity goes beyond
individuals pushing back from change. Rather, employees within an organization refuse
to experiment with existing processes. Therefore, when discontinuities are present,
employees find it difficult to adapt (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Therefore, we offer
the following:
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H4B-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower recovery capability
levels

Relationship between warning capability and recovery capabilities (H5)
According to Craighead et al., (2007) when organizations properly uses their
warning capability to detect and communicate pertinent information about disruptions,
they may be afforded time to inoculate themselves from the negative effects of a SC
disruption. Essentially, there is time to develop a mitigation strategy and deploy resources
to offset disruptions. Therefore, warning capability also affects the organizations ability
to respond to a disruption. Hence, we offer a hypothesis linking the two organizational
RM capabilities.
H5-Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher recovery
capability levels.

Relationship between the organizational RM capabilities and performance (H6A-B)
We evaluated organizational performance with three perceptual measures: market
share, operating cost, and service quality. The interviewees involved in the qualitative
interviews process confirmed that procurement professionals would be able to respond to
perceptual questions about these concepts. Most practitioners consider market share to be
a primary business success measure, while operating cost reflects practices designed to
improve asset availability, efficiency, and quality (Challis and Samson, 1996). In
addition, service quality is a common measure within most organizations. We ask
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respondents to rate their organization’s market share, operating cost, and service quality
as compared to the competition.

Relationship between warning capabilities and organizational performance (H6A)
The high reliability theory literature suggests that by quickly adjusting practices
that an organization can maintain its competitive advantage. In this context, warning
capability reflects the organizations ability to seek out SC threats and communicate
information about the threats to partners. Scanning provides information about
disruptions and educates practitioners on how to best respond. This includes the
immediate positioning of resources and the long-term development of new capabilities.
In addition, organizations communicate information about upcoming disruptions to
employees within the organization and to external partners that are unfamiliar with
existing strategies and practices. The information embedded within messages should
contain enough detail to insure comprehension by the receiving partner.
From this perspective, if an organization has high waning capability levels, we
believe that they will be able to scan the SC horizon and allow for the early threat
identification. Early identification provides time in which the organization can
reconfigure tactics and reposition resources in the effort to thwart pending SC
disruptions. Further, we believe that once an organization identifies a threat, that
managers can use their communication skills to exchange information about upcoming
threats to relevant partners. Therefore, we incorporate the scanning and communication
abilities into the waning capability construct and offer the following:
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H6A-Organizations with higher waning capability levels will have higher levels of
performance.

Relationship between recovery capabilities and organizational performance (H6B)
Practitioners should use recovery capability to deploy human and physical
resources and develop tactics to mitigate the effects of a SC disruption. Pre-emptive
recovery occurs before an actual disruption, while reactive recovery occurs after the
disruption becomes evident. According to the literature, high reliability theory enables
organizations to learn from previous accidents and near misses and to change future
behaviors. To this end, the organization can build and defend its competitive advantage
by developing recovery capability better than the competition.
When organizations are able to identify threats before a disruption occurs, they
are afforded time to respond. Pre-emptive recovery allows organizations to reduce or
eliminate the impact of a SC disruption altogether. Practitioners seek to understand how a
threat is manifesting itself and then alters the configuration of resources and operational
tactics.
Reactive recovery capabilities enable organizations to react to SC disruptions
after they occur. The ability to react quickly is important when a SC disruption event
offers no warning or when practitioners are unable to foresee the occurrence. During
reactive periods, practitioners evaluate how a threat is manifesting and marshal the
appropriate resources to counteract specific consequences. For example, in 1989, work
crews repaired the eastern span of the Bay Bridge after the Loma Prieta earthquake
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damaged it just over a month earlier (Citizendia.org). The California Department of
Transportation executives worked with contractors to determine the quickest way to
repair and reopen the earthquake-damaged bridge that transported thousands of
commuters daily between San Francisco and Oakland, California.
We incorporate both pre-emptive and reactive response capabilities into the
recovery capability construct and offer the following hypothesis.
H6B-Organizations with higher recovery capability levels will have higher levels of
performance.

We summarize the proposed hypotheses in Table 1 and then describe the
methodology employed to operationalize the various constructs and test the related
hypotheses.
Item

Hypothesis

H1A Organizations with higher common vision levels of will have higher warning capability levels
H1B Organizations with higher common vision levels of will have higher recovery capability levels
H1C Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and warning capability.
H1D Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and recovery capability.
H2A Organizations with higher SCDO levels will have higher warning capability levels
H2B Organizations with higher SCDO levels will have higher recovery capability levels
H2C Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and warning capability.
H2D Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and recovery capability.
H3A Organizations with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning capability levels
H3B Organizations with higher organizational learning levels will have higher warning capability levels
H3C Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and warning capability.
H3D Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and recovery capability.
H4A Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability levels
H4B Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower warning capability levels
H5

Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher recovery capability levels.

H6A Organizations with higher waning capability levels will have higher levels of performance.
H6B Organizations with higher recovery capability levels will have higher levels of performance

Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses- base model
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Instrument Development
We leverage Noar’s (2003) construct development process. Starting with existing
definitions and measures, we adapt multiple questions for each construct. TABLE 2
identifies the dimension and originating authors. See appendix A for a complete list of
survey questions.

Common vision
For the common vision measurement items, we draw from existing SC (Spekman,
Kamauff, and Myhr, 1998) and logistics research (Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2001/2002).
To reiterate, a common vision reflects the strategic alignment of an organization and its
suppliers. Managers can improve the organization’s common vision by improving clarity
within planning activities and developing mechanisms to share responsibility. From this
starting point, we adapt our survey questions to reflect the common vision concept within
organizations. See questions 1-4 in appendix A.
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Construct

Common Vision

Organizational
Learning

Dimension

Authors

Strategic vision

Spekman, Kamauff, and Myhr,
1998

Strategic vision

Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2001

Strategic vision
Learning environment, learning processes,
and reinforcing leadership

Stank, Keller, and Closs, 2002
Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino,
2008

Supply Chain
Disruption
Orientation (SCDO) Encouraging employees to act

Bode, Wagner, Petersen, and
Ellram, 2011

Routine Rigidity

Organizational rigidity

Gilbert, 2005

Organizational inertia

Viellechner and Wulf, 2010

Accuracy, adequacy, completeness,
Information Quality reliability, and timeliness

Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and RaguNathan, 2005

Warning Capabilities Identify and communicate
Early and late warning
Discovery
Monitoring
Communication
Communication
Proactively detect, interpret, and report
Identify/mitigate threats in advance
Recovery
Capabilities
Proactive and reactive response

Craighead et al., 2007
Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998
Hays and Hill, 2001
Grover and Malhotra, 2003
Chen and Paulraj, 2004
Chen, Paulraj, and Lado, 2004
Hall and Citrenbaum, 2009
Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2009
Craighead et al., 2007

Engaging responses, assets and capabilities Olavarrieta and Ellinger, 1997
Response agility
Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998
McCollough, Berry, and Yadav,
Recovery expectations and performance
2000
Koufteros, Vonderembse, and
Early involvement
Doll, 2001
Practice recovery behaviors
de Jong and de Ruyter, 2004

Table 2- Constructs, dimensions, and originating authors.
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Supply chain disruption orientation
We adapt measurement items for SCDO from a study that investigates response
efforts during periods of disruption (Bode et al., 2011). SCDO works as a motivating
force encouraging employees to act when there is mismatch between information needs
and what is available. We envision that this construct is similar to learning from mistakes
and near misses, a base construct from high reliability theory. If an organization cannot
overcome the cultural barrier of learning from their mistakes, then practitioners will limit
their problem solving potential. See questions 5-8 in appendix A.

Organizational learning
Questions pertaining to the organizational learning construct originate from
Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino (2008). In this article, the authors provide a tool kit to
determine “if yours is a learning organization.” We phrase questions to tap three key
organizational learning dimensions: supportive learning environment, learning processes,
and reinforcing leadership. See questions 9-12 in appendix A.

Routine rigidity
Gilbert (2005) conceives routine rigidity along with the resource rigidity
construct. Measures attempt to understand why employees are reluctant to change
processes and routines when transformation is necessary. Within the literature, few
questions reflecting routine rigidity are available. Therefore, we generate statements
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based on Viellechner and Wulf’s (2010) work as they sought to understand inertia within
the airline industry. In their work, Viellechner and Wulf investigate the causal factors of
routine rigidity. See questions 13-16 in appendix A.

Information quality
We adapt measurement items for the information quality construct from Li et al.
(2005). These researchers use five items to evaluate the quality of information shared
with partners. We interpret this as external trading partners such as raw material suppliers
and outside service providers. From this research, information quality dimensions include
accuracy, adequacy, completeness, reliability, and timeliness. We alter the original
questions to address information quality from an intra-organization perspective. See
questions 17-19 in appendix A.

Warning capability
We adapt the measures for warning capability from the concept of discovery
(Hays and Hill, 2001) and monitoring (Grover and Malhotra, 2003) to tap the construct’s
identification dimension. Also, we derived questions concerning communication from
Chen and Paulraj (2004) and Chen, Paulraj, and Lado (2004). The communication
measurement items focus on “events or changes that may affect the other party.” We
adapt them to refer to the internal communication between the disaster command center
and other intra-organization departments and employees. See questions 20-23 in
appendix A.
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Recovery capability
We develop the measures for recovery capabilities based on McCollough, Berry,
and Yadav’s ( 2000) work on recovery expectations, Koufteros, Vonderembse, and Doll’s
(2001) work on early involvement, and de Jong and de Ruyter’s (2004) work on
proactive recovery behaviors. To insure that we capture both the pre-emptive and
reactive dimensions of recovery, we create items that looked at pre- and post-disruption
response efforts. We also add control measures pertaining to the organization’s command
center, to determine how these entities affect SC disruption management.
When designing warning and recovery practices, managers need to keep four
overarching principles in mind. First, the organization’s communication infrastructure
significantly affects how practitioners communicate information internally and across the
supply chain. Managers should design warning and recovery systems to insure quick
communication of pertinent information to appropriate personnel. This includes methods
of transmission, protocols on how to categorize and handle SC threats, and escalation
procedures for unexpected threats. Second, practitioners should refine their scanning,
communication, and recovery activities with real-world testing. While training and
practice may be the only opportunity for rare events, actual use during a SC disruption
with structured feedback is the best method to improve capabilities. Smith (2011)
suggests that scenario planning and simulations are important techniques to test strategies
and plans. Third, while there is no way to eliminate all false positives, managers should
attempt to minimize their effect (Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998). This requires extensive
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communication and a keen understanding about disruption probabilities. Without
sustained communication efforts, organizations will experience a loss of faith as false
positives undermine the entire SCRM strategy. Finally, individuals involved with both
warning and recovery efforts should be free of organizational inertia or the influence of
the corporate culture (Smith, 2011). When biased by management or political initiatives,
information about SC disruptions may degrade and slow warning and recovery efforts.
See questions 24-27 in appendix A.

Research Methodology
Expert review
To establish face validity of the study’s definitions and measures, we reviewed
concepts with several practitioners and academic experts (Anastasi, 1988). These
informants validate our thinking with item-to-concept sorting procedures (Q-sorts) and
qualitative feedback on measure wording and model design. During Q-sorting
procedures, respondents spoke to incomplete definitions, misleading concepts, and the
Qualtrics.com survey instrument. After adjusting questions based on the Q-sorts, we then
asked procurement professionals to review the survey instrument. This study’s primary
investigator directed the interviews and asked clarifying questions. We recorded the
interviews and made changes to the final survey instrument based on the experts input.
Between April and November 2012, we interviewed six procurement
professionals from several industries. We asked interviewees about the hypothetical
model, survey questions, and proposed hypotheses. Procurement director #1 works at in a
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large medical center, procurement director #2 and #3 are employees at a large retailer.
Procurement director #4 works at a medium-size university and procurement professional
#5 is a supply corps officer. Additionally, we were able to interview a procurement
manager from a large retailer.

Unit of analysis
For this study, the unit of analysis is the strategic business unit (SBU). We
postulate that while managers develop RM strategies at the organizational level that
employees within the SBU shape the strategy for deployment and execution. Therefore,
we collect survey data from one respondent within the SBU. In particular, procurement
directors and buyers provide data about the intra-organization competencies, RM
capabilities, and their perception of performance.

Data collection
We collected pilot data from procurement directors at university-affiliated
hospitals. Initially, we sent an email survey and a gift card incentive to 938 hospital
professionals. This netted 49 useable responses or 5.2% of the sample frame. Based on
the results we reduced the number of questions and amended several unclear statements.
For the full survey, we sampled 2,700 procurement professionals from multiple
industries. A breakdown of the respondents is included in Figure 2. Empanelonline.com, a
market research company, administered the survey and collected 358 responses. Market
research panels allow researchers to control their data collection efforts, by screening and
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validating panel participants (Ayyagari, Grover, and Purvis, 2011; Carter, 2012). “When
used in conjunction with appropriate screening questions, these features help prevent
sampling and statistical conclusion errors by ensuring that researchers have access to
appropriate sample frames for their studies and can acquire adequate sample sizes and
response rates” (Carter, 2012, p. 208). See appendix B for a full description of
Empanelonline.com’s data collection procedures.
Command Center (COMMAND)
Yes
165
No
43
Position with the Firm (RANK)
VP or above
41
Director
52
Manager
72
Senior Buyer
12
Buyer
14
Analyst
8
Other
5
Years of Experience (TENURE)
< 1 Year
0
1-5 Years
22
6-10 Years
69
11-15 Years
48
15-19 Years
38
20-25 Years
19
>25Years
9

Annual Purchasing Spend (SPEND)
< $100,000
8
$100,000 - $499,999
27
$500,000 - $1 Million
50
$1-10 Million
61
$10-25 Million
34
$25-99 Million
17
>$100 Million
11
Annual Total Revenues (REVENUE)
< $5 Million
14
$5-49 Million
41
$50-99 Million
37
$100-499 Million
49
$500-999 Million
30
$1-10 Billion
26
>$10 Billion
10

Figure 2: Respondent profile
Of the 358 responses, 137 respondents were not eligible to complete the survey
because they could not adequately respond to the survey’s themes (less than 50 percent of
respondent’s time was devoted to procurement/purchasing activities) or their organization
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was too small (less than 50 employees within their organization). This left us with 221
survey responses.

Sample size
Before collecting any data for this research, we calculated the sample size to
ensure adequate power to detect the relationships within this study. Initially, we followed
the standards set by Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001). Their calculations require three
key inputs: alpha level (t), estimate of standard deviation in the population (s), and an
acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated (d). We selected an alpha level of
0.01. This conservatively accounts for the level of risk that the researcher is willing to
accept. We used the standard deviation estimate suggested by Bartlett of 1.167. This
conservative figure estimates the standard deviation for a 7-point scale. Lastly, we used
0.21 as the acceptable margin of error for the estimated mean. This represents the number
of options within a scale multiplied by the acceptable margin of error a researcher is
willing to accept.
=

=

= 204.925 or approximately 205 respondents. With 206

valid responses, we have exceeded the minimum suggested requirements.

Missing data
We tested the original data to determine if the omitted variables are missing
completely at random (MCAR). Using Little’s test, we conclude the data is MCAR (Chi-
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Square = 410.366, DF = 432, Sig. = 0.766). Hence, we replace any missing data using
EQS version 6.1. With less than 1 percent, we follow the advice of Tabachinek and Fidell
(2007) and use expectation-maximization (EM) imputation to estimate missing variables.

Preliminary analysis
We screened the data to identify unusual responses, which resulted in the
rejection of thirteen (13) responses (eight were excluded due to “straightlining,” two were
excluded for unusually short response time (less than 40 seconds), and three were
excluded because the majority of the questions were unanswered. Then, using
Mahalanobis distance values to evaluate multivariate outliers, we removed two responses.
Using EQS 6.1, we confirmed that the degree of multivariate skewness (Mardia, 1970)
was also excessive. A normalized Mardia’s estimate of 52.07 indicates positive and
significant multivariate kurtosis. When we removed two (2) outliers, and the Mardia
estimate dropped to 47.36. We conducted a preliminary analysis on the remaining data,
including tests for outliers and kurtosis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The final sample
resulted in 206 responses or 12.98 percent of the potential respondent pool.
Even with two outliers removed, we consider the data non-normal. Therefore, we
use the robust estimates available in EQS 6.1. This method allows users to analyze nonnormally distributed data with covariance based SEM techniques. Robust methods use
Satorra-Bentler
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Chi-square estimates (Satorra and Bentler 1988). In addition, we provide standard errors,
CFI, and RMSEA from SEM output based on Bentler’s (1995) calculations. Byrne (2006)
insists the robust methodology is valid, even though the data violates the normality
assumption. Chou, Bentler, and Satorra, 1991) have confirmed, via simulation, that
robust methods yield accurate estimates.

Common method bias
Podsakoff, McKenzie, and Podsakoff (2012) refer to common method bias
(CMB) when describing the systematic variance introduced into research by the
measurement method. Researchers should address this phenomenon as it can affect the
relationship between constructs. In particular, CMB can distort construct reliability
estimates (Bagozzi 1984) and the relationship parameter estimates (Podsakoff et al. 2012)
Researchers should attend to the CMB phenomenon during measurement design.
When done proactively, investigators are able to lessen the influence of the measurement
method. Initially, we employ multiple rounds of Q-sorting and pretesting to eliminate
wording ambiguity associated with specific questions. Procedurally, we changed the
anchors within the survey instrument in order to eliminate common scale properties
(Podsakoff et al., 2012).
Further, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2012), we also tested the measurement
instrument statistically. We employed both the latent factor and marker variable test to
identify method bias. (See Appendix C for full results.) Using the method factor test, we
identified four items, organizational learning1, warning capability-1, information quality-
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1, and SCDO1, indicating potential bias. For each item, the method factor accounted for
21.2 percent, 31.1 percent, 28.9 percent, and 32.9 percent of the total variance,
respectively. We further assess these findings by comparing the S-B X2 of the original
model as compared to the model where the method factor was included (Byrne 2006).
We found the change in S-B X2 to be significant at p<0.001. This indicates that additional
common variance was accounted for, when the method factor was included.
The marker variable test showed similar results. In this case, we compare the
average variance extracted (AVE) of the original model to the AVE of the model where
the marker variable is included. In total, the AVE decreased from 0.677 (original model)
to 0.594 (model with marker variable). Thus, both the method factor and marker variable
test indicate that common method bias is present within our data set. We, therefore, take
the conservative approach and control for the method bias in subsequent analyses.

Non-response bias
Non-response bias occurs when respondents that failed to answer a survey
provide significantly different answers than respondents that did complete a survey.
Applying the logic of Armstrong and Overton (1977), we compare early and late
responders. For this, we compare the means for three control variables: years of work
experience (WORK), annual revenue spent (SPEND), and annual revenue (REVENUE).
Table 3 below indicates that we did not find discernible differences between early and
late respondents. We conclude that non-response bias is not a significant problem.
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Tests of Non-Response Bias
Work Experience (WORK) Mean Std. Dev. t-stat
Early Respondents (N=15)
3.47
1.06
Late Respondents (N=15)
3.87
1.06
0.31

p-value (2-tail)
0.76

Annual Spend (SPD)
Early Respondents (N=15)
Late Respondents (N=15)

Mean
3.6
3.27

Std. Dev.
0.99
1.75

t-stat

p-value (2-tail)

0.53

0.6

Annual Revenue (REV)
Early Respondents (N=15)
Late Respondents (N=15)

Mean Std. Dev.
3.87
0.92
3.27
1.71

t-stat

p-value (2-tail)

0.24

0.81

Table 3: Tests of Non-Response Bias

Confirmatory factor analysis
Using Menor and Roth’s (2007) methodology, we employ confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) to assess the unidimensionality, reliability and validity (convergent and
discriminant) of the proposed measures. Table 4 illustrates the unidimensionality and
reliability of the proposed measures. Given that the X2 statistic was significant, we follow
MacCallum’s (1990) advice and evaluate the absolute and incremental fit indices. Using
EQS version 6.1, we calculate and report several fit measures in Table 4. We compared
the CFI to the generally accepted guideline value of 0.90. In addition, all of the SRMRs
were below the best practice standard of 0.08. We also report RMSEA values for each
construct and note that several are above 0.08, which suggests mediocre fit (MacCallum,
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Recently, Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, (2011) suggested
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that RMSEA values should not be computed for low degree of freedom models, as they
found the incremental fit calculation overinflated the resulting RMSEA values.
Item

# of items

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

Cronbach's Alpha

Composite
reliability

Average
variance
extracted

Common Vision
Organizational
Learning
DSRC
Routine Rigidity
SCDO
Information Quality
Warning Capability
Recovery Capability

4

0.956

0.148

0.035

0.878

0.88

0.695

4

0.988

0.071

0.025

0.885

0.886

0.705

8
4
4
3
4
4

0.924
0.925
1.00
1.00
0.945
0.986

0.108
0.243
0
0
0.179
0.090

0.052
0.07
0.01
0
0.062
0.023

0.927
0.847
0.847
0.874
0.881
0.855

0.928
0.855
0.855
0.888
0.878
0.862

0.671
0.657
0.657
0.757
0.693
0.667

Table 4: Unidimensionality and reliability of warning and recovery capabilities
To evaluate the measure’s reliability, we use the CFA standardized factor
loadings to calculate composite reliability and average variance extracted (AVE) values.
In this context, “reliability refers to the extent to which the questionnaire is free from
measurement error” (Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1987, p. 10). Bagozzi and Yi (1988)
suggest that researchers compare the calculated composite reliability values to a standard
of 0.70. All measures, including those for warning and recovery capability, exceed this
guideline. With over 70% of the variance estimating the true score variance, the evidence
indicates that the measures reliably reflect the constructs of interest. Further, we compare
the AVE to the best practice value of 0.50 (See Table 5). We surmise that the measures
account for the constructs variance rather the error. Both the AVE and the composite
reliability figures suggest that the measures accurately reflect the proposed constructs.
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Items

Common
Vision

Common Vision-1

0.726

Common Vision-2
Common Vision-3
Common Vision-4
SCD0-1
SCD0-2
SCD0-3
SCD0-4
Organizational Learning-1
Organizational Learning-2
Organizational Learning-3
Organizational Learning-4
Routine Rigidity-1
Routine Rigidity-2
Routine Rigidity-3
Routine Rigidity-4
Information Quality-1
Information Quality-2
Information Quality-3

0.801
0.797
0.761

Supply Chain
Disruption
Org
Routine Information Warning Recovery
Orientation Learning Rigidity
Quality
Capability Capability Performance

AVE

0.695

0.68
0.649
0.737
0.674

0.645

0.637
0.813
0.766
0.794

0.705

0.729
0.688
0.887
0.784

0.657
0.767
0.757
0.792

0.757

Warning Capability-1

0.645

Warning Capability-2

0.689

Warning Capability-3

0.857

Warning Capability-4

0.9

0.693

Recovery Capability-1

0.729

Recovery Capability-2

0.729

Recovery Capability-3

0.722

Recovery Capability-4
Performance-1

0.71

0.667

0.626

Performance-2
Performance-3

0.76
0.764

Table 5: Measurement properties of reflective constructs
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0.634

We evaluate the convergent validity by inspecting the magnitude and sign of the
standardized loading factors (see Table 6). All loadings factors appear to be directionally
appropriate (concurrent validity). In addition, the average variance extracted (AVE) for
each construct is exceeds > 0.50 the suggested guidelines found within literature (Fornell
& Larcker, 1981). This inspection suggests the proposed measures exhibit convergent
validity.

Composite
Reliability
Common Vision
0.880
Organizational Learning
0.886
Warning Capability
0.878
Recovery Capability
0.862
Routine Rigidity
0.855
SCDO
0.846
Information Quality
0.888
Performance
0.795
Items

AVE #of items

Items

0.695
0.705
0.693
0.667
0.657
0.645
0.757
0.634

CV
OL
WC
RC
RR
SCDO
IQ
PERF

4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3

Common Organizational
Warning
Recovery Routine
Vision
Learning
Capability
Capability Rigidity
0.83
30.31
1.66
36.64
43.93
0.87
0.84
32.06
38.41
39.14
0.76
0.70
0.83
9.16
61.01
0.81
0.82
0.92
0.82
40.82
(0.01)
(0.17)
0.09
0.01
0.81
0.73
0.68
0.72
0.70
0.05
0.74
0.59
0.77
0.78
0.10
0.84
0.84
0.75
0.85
0.09

SCDO
42.41
38.17
34.95
28.68
46.08
0.80
0.78
0.69

Information
Performance
Quality
37.99
20.31
27.16
21.36
26.21
36.85
48.98
16.4
30.78
54.27
47.71
38.26
0.87
35.79
0.76
0.80

Table 6: Correlations1 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)2 and chi-square
differences3 ()4
1. Correlations bottom left triangle
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the
AVE to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located
in bottom left triangle.
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe)
4. Negative correlations between factors
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Finally, we explore the scale’s discriminant validity. We assess the multi-items
scales by estimating 42 models (21 constrained and 21 unconstrained) and calculating the
X2 difference for nested models (Satorra and Bentler, 2001) (See Appendix E for input
and output variables). Since our data set is non-normal, we use the scaled Satorra-Bentler
chi-square values (S-B) within the EQS 6.2 software. We calculate the S-B X2 differences
using the scaled difference procedure prescribed by Bryant and Satorra (2012). The S-B
X2 difference tests were executed between the constrained model (correlations between
factor pairs constrained to one (1)) and the unconstrained model (correlations between
factor pairs are allowed to correlate freely). We also produced a third set of models to
estimate the scaling correction factor. Bryant and Satorra (2012) provide this correction
to accurately calculate the S-B X2 differences.
When comparing factor pairs, we expect significant differences between
constrained and unconstrained models. Two relationships do not show significant
differences at the P <0.001 value, hence they are not unique constructs (common vision warning capability and warning capability - recovery capability). Particularly concerning
is the lack of difference (S-B X2difference of 9.16) between the warning capability and
recovery capability constructs. This indicates that the two constructs are not significantly
different. We further confirm this finding by evaluating the correlation between the
warning capability and recovery capability constructs. At 0.917, the evidence suggests
these are not unique measures. Therefore, we cannot conclusively establish discriminant
validity between the warning capability and recovery capability constructs.
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Alternate Model
As the warning and recovery capability constructs are not unique, that is due to a
lack of discriminant validity, we offer an alternate model (Figure 3). In the new
representation, warning and recovery represent two dimensions of an organization’s
disruption sensing and response capability. The warning dimension speaks to the
organization’s ability to scan the SC for anomalies and then to communicate information
about threats to partners. The recovery dimension addresses an organization’s response
capabilities. Specifically, they call attention to preemptive recovery, which takes place
before an actual disruption occurs, and reactive recovery for response initiatives that
occur after a SC disruption has manifest. Taken together, disruption sensing and response
capability reflects a multi-dimensional construct of how an organization addresses SC
disruption
As in the first model, the alternate model also has the same four antecedent
competencies, one mediating variable, information quality, one capability level construct
representing disruption sensing and response capability, and organizational performance.
Specifically, the four competencies, common vision, SCDO, organizational learning, and
routine rigidity, reflect an organization’s orientation. Disruption sensing and response
capability is representative of the organizational RM capabilities. Information quality
mediates the relationships between the intra-organization competencies (common vision,
SCDO, organizational learning, and routine rigidity) and the organizational RM
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capabilities. The performance construct represents the practitioners’ perception of
financial and operational performance.

Figure 3- Alternate Model

Relationship between common vision and disruption sensing and response
capability (H1A)
As noted above, executives use a common vision to provide insight on how to
manage an organization. The messages should highlight key objectives and show how
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attaining goals aligns with an employee’s belief system. When managers properly
communicate the common vision, practitioners are motivated to pursue the organization’s
objectives without direct incentives.
When considering the relationship between the common vision competency and
disruption sensing and response capability, executives should outline why scanning,
communicating, and responding to SC disruptions is paramount. This includes written
and verbal communications about how managing SC risk is good operationally and
financially. We avow that addressing SC disruption within the common vision allows
practitioners to understand how RM leads to better service, balanced operations, and
steady shareholder value (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, 2009).
We suppose that highly reliable organizations seek a more balanced approach
emphasizing long-term safety, improvisation, and redundancy, along with cost
management (for non-profits) or profits (for profit organizations). Further, we believe
that executives must clearly communicate the common vision messages to employees if
they are to develop a reliable organization. From this position, when organizations
properly develop the common vision competency, we believe they will have improved
scanning, communication, and response abilities. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1A-Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher disruption
sensing and response capability levels.
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The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between common
vision and disruption sensing and response capability (H1B)
As executives communicate their vision to employees, they need to insure the
information quality of the messages. Without high information quality, employees may
misunderstand the intent and fail to link key objectives to personal beliefs. While
information quality has been researched as a mediator (e.g. Pearson, Tadisina and
Griffin, 2012 or McDowell and Karriker, 2009), its affect on abstract communications
such as a common vision is absent within literature. Therefore, we advise that
information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and the disruption
sensing and response capability construct.
From a high reliability perspective, employees need a foundation from which to
act. Executives need to outline, within the common vision, the organization’s goals as
they pertain to SC disruption. When done, executives empower employees to respond
quickly and without fear. Ultimately, when quality common vision messages flow
throughout an organization, we envision that they help reduce confusion and frustration,
which enhances organizational success (Huber and Daft, 1987). Thus:
H1B-Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and
disruption sensing and response capability
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Relationship between supply chain disruption orientation and disruption sensing
and response capabilities (H2A)
Managers should establish a supply chain disruption orientation (SCDO) to
ensure that practitioners have a concern for and the motivation to act upon SC disruptions
(Bode et al., 2011). While stemming from management’s communication, SCDO is an
operations level posture that affects the culture of an organization. Thus, employees are
encouraged to think about and seek out behaviors that are disruptive. When viewed with
an high reliability theory lens, a SCDO is similar to situational awareness. Situational
awareness refers to an employee’s perception of their environment, which helps
comprehend the current situation, and envision future states (Endsley, 1995; Weick et al.,
1999)
We imagine that a SCDO should complement an organization’s disruption sensing
and response capability by motivating practitioners to seek out and respond to various SC
threats. For the warning dimension, we embrace Daft and Weick’s (1984) view that
organizations can develop competencies to scan their environment, interpret, and then act
upon various phenomena. When employees understand that uncertainty is present, they
can tune scanning systems to seek out anomalies.
For the disruption sensing and response capability recovery dimension, a SCDO
motivates an organization towards SC stability using its recovery capabilities. (Bode et
al., 2011). With this posture, organizations develop abilities to withstand SC disruptions.
When experienced, employees interpret, adapt, and quickly overcome manifest
consequences. Thus:
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H2A-Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher disruption sensing and
response capability levels.

The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between SCDO and
disruption management capabilities (H2B)
Messages outlining a SCDO provide guidance to operators on how to perform
both before and after a SC disruption. Executives should construct these communications
with high information quality, so practitioners understand and embrace the messages.
Otherwise, operators may not be motivated to seek out potential threats and quickly
respond to actual disruptions.
From a high reliability theory perspective, SCDO is analogous to mindfulness,
where practitioners are preoccupied with failure, sensitive to operations, and committed
to resilience. If mangers fail to outline the organization’s SC goals, then practitioners may
hesitate and delay actions that either mitigate disruption consequences and/or return the
SC to normal. Further, the information quality of these messages must be paramount, as
confusion may drive practitioners to sub-optimal solutions.
The existing literature suggests that organizations can enhance performance when
managers improve the information quality of organizational processes (Preuss, 2003). We
postulate that this is true within SC networks where practitioners gather information from
multiples sources and make time sensitive decisions. Hence, we offer the following
hypothesis:
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H2B-Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and disruption
sensing and response capability

Relationship between organizational learning and disruption sensing and response
capability (H3A)
Organizational learning reflects an organization’s ability to extract information
about a phenomenon, digest it, and alter future behavior. In high reliability theory
vernacular, organizations learn from experimentation (Rochlin, 1993), trial-and-error
(LaPorte and Consolini, 1991), and adaptive learning (Weick et al., 1999). We argue that
organizations with high levels of organizational learning competency will have improved
disruption sensing and response capability levels.
We envision that organizations use experimentation and trial-and-error to
develop the warning dimension of the disruption sensing and response capability
construct. Even with routine activities, experimentation and trial-and-error allows
practitioners to develop their warning tactics as outcomes change over time. This is
particularly true as managers’ experiment with different SC configurations, changing
linkages and relationships as needs change.
Additionally, we liken adaptive learning abilities to response practices used to
restore the SC to normalcy. As disruptions occur, SC practitioners should address the
disruption with mitigation and response tactics. Adaptive learning allows the
organization to learn on the fly and adjust, as the situation requires.
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Further, as an organization develops its reliability capabilities, it should expect a
reduction in the number of disruptions. Therefore, highly reliable organizations should
develop a preoccupation with failure, where practitioners recognize “that all of the
potential failure modes into which the highly complex technical systems could resolve
themselves have yet to be experienced” (Schulman, 1993, p. 364). Thus, we imagine that
managers can develop organizational learning abilities as a means to improve the warning
and recovery abilities, which develops an organization’s disruption management
capabilities. Thus:
H3A-Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher
disruption sensing and response capability levels.

The mediating affects of information quality on the relationship between
organizational learning and disruption sensing and response capability (H3B)
Organizations use organizational learning techniques to enhance understanding
(Damanpour, 1991), influence behavior (Huber, 1991), improve problem solving (Senge,
1990), and boost overall performance (Matsuno and Mentzer, 2000; Hult, Ferrell, and
Hurley, 2002). Practitioners can then use the knowledge acquired from these processes to
develop improved disruption scanning and response systems. However, in order to
benefit from organizational learning initiatives, organizations must be able to gather high
quality data from different information systems and partners. When high information
quality material is available, organizational learning practices enhance organizational
processes and shorten the time associated with learning a new process. If information
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quality is low, then practitioners and the organization will struggle to learn as information
becomes available. Thus:
H3B-Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and
disruption sensing and response capability.

Relationship between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response
capability (H4)
The extant literature suggests that employees are subject to routine rigidity when
embedded processes are hard to amend (Teece et al. 1997). As this construct was born
from the organizational inertia literature, the strength of routine rigidity grows as an
organization’s size increases. This occurs as employees become accustomed to a
particular response, especially during uncertain periods. Tushman and O’Reilly (1996)
indicate that overcoming routine rigidity is difficult, because employees perceive cultural
pressure.
Previous research also suggests that certain organization types can overcome
routine rigidity. Bala and Venkatesh (2007), for example, found that nondominant firms
(compared to dominant firms) experienced less routine rigidity, because the routines used
depended on the partner’s relationship type. Stated differently, employees changed
processes when dealing with different partners. They also found that non-adaptive
organizations were unable to overcome routine rigidity (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007).
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We speculate that in uncertain times, employees will embrace routine rigidity and
diminish the disruption sensing and response capability levels within an organization.
Specifically, we purpose that larger organizations will experience higher levels of routine
rigidity as social inertia inhibits experimentation. Conversely, smaller organizations,
adept to adaptation, should experience less routine rigidity as employees are used to
adaptation. From this rationale, we hypothesize that routine rigidity negatively affects
disruption sensing and response capability. However, due to the inertia effect on the
routine rigidity construct, we propose a moderated effect that varies depending on
organization size. Similar to previous research, we use annual revenue as a proxy for
organizational size (Bajwa, Lewis, Pervan and Lai, 2005). Hence, we offer the following
hypothesis:
H4-Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower – disruption sensing
and response capability levels.

Relationship between disruption sensing and response capabilities and
organizational performance (H5)
When decomposing the disruption sensing and response capability construct, we
find that organizations should develop abilities to scan the SC horizon, communicate
information about threats, and make possible both preemptive and reactive response
tactics. Leveraging the high reliability perspective, this suggests that by developing
certain RM practices that organizations can mitigate SC threats and minimize the impact
of actual SC disruptions. However, in order to manage these competing goals, highly
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reliable organizations as are preoccupied with failure, sensitive to operations, and
committed to resilience. We put forward that by doing so, an organization can also
improve its level of performance. Hence, we offer the following:
H5-Organizations with higher disruption sensing and response capability levels will have
higher levels of performance.

We summarize the proposed hypotheses in Table 7 and discuss the control
variables in section 5.3. Then, we describe the CFA methodology for operationalizing the
disruption sensing and response capability construct and conducting tests of the
hypotheses
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Item
H1A
H1B
H2A
H2B
H3A
H3B
H4
H5

Hypothesis
Organizaitons with higher common vision levels of will have higher disruption
sensing & response capability levels
Information quality mediates the relationship between common vision and
disruption sensing & response capability levels
Organizaitons with higher SCDO levels will have higher disruption sensing &
response capability levels
Information quality mediates the relationship between SCDO and disruption
sensing & response capability levels
Organizaitons with higher organizational learning levels will have higher
disruption sensing & response capability levels
Information quality mediates the relationship between organizational learning and
disruption sensing & response capability levels
Organizations with higher routine rigidity levels will have lower disruption sensing
& response capability levels
Organizations with higher disruption sensing & response capability levels will
have higher levels of performance

Table 7: Summary of Hypotheses- alternate model

Control variables
We include four control variables in this research: command center
(COMMAND), organization rank (RANK), years in position (TENURE), and annual
purchasing spend (SPEND). Participants involved in the exploratory interviews spoke
regularly about the activation of a COMMAND during SC disruptions. A command
center allows organizations to respond to SC disruptions in a centralized manner. Within
a command center environment, we believe that managers can allocate resources and
make decisions because more and higher quality information is available. We also
believe it important to control for RANK and TENURE as it should affect understanding
of SC disruptions. Previous research suggests that experience affects a practitioner’s
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behaviors and decision making (Daft and Weick, 1984; Roberts, 1990; Bode et al., 2011).
By extension, we assume that higher ranked and tenured practitioners will have more
experience with SC disruptions and the tools to manage them. Finally, SPEND is
included as a proxy for organizational size.

Confirmatory factor analysis for alternate model
With the CFA analysis, we assess the unidimensionality, reliability, convergent
validity and discriminant validity of the proposed measures. See Table 8 for a summary
of findings Table 9 for specific item measurement properties. We assess the scale’s
unidimensionality by creating models for each measure. Using the CFI as an indicator of
fit, we find that all CFIs are greater than the generally accepted cut-off value of 0.90. In
addition, SRMR values fall below the 0.08 standard. We also report RMSEA values for
each construct and note that several are above 0.08, which suggests mediocre fit
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Recently, Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach,
(2011) suggested that RMSEA values should not be computed for low degree of freedom
(df) models, as they found the incremental fit calculation overinflated the resulting
RMSEA value. Therefore, the results indicate that all items loaded appropriately.
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Average
variance
extracted

Item

# of items

CFI

RMSEA

Cronbach's Composite
SRMR
Alpha
reliability

Common Vision
Organizational
Learning
DSRC
Routine Rigidity
SCDO
Information Quality

4

0.956

0.148

0.035

0.878

0.88

0.695

4

0.988

0.071

0.025

0.885

0.886

0.705

8
4
4
3

0.924
0.925
1.00
1.00

0.108
0.243
0
0

0.052
0.07
0.01
0

0.927
0.847
0.847
0.874

0.928
0.855
0.855
0.888

0.671
0.657
0.657
0.757

Table 8- Unidimensionality and reliability of measures including disruption sensing and
response capability
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Items

Common Vision

Common Vision-1
Common Vision-2
Common Vision-3
Common Vision-4
SCD0-1
SCD0-2
SCD0-3
SCD0-4
Organizational
Learning-1
Organizational
Learning-2
Organizational
Learning-3
Organizational
Learning-4
Routine Rigidity-1
Routine Rigidity-2
Routine Rigidity-3
Routine Rigidity-4
Information Quality-1
Information Quality-2
Information Quality-3
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability1
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability2
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability3
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability4
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability5
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability6
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability7
Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability8
Performance-1

0.741
0.81
0.799
0.762

Supply Chain
Disruption
Orientation

Org
Learning

Routine
Rigidity

Information
Quality

Disruption
Sensing and
Response
Capability

Performance

AVE

0.695
0.697
0.675
0.742
0.679

0.645

0.623
0.802

0.705
0.755
0.785
0.741
0.702
0.882
0.775

0.657
0.79
0.766
0.799

0.757

0.664

0.723

0.831

0.864

0.671
0.705

0.691

0.705

0.743
0.649

Performance-2

0.781

Performance-3

0.744

Table 9: Measurement properties of reflective constructs
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0.634

We evaluate the measures’ reliability, using the standardized factor loadings
provided in the CFA analysis. This method allows us to calculate values for composite
reliability and the AVE. We compare the measures composite reliability values to a
standard of 0.70 as discussed by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). All measures, including the
newly operationalized disruption sensing and response capability, range from 0.855 to
0.928. Hence, the composite reliability values indicate the measures reliably represent the
theoretical constructs. Further, we calculate AVE values for each measure and compare
them to the established cut off value of 0.50. Thus, we are satisfied that the measures
explain the construct’s variance, rather than error.
Thirdly, we assess the measures for convergent validity. To do so, we inspect
the standardized loading factors to see if they are appropriate (both sign and magnitude).
See Table 10 for a summary of correlations, square root of AVEs, and S-B differences.
We found the factor loadings were significantly and directionally appropriate.
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Common
Vision

Items

Common
Organization
al Learning
Disruption
Sensing &
Response
Capability

Routine
SCDO
Information
Quality
Performance

Organizational
Learning

Disruption
Sensing &
Response
Capability

Routine
Rigidity

0.83

21.43

0.88

0.84

0.81

0.77

0.82

0.00
0.74

(0.15)
0.68

0.08
0.74

0.81
0.07

0.74

0.58

0.80

0.83

0.83

0.81

SCDO

Information
Quality

Performance

56.99

53.7

48.23

40.62

21.29

36.67

43.48

29.33

21.07

17.15

65.63

44.59
39.07
0.80

36.11
34.81
46.39

27.93
54.00
44.25

0.13

0.79

0.85

0.11

0.68

0.75

31.92
0.94

Table 10: Correlations1 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)2 and chi-square
differences3 ()4
1. Correlations bottom left triangle
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the
AVE to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located
in bottom left triangle.
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe)
4. Negative correlations between factors

Finally, we assess the discriminant validity of each measure. We used the S-B
X2 difference test for nested models as our data was non-normal (Satorra and Bentler,
2001). This consists of testing 15 pairs of nested models (15 unconstrained and 15
constrained). We used Crawford and Henry (2003) SBDIFF.exe to calculate the S-B X2
differences. The results indicate that each measure demonstrates discriminant validity.
This leads us to believe that the measures accurately reflect our research constructs.
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Analysis and Findings
We provide the minimums, maximums, means, and standard deviations for all
measures in Table 11. Please note that after the imputation process we adjusted two
responses to 7.0, which was the maximum of our Likert scale.
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Code

Question

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std Dev

Common Vision-1 The management team has clearly explained our organization’s vision.
Most employees are aware of my organization’s primary business goals and
Common Vision-2 objectives.
Common Vision-3 Most employees value my organization’s goals and objectives.
Common Vision-4 When setting goals, most employees consider the organization’s vision.
Org Learning-4
Within my organization, learning is key to improvement.
Org Learning-5
As an organization, we learn from our experiences.
Org Learning-6
Our ability to learn is the key to improving my organization.
Org Learning-7
As an organization we learn from our successes.
Performance-1
My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum.
Performance-2
My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum.
Performance-3
My organization is able to keep service quality high.
DSR-1
My organization has procedures to identify threats.
Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about
DSR-2
potential threats.
DSR-3
Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions.
DSR-4
The command center identifies potential threats.
When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery
DSR-5
efforts.
Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the
DSR-6
negative effects.
My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the
DSR-7
effects of a disruption.
DSR-8
Resources can be deployed before an actual disruption occurs.
Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is
Info Qual-1
reliable.

2.00

7.00

5.83

1.21

1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

5.72
5.79
5.71
5.96
5.94
6.02
5.94
5.52
5.59
5.96
5.73

1.25
1.13
1.09
1.05
1.11
1.04
1.06
1.22
1.15
1.15
1.22

1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00

5.74
5.73
5.71

1.14
1.20
1.18

2.00

7.00

5.91

1.05

2.00

7.00

5.91

1.07

2.00
1.00

7.00
7.00

5.86
5.74

1.13
1.19

1.00

7.00

5.77

1.24

Info Qual-2

2.00

7.00

5.81

1.02

1.00

7.00

5.84

1.06

1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00

5.05
5.13

1.67
1.48

1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00

4.72
3.93

1.91
2.14

1.00
2.00

7.00
7.00

5.93
5.77

1.20
1.13

2.00
2.00

7.00
7.00

5.89
5.86

1.04
1.05

1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00

2.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

1.21
2.75
3.94
3.89
3.76

0.41
1.43
1.31
1.42
1.60

Info Qual-3
Routine Rigidity-1
Routine Rigidity-2
Routine Rigidity-3
Routine Rigidity-4
SCDO-1
SCDO-2
SCDO-3
SCDO-4
COMMAND
RANK
TENURE
SPEND
REVENUE

Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is timely.
Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is
accurate.
There is resistance within my organization when trying to change existing
business processes.
Within my organization, there are many overlapping processes.
I have a tendency to resist changing how I am used to doing things within my
organization.
I find it difficult to learn new processes.
Understanding how supply chain disruptions occur is important to my
organization.
As an organization, we regularly think about supply chain disruptions.
We think about how supply chain disruptions can be avoided across the
organization.
Supply chain disruptions show my organization where we can improve.
Does your organization have an emergency command / center or disaster
response center?
Position within the firm?
Years / of professional work experience?
Annual purchasing spend (approximate).
Annual revenues (approximate).

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Model
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We then evaluate the model’s overall fit. Because the data is non-normal, we
utilize the robust fit indices: χ2 = 746.25, df = 500, NNFI = 0.910, CFI = 0.924, and
RMSEA = 0.049. Robust (maximum likelihood) statistics are appropriate when data
exhibits non-normality. The structural model (i.e., the combined measurement and path
model) indicates the data fits well. Existing literature shows that OM researchers use
robust fit indices (Vickery, Droge, Stank, Goldsby, & Markland, 2004; Kroes & Ghosh,
2010). Consistent with these works, we report the standardized Betas, S-B χ2 statistic,
and corresponding fit indices in Table 12.
Hypothesis
H1A
H1B
H2A
H2B
H3A
H3B
H4
H5
Control

Fit

Path
Common Vision >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct)
Common Vision >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability
(Mediated)
Supply Chain Disruption Orientation >> Disruption Sensing & Response
Capability (Direct)
Supply Chain Disruption Orientation >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing &
Response Capability (Mediated)
Organizational Learning >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct)
Organizational Learning >> Info Quality >> Disruption Sensing & Response
Capability (Mediated)
Routine Rigidity >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability (Direct)
Routine Rigidity * REVENUE >> Disruption Sensing & Response Capability
(Moderated)
Disruption Sensing & Response Capability >> Organizational Performance
REV= Annual Revenues >> Organizational Performance
Index
S-B Scaled Chi-Square
DEGREES OF FREEDOM
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI)
NON-NORMED FIT INDEX (NNFI)
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA)
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF RMSEA

Unstandardized b
(Std Error)
0.125 (0.208)

Standardized β Confirmed
0.131
No

0.286 (0.145)

0.299

Yes

-0.051 (0.145)

-0.053

No

0.250 (0.110)

0.262

Yes

0.436 (0.190)

0.456

Yes

-0.167 (0.109)
0.109 (0.049)

-0.174
0.114

No
Yes

-0.105 (0.044)
0.829 (0.085)
0.038 (0.023)

-0.110
0.860
0.064
Alternate Model
746.25
500
0.924
0.91
0.049
(0.041, 0.056)

Yes
Yes
No

Table 12: Coefficients and Robust Fit Indices for the Alternate Model

Common vision (H1A-B)
The evidence indicates the direct path (H1A) from common vision to disruption
sensing and response capability is not significant, (β = 0.125, p=0.5488). However, we
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find the indirect path (H1B) from common vision to disruption sensing and response
capability is significant. Upon inspection, we find that information quality fully mediates
the relationships. Common vision to information quality (β = 0.560, p = 0.0106) and
information quality to disruption sensing and response capability (β = 0.511, p =0.0051)
are both significant. Therefore, the resultant indirect effect equals β = 0.2862. Selig and
Preacher (2008) suggest assessing the indirect effects with a Monte Carlo or bootstrap
test that estimates the confidence interval for the indirect effect. To confirm a significant
mediated effect between common vision and disruption sensing and response capability,
we conduct a bootstrap analysis to determine if the confidence interval includes zero
(Selig and Preacher, 2008). Based on 20,000 bootstrap samples, the 95% confidence
interval (CI) ranged from 0.03994 (lower CI) to 0.6363 (upper CI) (see appendix #D for
distribution of indirect effects). This confirms that the fully mediated relationship is
significant. We interpret this finding in the following manner. When executives
communicate the high-level objectives, they should carefully craft the common vision
messages. This follows Redman’s (1998) assertion that poor information quality can
undermine an employee’s trust, demoralize the organization, and make strategic
alignment difficult.

Supply chain disruption orientation (H2A-B)
The path coefficient from SCDO to disruption sensing and response capability
(H2A) is not significant, (β = -0.051, p = 0.7265). However, we find a fully mediated
relationship between SCDO to disruption sensing and response capability (H2B).

129

Specifically, information quality fully mediates the linkage between the constructs.
SCDO to information quality (β = 0.489, p = 0.0005) and information quality to
disruption sensing and response capability (β=0.511, p =0.0051) for an indirect total of β
= 0.2410. Leveraging best practice, we conduct a bootstrap analysis to verify the
significant mediated effect between SCDO and disruption sensing and response
capability. Using 20,000 repetitions, the 95% confidence interval (CI) ranged from
0.05797 (lower CI) to 0.5101 (upper CI) (see appendix D for distribution of indirect
effects). The evidence confirms the fully mediated relationship between SCDO and
disruption sensing and response capability. As SCDO is an operational level construct, we
envision that employees need quality messages to comprehend SC objectives.
Operationally, poor information quality leads to increased costs and undermines the
satisfaction of both employees and customers (Redman, 1998).

Organizational learning (H3A-B)
H3A hypothesized a positive relationship between organizational learning and the
disruption sensing and response capability construct. The findings indicate that the direct
path is significant and positive (β = 0.436, p = 0.0224). We expected this result, as the
organizational learning literature suggests that activities such as practice and simulation
affect SC capabilities. For example, Ngai, Chau, and Chan (2010) linked organizational
learning to SC agility. In addition, research has also linked organizational learning to
productivity and cost improvements (Hatch and Mowery, 1998) and product quality
capabilities (Fine, 1986; Linderman et al., 2004).
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With a significant direct relationship established in H3A, we can only test for a
partially mediated relationship through information quality. The analysis, however, shows
that linkage between the organizational learning and information quality construct to be
non-significant (b = -0.327. When factoring in the relationship between information
quality and disruption sensing and response capability (b = 0.511), we find the indirect
total to be b=-0.167. Therefore, only the direct relationship exists between organizational
learning and the disruption sensing and response capability construct. We confirm that the
indirect relationship is non-significant using a bootstrap analysis (see appendix D for
distribution of indirect effects). Using 20,000 repetitions, the 95% confidence interval
(CI) ranged from -0.4404 (lower CI) to 0.0263 (upper CI). Since this range included zero
(0), the indirect relationship is not significant.

Routine rigidity (H4)
For hypothesis #4, we proposed a negative relationship between routine rigidity
and the disruption sensing and response capability construct. However, to determine the
impact we include REVENUE, a proxy for organizational size. We believe a moderated
relationship exists as the effect of routine rigidity depends on the organization size. Stated
differently, as organization size increases, the effect of routine rigidity will also change.
Both routine rigidity (IV) and REVENUE (moderating variable) were mean centered for
the analysis. Upon examination, we find that the interaction routine rigidity X
REVENUE negatively affects the direct relationship. Stated differently, there is a
moderated relationship between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response
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capability when we account for REVENUE. Hence, we see a decrease in the slope by 0.105 for every unit increase for REVENUE. Thus, we find support for H4A.. While
informative, this does not provide a complete understanding of what is occurring.
. To facilitate interpretation, we report simple slopes as suggested by Aiken and
West (1992). As part of the analysis, we find a significant and positive direct relationship
(β = 0.109, p =0.0272) between routine rigidity and disruption sensing and response
capability





Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at +3 standard deviations
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * +3* 1.601) = -0.3953
Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at +1 standard deviations
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * 1* 1.601) = -0.05910
Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at its mean = 0.109
Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at -1 standard deviations
of REVENUE = 0.109+(-0.105 * -1* 1.601) = 0.27710

This indicates that at high REVENUE levels (larger organizations); a one-unit
increase in routine rigidity decreases disruption sensing and response capability by
0.05910 units. At moderate levels of REVENUE, a one-unit change in routine rigidity
slightly improves the disruption sensing and response capability by 0.104. Finally, when
REVENUE levels are low (small organizations), a one-unit increase in routine rigidity
improves the disruption sensing and response capability by 0.27710. Bala and Venkatesh
(2007) had similar results in their study of routine rigidity and the dominance of firms.
They found that non-dominant organizations are immune to routine rigidity effects, by
developing a range of routines for different trading partners. Figure 4 illustrates the slope
of the interaction at high (+1 standard deviations), medium (at mean), and low levels (-1
standard deviations). We also provide the simple slopes at +3 standard deviations to
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illustrate extremely large organizations were the inertia literature suggests routine rigidity
would be most prevalent.

1
0.8

Disruption Sensing & Response Capability

0.6
0.4
0.2
Low Revenue

0
Med Revenue

-0.2

High Revenue

-0.4

Very High Revenue

-0.6
-0.8
-1

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Mean centered scale
Original scale 7 - pt

Routine Rigidity

Figure 4: Simple Slopes for routine rigidity x REVENUE interaction

Disruption sensing and response capability to organization performance (H5)
The path coefficient from disruption sensing and response capability to
organization performance is positive, (β = 0.829, p > 0.0001). This suggests that
managers can develop disruption sensing and response capabilities as a method to
improve performance. This result also supports the assertions within the existing RM
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literature suggesting that warning and recovery capabilities enhance performance
(Craighead et al., 2007).

The effect of control variables
We tested the effect related to several control variables: command center
(COMMAND), experience (TENURE), position (RANK), and annual purchasing spend
(SPEND) (See Table 13). None of the controls, COMMAND, TENURE, RANK, or
SPEND, significantly altered the relationships found within the alternate model.

Disruption Sensing
& Response
Capability
Information
Quality
Organizational
Performance
S-B Scaled ChiSquare
DEGREES OF
FREEDOM
COMPARATIVE FIT
INDEX (CFI)
NON-NORMED FIT
INDEX (NNFI)
ROOT MEANSQUARE ERROR OF
APPROXIMATION
(RMSEA)
90% CONFIDENCE
INTERVAL OF
RMSEA

COMMAND

RANK

TENURE

SPEND

-0.267 (0.037)***

-0.011 (0.050)

-0.063 (0.059)

-0.143 (0.169)

0.127 (0.034)**

0.015 (0.067)

0.075 (0.062)

0.046 (0.056)

0.041 (0.043)

0.012 (0.067)

0.003 (0.076)

0.035 (0.092)

948.22

796.16

787.76

769.48

526

526

526

526

0.882

0.916

0.919

0.925

0.859

0.899

0.903

0.91

0.063

0.05

0.049

0.048

(0.056-0.069)

(0.043-0.057)

(0.042-0.056)

(0.040-0.054)

Notes: *** Significant to 0.0001; ** Significant to 0.001;

Table 13: Control variable betas, standard errors, and fit indices
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Implications for Research and Practice
Research into SCR and RM continues to expand as organizations realize the
vulnerabilities of their elongated supply chains. While many studies examine operational
mitigation techniques like buffers and capacity, there is scant research into organizational
RM practices. In particular, there is a dearth of behavior-based RM techniques (Zsidisin,
2003; Simchi-Levi et al., 2010). Recognizing how organizations develop and embed
these RM competencies and capabilities into the organization’s culture is central to
understanding future RM initiatives. By developing and empirically validating the
disruption sensing and response capability measure, this study enhances future SCRM
research in three ways. First, we provide an empirically valid and reliable measure that
organization can use to measure and benchmark their RM capabilities. Second, the study
confirms that organizations should develop their common vision, SCDO, and
organizational learning competencies to enhance their RM capabilities. Third, the
evidence implies that large organizations must manage their routine rigidity levels;
otherwise, they may experience a degradation of their disruption sensing and response
capabilities. Fourth, by teasing out the effect of information quality on the different
relationships, managers understand the importance of quality communications. Lastly, the
study provides empirical evidence, illustrating how managers can use behavior-based RM
techniques.
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Discussion
While practitioners may suggest that an organization’s common vision, SCDO,
organizational learning, and routine rigidity competencies may affect its RM capabilities,
there is scant evidence confirming the relationships. To fill this gap, we empirically test
the effect of four antecedent competences and one mediating variable on the disruption
sensing and response capability measure and organization performance. We provide
confirmation that organizations can develop their common vision, SCDO, and
organizational learning competencies as a way to address SC risk. These competencies
allow managers to develop their employees and their abilities rather than just investing in
redundancies such as inventory or capacity.
In addition, we offer a new multi-dimensional RM measure, which enables
academics and practitioners to evaluate and compare a key RM capability. The measure
uses Craighead’s, (2007) definition and accounts for both a warning and recovery
dimension. However, the evidence suggests that practitioners have a difficult time
separating the warning and recovery dimensions. We recognize that we tested the
constructs across multiple industries. Future research, where industry variance is
controlled may lead to different results.

Limitations
We acknowledge several methodological and conceptual limitations. The primary
limitation of this work is that we derive our findings from 206 procurement directors and
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managers. While we believe these respondents represent the larger population of
procurement professionals, we suggest caution when interpreting the results.
Second, using a sample composed of organizations from different industries may
be problematic. The sample’s diversity may have caused the strength of specific
relationships to be attenuated by industries with stronger or weaker relationships. We
suspect that if this study focused on a single industry that the path coefficients found
could be slightly different.
Third, while we triangulate this study with qualitative data from multiple rounds
of item-to construct sorting procedures and interview feedback, we believe additional
research is necessary. Researchers need to confirm the validity and reliability of the
measurement items and this survey instrument.
A fourth limitation is that while our conceptualization of the disruption sensing
and response capability measure advances our understanding of SCRM, we concede that
other factors also influence an organization’s RM capabilities. In particular, we did not
test the manager’s risk perception about how a threat affects an organization’s disruption
sensing and response capability. As this investigation’s original objective was to
operationalize the warning and recovery constructs, as proposed by Craighead et al.
(2007), we felt appropriate to test the predictive validity of the newly proposed behaviorbased RM tactic.
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Future Research Opportunities
We note three potential research opportunities that stem from this analysis. First,
and most logical, is to investigate other organizational competencies, such as external SC
integration or vertical information systems (Galbraith, 1974), which can be linked to an
organization’s disruption sensing and response capability. Second, we believe there is a
wealth of opportunity to explore the proactive and reactive recovery capabilities that are
proposed within our manuscript. Results from these opportunities will further augment
the extant knowledge of SCRM frameworks and risk management practices. Third, we
would like to see these same constructs tested within a single industry. We believe the
results and supporting theory could provide additional insight into how an organizations
and its industry deal with SC disruptions.

Conclusions
Our results indicate that organizations can manage behavior-based competencies
as a mechanism to improve their SCRM capabilities. We show, in particular, the value of
developing an organization’s common vision and SCDO. Managers use these
competencies to outline the goals of an organization and provide energy and guidance as
practitioners work to achieve these objectives. The evidence also suggests that enhanced
organizational learning abilities allow practitioners to learn from and better prepare for
SC disruption. With expanding supply chains and more complexity between the various
nodes, SC practitioners need to be able to convert what they learn into new RM practices.
At the same time, we found that controlling routine rigidity levels is important so
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employees do not inhibit their adaptation and improvisation abilities, which help address
unpredictable SC threats. The evidence suggests this is a significant issue within larger
organizations. Managers need to prepare SC practitioners for disruption so they can
respond quickly and adapt when necessary.
Beyond the findings specific to behavior-based competencies, this study
contributes to the OM and RM literature in four ways. First, it validates a theory-based
SCRM measure. The disruption sensing and response capability construct addresses both
the warning and recovery dimension as proposed by Craighead et al., (2007). However,
by confirming that the warning capability and recovery capability measures are not
different, we provide evidence about how practitioners view SCRM. Specifically, the
evidence indicates that while warning and recovery are conceptually different, that in
practice, they are actually one RM concept. Second, we provide evidence of the
connection between internal competencies, RM capabilities, and operating performance.
This confirms high reliability theory theorists’ belief that organizations can
simultaneously focus on several objectives, such as performance and safety. Third, by
studying the moderating effects of firm size and the mediating effects of information
quality, we provide direction to managers as they develop RM strategies. As stated by
Manuj and Mentzer (2008), “Managers must understand the advantages and
disadvantages of the various risk management strategies, and when they are appropriate”
(p. 216). Lastly, by studying the behavior-based competencies and capabilities, we
further the principle that organizations should embed an understanding of RM and risk
assessment into their culture (Simchi-Levi, 2010). Managers should design daily
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activities that enhance organizational learning, information quality, and communication
with RM initiatives in mind. Otherwise, SC practitioners and the organization will not be
prepared for the next inevitable SC disruption.
By developing behavior based competencies and capabilities to the arsenal of RM
tactics, organizations can better protect their supply chains from inevitable disruptions.
These RM techniques are particularly helpful for when SC threats rarely occur and when
they do, they manifest in unpredictable ways. We hope managers embed these behaviors
into the culture of an organization so practitioners can adapt and overcome any type of
SC threat, large or small.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Survey questions
Common vision
1. The management team has clearly explained our organization’s vision.
2. Most employees are aware of my organization’s primary business goals and
objectives.
3. Most employees value my organization’s goals and objectives.
4. When setting goals, most employees consider the organization’s vision.
Supply chain disruption orientation
5. Understanding how supply chain disruptions occur is important to my
organization.
6. As an organization, we regularly think about supply chain disruptions.
7. We think about how supply chain disruptions can be avoided across the
organization.
8. Supply chain disruptions show my organization where we can improve.
Organizational learning
9. Within my organization, learning is key to improvement.
10. As an organization, we learn from our experiences.
11. Our ability to learn is the key to improving my organization.
12. As an organization, we learn from our successes.
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Routine rigidity
13. There is resistance within my organization when trying to change existing
business processes.
14. Within my organization, there are many overlapping processes.
15. I have a tendency to resist changing how I am used to doing things within my
organization.
16. I find it difficult to learn new processes.
Information quality
17. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is reliable.
18. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is timely.
19. Within my organization, information used for analysis and reporting is accurate.
Warning capability
20. My organization has procedures to identify threats.
21. Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about potential
threats.
22. Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions.
23. The command center identifies potential threats.
Recovery capability
24. When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery efforts.
25. Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the
negative effects.
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26. My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the
effects of a disruption.
27. Resources can be deployed before an actual disruption occurs.
Performance
28. My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum.
29. My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum.
30. My organization is able to keep service quality high.
Control questions
31. Does your organization have an emergency command / center or disaster response
center?
32. Position within the firm?
33. Years / of professional work experience?
34. Annual purchasing spend (approximate).
35. Annual revenues (approximate).
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Appendix B: Data collection procedures
In this study, we used Empanelonline.com to administer the data collection
process. With access to 1.3 million potential respondents, Empanelonline.com, uses a
“double opt-in” procedure to register and survey qualified panelists. Initially, prospective
respondents join various panels by registering at Empanelonline.com. Respondents
identify panels for which they are qualified, by answering questions about their
credentials (experience, job title, household income, etc.) Once qualified
Empanelonline.com invites respondents to complete questionnaires that pertain to certain
topics (i.e. the join certain panels. Empanelonline.com does conduct verification checks
to determine if respondents’ are genuine. This includes validating address and email
information and verifying respondents against third-party databases when possible.
Further, Empanelonline.com periodically reviews the quality of respondents to ensure
that panelists are qualified to answer survey. This includes monitoring how many surveys
the panelist has completed and qualification questions about certain topics. Lastly,
Empanelonline.com does monitor professional survey takers and removes them from all
available panels.
The population of interest for our study was procurement/purchasing decision
makers such as procurement director, purchasing managers and procurement analysts.
Empanelonline.com invited respondents from a random sample of qualified panel
members: procurement/purchasing professionals. The email invitation explained the
research objective, presented a hyperlink to the actual survey, offered a time estimate to
complete the survey, provided contact information pertaining to the primary researcher,
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described the incentive to complete the survey, and offered opt-out information.
Empanelonline.com offers respondents incentive points to complete the survey.
We targeted respondents who devoted 50% or more of their time to
procurement/purchasing activities and were from organizations with at least 50
employees. To ensure that panelists matched this frame, we embedded two screening
questions into the survey. These were the first two questions asked. If panelists
responded that less than 50% of their time was devoted to procurement/purchasing
activities or they worked for organizations with less than 50 employees, the survey
concluded and thanked respondents for their participation. All others respondents were
allowed to continue answering survey questions.
Qualification #1
How much time on a weekly basis do you spend with procurement/purchasing duties?
Less than < 50% -(Survey concluded and thanked respondents for their participation)
Between 50 and 75% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey
questions)
Between 75 and 90% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey
questions)
Greater than >90% -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
Qualification #2
How many employees in your organization?
< 50% -(Survey concluded and thanked respondents for their participation)
50-999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
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1,000-9,99 9-(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
10,000-49,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
50,000-99,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
100,000-249,999 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
>250,000 -(Respondents were allowed to continue answering survey questions)
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Appendix C: Latent factor and marker variable test
Factor

Item
CV1
Common CV2
Vision
CV3
CV4
OL1
Organizat
OL2
ional
OL3
Learning
OL4
PER1
Performa
PER2
nce
PER3
WC1
Disruptio WC2
n
WC3
Manage WC4
ment
RC1
Capabiliti RC2
es
RC3
RC4
Informati IQ1
on
IQ2
Quality
IQ3
RR1
Routine
RR2
Rigidity
RR3
RR4
Supply SCD1
Chain SCD2
Disruptio SCD3
n
SCD4
AVE
Chi-square
Chi-square (S-B)
df
CFI (S-B)
RMSEA (S-B)
RSMR

Trait Loading Trait Loading
0.827
0.741
0.813
0.81
0.818
0.799
0.752
0.762
0.757
0.623
0.837
0.802
0.849
0.755
0.803
0.785
0.648
0.649
0.757
0.781
0.799
0.744
0.807
0.664
0.793
0.723
0.819
0.831
0.808
0.864
0.787
0.705
0.828
0.691
0.814
0.705
0.706
0.743
0.918
0.79
0.808
0.766
0.79
0.799
0.725
0.741
0.684
0.702
0.894
0.882
0.774
0.775
0.868
0.697
0.778
0.675
0.727
0.742
0.649
0.679
0.677
894.68
602.61
377
0.918
0.054
0.048

Sqd Method Loadings Trait Loading
0.174
0.757
0.030
0.734
0.039
0.756
0.013
0.671
0.212
0.717
0.048
0.808
0.135
0.798
0.030
0.757
0.026
0.513
0.011
0.63
0.051
0.737
0.311
0.732
0.114
0.713
0.019
0.73
0.001
0.706
0.088
0.687
0.142
0.763
0.132
0.719
0.019
0.582
0.289
0.85
0.077
0.72
0.039
0.699
0.027
0.681
0.034
0.655
0.000
0.875
0.023
0.73
0.329
0.798
0.176
0.661
0.033
0.624
0.020
0.559
0.632
718.65
516.44
347
0.938
0.049
0.041
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Sqd Marker Loadings
0.095
0.104
0.086
0.096
0.050
0.048
0.070
0.061
0.114
0.132
0.102
0.104
0.104
0.115
0.125
0.127
0.100
0.129
0.129
0.123
0.110
0.109
0.050
0.025
0.037
0.066
0.119
0.137
0.106
0.081
0.594
912.64
612.36
377
0.915
0.055
0.072

Appendix D: Bootstrap tests for indirect effects
Distribution of indirect effect for the common vision – information quality – disruption
sensing and response capability relationship
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Distribution of Indirect Effect for the SCDO – information quality – disruption sensing
and response capability relationship
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Distribution of Indirect Effect for the organizational learning – information quality –
disruption sensing and response capability relationship
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Appendix E: Satorra-Bentler difference input & output variables
Common vision and organizational learning
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 555.92
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 758.63
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 758.639
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 555.872
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 30.3126186

Common vision and PERF
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 540.3314
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 746.252
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 746.260
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 540.311
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 20.30977216

Common vision and warning capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=594.9573
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 795.502
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 795.509
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 594.9518
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 1.656345401

Common vision and recovery capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=559.2729
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 774.131
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Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 774.138
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 559.4283
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.64751981

Common vision and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 526.9013
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 778.294
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.2784
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.675
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 778.297
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 526.998
DF =347
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 37.99411042

Common vision and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=517.97
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 779.48
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 779.484
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 517.8528
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.93457245

Common vision and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 563.4334
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 783.997
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 784.005
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 563.6130
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 42.40656099

Organizational learning and PERF
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=544.5128
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 744.750
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 744.756
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 544.3480
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.36980586
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Organizational learning and warning capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=511.767
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 767.120
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 767.126
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 511.7825
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 32.06967312

Organizational learning and recovery capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 550.23
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 771.88
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 771.88
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 550.21
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.41208166

Organizational learning and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=508.9184
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 759.199
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 759.1992
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 508.9184
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 27.16536529

Organizational learning and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=515.20
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 780.35
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Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 780.355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 515.2626
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 39.14806243

Organizational learning and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=529.0177
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 777.754
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 777.76
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 529.1026
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.17300317

158

PERF and warning capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 567.55
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 769.24
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 769.24
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 567.57
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.85723134

PERF and recovery capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 537.8265
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 739.744
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 739.749
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 537.7272
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =

877128

PERF and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 554.7522
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 764.886
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 764.887
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 554.6510
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 35.79916029

PERF and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=546.8164
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Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 797.850
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 797.857
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model =546.821
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 54.27522009

PERF and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=553.5108
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 772.355
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 772.363
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 553.5256
DF =347
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =38.26464361

Warning capability and recovery capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 528.7864
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 732.579
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 515.7481
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.658
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 732.583
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 528.9370
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 9.160674837

Warning capability and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=510.1897
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 760.114
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 760.120
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 510.2841
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 26.21433738

Warning capability and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=548.9498
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 797.376
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 797.378
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 548.7743
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 61.01737605
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Warning capability and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=518.9067
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 769.093
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 769.095
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 518.8685
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 34.95294823

Recovery capability and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=569.7315
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 788.710
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 788.712
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 569.7873
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 48.98127499

Recovery capability and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=519.5856
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 781.188
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 781.190
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 519.6151
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 40.82216157

Recovery capability and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=509.4189
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 759.960
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Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 759.964
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 509.3705
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 28.68384106

Information quality and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=511.3064
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 763.065
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 763.069
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 511.2599
DF =347
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 30.78329397

Information quality and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=564.6754
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 787.591
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 787.597
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 564.7379
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 47.71625524

Routine rigidity and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=528.2703
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 779.084
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 348
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 516.6214
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 718.674
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 347
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 779.088
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 528.1042
DF =347
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 46.08455649
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Appendix F: Difference input & output variables-amended model
Common vision and organizational learning
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 563.2584
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 782.230
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 782.233
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 563.2083
DF =354
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.43247838

Common vision and PERF
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 564.0833
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 780.354
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 780.356
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 564.1165
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.29363171

Common vision and disruption sensing and response capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 619.0092
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 834.593
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 834.597
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 618.8700
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 56.99258656

Common vision and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 551.6694
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Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.253
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.258
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 551.6002
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 40.62832603

Common vision and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 553.5034
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 826.172
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 826.175
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 553.6120
DF =355
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 53.70839089

Common vision and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 584.8063
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.209
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.212
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 584.9173
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 48.23821762
Organizational learning and PERF
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 562.8300
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 775.823
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 775.828
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 562.7870
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 17.15182138

Organizational learning and disruption sensing and response capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 541.4671
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 807.015
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 807.017
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 541.4443
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 36.67732463

Organizational learning and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 529.1605
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Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 785.731
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 785.735
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 529.0224
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 21.07248324

Organizational learning and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 548.7043
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 815.818
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
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Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 815.819
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 548.7128
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.48943649

Organizational learning and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 532.9881
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 795.971
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 795.973
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 532.9665
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 29.3398602
PERF and Disruption sensing and response capability
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 577.5904
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 788.827
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
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Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 788.839
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 577.6336
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =27.9331226

PERF and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=580.1387
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 800.582
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 800.586
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 579.9547
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =31.92555118
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PERF and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=579.1166
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 835.613
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 835.614
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model =
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =54.00036943

PERF and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=577.8011
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 805.368
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
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Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 805.372
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 578.0100
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =44.2580408

Disruption sensing and response capability and information quality
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=543.9091
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 803.219
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 803.221
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 543.9561
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =36.10791978

Disruption sensing and response capability and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=552.1511

178

Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 841.459
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 841.462
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 552.3095
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =65.63925219

Disruption sensing and response capability and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=545.5732
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 814.523
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 814.527
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 545.6578
DF =355
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OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =44.60035413

Information quality and routine rigidity
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=540.5755
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 802.196
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 802.199
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 540.6051
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =34.80287969

Information quality and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=557.2890
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 817.699
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 817.704
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 557.3354
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =46.39760723

Routine rigidity and SCDO
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model=541.9344
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 809.503
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 355
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 535.5959
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 751.485
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 354
Unconstrained Model with start values from Model 2 and iterations=0
Normal chi square for the RETEST model= 809.506
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the RETEST model = 541.9454
DF =355
OUTPUTS: Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference =39.0711807
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND WARNING AND RECOVERY
CAPABILITIES- A HOSPITAL PERSPECTIVE
Abstract
Risk experts suggest that organizations employ an array of mitigation techniques
to manage supply chain risk. However, most studies focus on buffers and/or capacity as
the primary risk management instrument. Therefore, following the recommendation of
Zsidisin (2003) and Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi (2010), we investigated
behavior-based capabilities, such as supply chain risk management tactics. To do this, we
operationalized the warning and recovery measures proposed by Craighead, Blackhurst,
Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007). We used a judgment-based sorting process,
factor analysis, and survey data from hospital material managers to establish the
measure’s unidimensionality, reliability, and validity.
Furthermore, we studied how three competencies, internal integration, training,
and information sharing, affect the warning and recovery constructs. These competencies
provide structure, allow practitioners to connect and share information, and enable
backup systems during SC disruptions (Bellamy, Crawford, Marshall, & Coulter, 2005;
Reason, 2000; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987).
The results indicated that internal integration and training positively affect the
warning and recovery constructs. Our findings also indicated that managers should
develop risk management capabilities, such as warning and recovery. First, the new
measures allow practitioners and academics to assess an organizations’ warning and
recovery capabilities. Second, our study provides evidence that the two risk management
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measures positively affect an organization’s performance. Both findings are important for
managers who seek alternative risk management techniques that would have a positive
effect on performance.
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Introduction
Organizations develop complex and extended supply chains to reduce costs,
connect with suppliers, and offer products and services to customers. However, as
managers experiment with different supply chain (SC) configurations, they must consider
that the risk of disruption rises as complexity increases (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). Risk
management (RM) experts also suggest that the probability of disruption increases as the
SC becomes more integrated (Handfield, Blackhurst, Craighead, & Elkins, 2006;
Norrman & Jansson, 2004). In such coupled networks, disruption consequences can
travel quickly throughout a SC network. We believe that most organizations expend
resources to reduce the negative effects of disruption consequences.
We argue that organizations should develop behavior-based capabilities and
competencies to manage supply chain risk (SCR). Warning and recovery capabilities are
proposed to enable rapid disruption identification and response while organizational
competencies, such as information sharing (INFOSHR), internal integration, and training
(TRAIN), provide structure, enhance internal connectedness, and enable backup system
initiation (Bellamy et al., 2005; Reason, 2000; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987).
The extant literature suggests that organizations can use behavior-based RM
techniques to mitigate and even eliminate SC threats (Cheng, Yip, & Yeung, 2012;
Simchi-Levi et al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003). However, only a few researchers investigated
the use of behavior-based tactics, such as RM mechanisms, directly. Examples include
supplier certification (Lockhart & Ettkin, 1993; Zsidisin & Ellram, 2003), supplier
development (Hartley & Choi, 1996; Watts & Hahn, 1993), target costing (Zsidisin &
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Ellram, 2003), and quality development programs (Choi & Liker, 1995; Zsidisin &
Ellram, 2003).
Following the logic espoused by high reliability theory (HRT), we argue that
hospitals can use behavior-based tactics to reduce SCR by enhancing the internal
coordination and structural coupling within the SC (Smart, Tranfield, Deasley, Levene,
Rowe, & Corley, 2003). With this theoretical frame, we address three questions. First,
can we develop psychometrically valid measures for warning and recovery capabilities?
Second, do certain structural competencies improve a hospital’s warning and recovery
capabilities? Third, do enhanced warning and recovery capabilities lead to improved
performance?
To answer these questions, we collected survey data from 215 hospital material
and risk managers with an aim to investigate the relationships among various
competencies, capabilities, and performance measures. We sought to understand the
relationship among specific antecedent competencies and the warning and recovery
constructs. Warning capabilities (WARN) reflect an organization’s ability to scan for and
communicate information about SC threats while recovery capabilities (RECOVR) refer
to the pre-emptive and reactive response practices (Craighead et al., 2007).
We employed Noar’s (2003) construct development process to operationalize the
warning and recovery measures proposed by Craighead et al. (2007). We used qualitative
feedback, judgment-based sorting processes (Q-sort), and confirmatory factor analysis to
establish unidimensionality, reliability, and validity of the measures.
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This study’s aim was to gather insight on RM and SCRM practices within
hospitals. With mandates to simultaneously reduce costs and improve quality, healthcare
managers are actively seeking methods to minimize inventory and risk while delivering
world-class service. McKone-Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis (2005) indicated that nearly
40% of a hospital’s budget, in general, supports SC expenditures. Therefore, by
developing behavior-based techniques, hospitals can improve their RM capabilities by
enhancing their organization rather than investing in dollar intensive inventory.
This contribution is unique, as it suggests that organizations can develop
competencies to improve their RM capabilities. Within healthcare operations,
competencies, including internal integration, TRAIN, and INFOSHR, are necessary
practices. Further, managers can justify investment in competencies rather than tangibles,
such as inventory or capacity (Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003), as a way to reduce
disruption risk.

Outline of the manuscript
First, we review high reliability theory along with the relevant SC and RM
literature in section 2. In section 3, we discuss the proposed model and hypotheses.
Section 4 addresses methodological and statistical issues. Section 5 discusses the research
findings. Further, in section 6 and 7, we discuss the limitations of our study and potential
future research avenues.
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Literature Review
Within this section, we review conceptual tenets of high reliability theory that are
pertinent to this research. In addition, we differentiate between several key components
of risk and risk management. Lastly, discuss the dimensions of warning and recovery
capabilities and establish their importance to this research.

High reliability theory (HRT)
High reliability theory (HRT) postulates that an organization can avoid accidents
indefinitely by designing systems that emphasize reliability rather than efficiency. HRT
theorists describe how highly coupled and complex systems regularly face catastrophic
disasters yet thrive over time (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick & Roberts,
1993). Initial research venues included aircraft carriers (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts,
1987), submarines (Bierly & Spender, 1995), nuclear power plants (Roth, 1997), and
space shuttles (Marais, Dulac, & Leveson, 2004). These concepts have evolved and are
now applied to product safety within supply chains (Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss,
2011), lean management (Marley, 2006), and emergency decision-making (White,
Turoff, & Van de Walle, 2007).
While others have used HRT to frame RM research within healthcare settings, no
one has used the theory to investigate SC risk within hospitals. Carroll and Rudolph
(2006) sought to improve safety performance within healthcare organizations by using
design principles from HRT. Similarly, Tamuz and Harrison (2006) framed their patient
safety investigations using HRT tenets. Therefore, we seek to determine how hospital
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supply chains use behavior based RM techniques to mitigate risk within the hospital
supply chain. We argue that hospitals foster a culture of reliability, encourage
practitioners to learn from accidents and near misses (La Porte & Consolini, 1991), and
value redundancy (Rochlin et al., 1987). Further, while advocates pontificate that system
reliability is above all else, we find that most highly reliable organizations value both
performance and reliability equally (La Porte & Consolini, 1991).
Managers should draw on decoupling design principles, reliability oriented
management practices, and a mindful organizational culture to sustain a highly reliable
organization over time. Decoupled design principles refer to structures that seamlessly
enable backup processes and systems (Bellamy et al., 2005; Reason, 2000; Rochlin,
LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987). This includes practices that integrate and share information
from multiples sources simultaneously. Reliability oriented management practices refer
to a decentralized system where employees are empowered to make quick decisions
rather than escalating to a centralized hierarchy (Bellamy et al., 2005). In the HRT
environment, employees should be able to make timely decisions to maintain safety and
save lives. “Mindful” practitioners are oriented towards learning from failures; they are
committed to resilience and avoid simple interpretations that may lead to mishaps and
near misses (Bellamy et al., 2005; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Mindfulness
equates to a preoccupation with avoiding failure and latitude for individual improvisation
(Bellamy et al., 2005; Beyea, 2004).
We adopt the conceptual tenets of HRT, as it advocates how to operate a complex
system, such as a hospital SC. Several tenets of the theory align with the aims of our
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investigations. In particular, we seek to understand the effects of organizational
structures, such as internal integration and training, on certain RM capabilities. Training,
for instance, illustrates how practitioners respond to threats while internal integration
reflects a connectedness tactic that enables employees and systems to work together.
To anchor our investigation to current risk and SC management thinking, we
review existing risk, SCR, and SCRM literature. We then discuss warning and recovery
capabilities before we operationalize the constructs and developed related hypotheses. We
also segregate the two RM capability constructs into various dimensions and adopt
appropriate definitions.

Risk
Risk refers to unplanned variability associated with an outcome, and it “can be
viewed as an expected value - the product of impact and probability” (Zsidisin, Melnyk,
& Ragatz, 2005, p.3403). Previous research suggests that organizations should develop
strategies to manage risk, absorb disruption consequences, or enable quick recovery
(Tang, 2006). By developing these tactics proactively, organizations can prepare for an
inevitable SC disruption (Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009).
Only a few operations management researchers have developed risk measures.
Ellis, Henry, and Shockley (2010) operationalized the measures of the magnitude and the
probability of supply disruption along with providing details about the overall level of
disruption risk. Several measures of operational failures associated with nurses are
germane to the hospital context (Tucker, 2004). This research categorizes interruption,
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delay, risk, and losses as dimensions of failure and measures actions that affect patient
outcomes.

Supply chain risk
According to Juttner et al. (2003), supply chain risk (SCR) describes risks
associated with the movement of information, raw materials, or finished product as they
flow from suppliers to consumers. Understanding that variability exists within all
systems, SCR describes threats that create variability beyond planned levels. We believe
that variability negatively affects operations and forces managers to expend resources to
return the SC to normal (Tang, 2006).

Supply chain risk management
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) alludes to the coordination resources and
the collaboration of SC partners to ensure continuity and profitability. The RM literature
suggests four SCRM strategies, avoidance, mitigation, transference, or acceptance (Piney,
2003). Avoidance argues for organizations to discontinue the use of risky practices.
Mitigation suggests engaging in activities that reduce consequential effect. Practitioners
employ transference by shifting risk and the resulting consequences to a third party, such
as a vendor or insurer. Acceptance advocates for developing systems to absorb the
consequences of SC disruption.
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Warning capability
Warning capabilities (WARN) refer to “interactions and coordination of SC
resources to detect a pending or realized disruption and to subsequently disseminate
pertinent information about the disruption to relevant entities within the SC” (Craighead
et al., 2007, p. 146). The term detection represents an ability to recognize a hazard.
Organizations that detect SC disruptions before they occur have time to evaluate them
and respond. Without detection, there is no signal indicating that a response is necessary.
The terms pending and realized illustrate that a disruption can take varied forms.
A pending disruption is one that has not yet occurred. Here, warning indicators, such as a
delayed shipment or poor quality raw materials, may indicate that a SC disruption is
possible. Conversely, in situations such as earthquakes, disruptions can occur without
warning. Therefore, identification occurs after a disruption happens. Within the business
context, realized consequences include quality issues, unplanned outages, and delayed
deliveries from suppliers.
Organizations must also “disseminate pertinent information about the disruption
to relevant entities within the SC” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 146). This reflects a firm’s
INFOSHR and communication abilities. During a disruption, communication channels
may break down or become inefficient. Therefore, redundant systems insure that
communication is possible.
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Recovery capability
Recovery capability (RECOVR) refers to “interactions of SC entities and the
corresponding coordination of SC resources to return the SC to a normal and planned
level” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 144). Organizations use pre-emptive recovery to initiate
response efforts before an actual disruption occurs and reactive capabilities to respond
after a SC disruption occurs. Normal and planned levels allude to a steady state of
production or service.

Pre-emptive recovery
When organizations identify a SC threat before its manifestation, they may be
able to mitigate the threat. Mitigation refers to actions taken to reduce disruption
consequences. The reduction potential depends on the type of disruption, consequences
created, resources marshalled, and the amount of time until the disruption occurs.
By understanding the source of a risk, potential consequences, and the resources
available, organizations can preemptively prepare for a SC disruption. The opportunity
to mitigate the disruption effects increases if the warning window expands. The warning
window represents the time between when practitioners acknowledge a SC threat and
when the disruption actually occurs (Riley, Miller, & Sridharan, 2012).

Reactive recovery
Practitioners should use reactive recovery capabilities after an actual SC
disruption occurs. “These purposive interactions and coordination of resources allow
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interventions to be designed and implemented to overcome the slowing or stoppage of
planned product flow within the SC” (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 144). We argue that
most organizations will attempt to reduce the amount of time associated with recovery
efforts.
By reviewing the many characteristics of risk as they pertain to SC management
and SCRM, we are able to ground our thinking as we develop new models, hypotheses,
and measures. In section 3, we propose a model that links three antecedent competencies,
to measures for warning and recovery capabilities, and organizational performance. We
then develop new hypothesis framed by HRT thinking. Then in section 4, we test the
validity and reliability of the two new RM measures along with existing measures for the
antecedent competencies and organizational performance. The intent is to operationalize
measures and a measurement instrument that researchers can use when investigating
future SC and RM topics.

Proposed Model and Hypothesis Development
Drawing on HRT, this research aims to show that behavior based RM techniques
can mitigate risk with hospitals. To do so, we intend to illustrate how three antecedent
competencies affect two RM capabilities and the organization’s business performance.
We propose a conceptual model (Figure 1) based on the SC and RM literature and several
qualitative interviews.
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Figure 1: Proposed Model

Theoretical model
The objective of this research is to validate measures of the WARN and
RECOVR constructs. We use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to establish the
instrument’s unidimensionality and reliability along with the convergent and discriminant
validity. To achieve this goal, we developed a structural model to define the relationships
between three antecedent competencies and the proposed RM capabilities. To test the
relationships, we collect and analyze survey data from U.S. hospitals.

205

Internal integration, TRAIN, and INFOSHR are structures that provide
connectedness by influencing an organization’s ability to align priorities and
communicate those ideals. In the proposed model, we represent these organizational
structures as antecedent competencies. Like Sinkula (1994), we argue that managers can
manipulate these structures to create a positive change in behavior. This thinking
complements HRT, which suggests that managers can manipulate competencies to affect
an organization’s ability to learn from mistakes and near misses (Weick et al., 1999).
We included the interaction TrainingXLicensed beds (TRAINxBEDS) to test the
moderating effect of organization size. We believe organization size or hospital size is
important to the study of training since larger organizations typically will have more
employees who could benefit from additional formal training. Previous research supports
our assumption about training and organization size (Frazis, Herz, & Horrigan, 1995.
Additionally, OM researchers regularly use licensed beds to characterize hospital size
(Goldstein & Naor, 2005; Tucker, 2004).
The WARN and RECOVR constructs represent organizational RM capabilities.
Researchers have postulated that these RM capabilities moderate the severity of a SC
disruption by lessening the effect of SC density, complexity, and node criticality
(Craighead et al., 2007). We extend this thinking and suggest that both WARN and
RECOVR positively affect organizational performance. Because these RM capabilities
reduce the timing associated with detecting and responding to SC disruptions, we
anticipate that organizations will be able to lessen the effect of an actual disruption. By
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extension, we expect that improved responsiveness would decrease expenditures,
improve profitability, and increase customer satisfaction levels.
We treated both WARN and RECOVR as intermediate outcomes while considering
organizational performance as the final performance outcome. WARN serves as an
intermediary between the antecedent capability and the organizations response and
recovery capabilities. In this research, we tested the relationships among the antecedent
competencies and RECOVR. We aimed to determine whether the relationships are direct,
indirect (i.e., completely mediated by WARN), or both direct and indirect (i.e., partially
mediated by WARN). Next, we put forth our research hypotheses.

Proposed relationships
In the following section, we identify key terms used within the formal hypotheses.
This includes definitions for three competencies, internal integration, information
sharing, and training. Additionally, we give details to the two capability constructs,
warning and recovery, and the moderating variable licensed beds.

Internal integration
By definition, internal integration suggests that managers can unify processes and
functions within an organization to accomplish higher-level goals and objectives
(Germain & Iyer, 2006). In this research, SC functions such as procurement and logistics
are able to internally integrate and support key hospital objectives. Key dimensions to
this definition include coordination, collaboration, and interconnectedness.
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Information sharing
Li et al. (2005) defined INFOSHR as “the extent to which critical and proprietary
information is communicated to one’s supply chain partner” (p. 621). As this research
investigates internal connectedness, we seek to understand information sharing as data
and knowledge, including proprietary information, is communicated between individuals
and departments. We envision that people, processes, and systems help distribute
information.

Training
Training refers to the formal and informal processes of teaching practitioners
within an organization job-related skills and knowledge (Kaynak, 2002). Training may
be necessary for specific tasks or functions, general knowledge, certification, or a as a
refresher concerning a previously studied topic.

Licensed beds
The number of licensed beds refers to “the maximum number of beds for which a
hospital holds a license to operate (ahrq.gov). While the term alludes to a maximum
number, some hospitals do not operate to this number.
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Formal hypotheses: Relationships with SCRM capabilities
Below are the formal hypotheses of this study. We proposed each relationship apriori and under the purview of HRT. For each competency-capability linkage, we offer
two direct relationships and one mediated relationship that work through the intermediary
warning capabilities.

Relationship between internal integration and the organizational SCRM capabilities
(H1A-C)
Experts agree that the first principle of managing risk is to organize one’s affairs
before requiring others to do so (Handfield & Nichols, 1999; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005;
Swink, Narasimhan, & Kim, 2002). Thus, organizations should integrate their own SC
functions before integrating externally. Internal integration refers to practices that enable
and encourage interaction between internal processes and partners. From the HRT
perspective, internal integration is akin to structural coupling, a mechanism that enables
dependence between internal functions (Smart et al., 2003). In our investigation, internal
integration details the extent to which organizations collaborate across internal
boundaries to provide a refined customer experience (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). Integrating
activities include cross-functional cooperation (Ballou, Gilbert, & Mukherjee, 2000) and
information system integration (Sahin & Robinson, 2005). If managers develop this
competency properly, internal integration reduces information uncertainty and
equivocality (Koufteros, Vonderembse, & Jayaram, 2005) and improves practitioner
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decision making. Without internal integration, practitioners may form functional silos,
which optimize divisional processes rather than organization.

Warning capability
Internal integration also empowers employees without direct supervision to
interpret and respond to SC threats. Stated differently, internal integration should also
speak to the willingness to cooperate, not just the requirement of compliance (Chen &
Paulraj, 2004). HRT theorists call this mindfulness and use this term to describe
employees that make operational decisions without formal structure or authority (Weick
& Sutcliffe, 2001, 2006). Jun, Qiuzhen, and Qingguo (2011) found that internal
integration enhances communication between team members. The ability to communicate
quickly and clearly is important for practitioners within complex organizations.
Otherwise, misinformation leads to sub-optimal solutions. Thus, we hypothesized:
H1A-Organizations with higher levels of internal integration competence will have
higher warning capability levels.

Recovery capability
As an antecedent to RECOVR, internal integration enables high information
processing capabilities and allows organizations to address risk systematically (Jun et al.,
2011). Preemptively, managers employ information from internally integrated systems
and processes to position resources. Rapid deployment of resources and personnel
improves the opportunity to lessen the effect of pending SC disruptions. Examples of
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resource placement include sand bags and storm shutters deployed before a flood or
hurricane. When positioned, these resources enable organizations to minimize SC
damage.
Internal integration also allows organizations to respond to disruptions after they
occur. Emergency command centers and deployment support systems are examples of
internal integration mechanisms designed specifically for reactive RM activities.
Command centers enable decision makers to centralize information about disparate
events and make decisions about response efforts and resource placement. Managers can
deploy disaster recovery teams and activate redundant systems to lessen consequential
effect. Ad-hoc committees and project managers enable cross-functional integration and
combat compartmentalization within organizations (Germain & Droge, 1997). Hence,
internal integration should enable response efforts. Leveraging this rationale, we
developed the following hypothesis:
H1B-Organizations with higher internal integration competence levels will have higher
recovery capability levels.

Mediated relationship
We also hypothesized a mediated relationship between internal integration and
RECOVR, where WARN serves as an intermediate step. See Figure 2. Using the
Craighead et al.’s (2007) definition, WARN allows for the “coordination of supply chain
resources to detect a pending or realized disruption” (p 146). Hence, organizations use
their scanning abilities to accumulate information about SC threats and disruptions. With
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this information, managers can properly integrate systems and position response teams
and resources to hasten recovery efforts. In this capacity, WARN enhances organizational
connectedness, which enables response and recovery capabilities. Leveraging this logic,
we offer the following:
H1C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between internal integration and
recovery capability.

Figure 2: Warning mediates the internal integration-recovery capability relationship

Relationship between Information Sharing and the Organizational SCRM
Capabilities (H2A-C)
We define INFOSHR as the act of and the willingness to make information
available to other employees, departments, and partners. Research suggests that
organizations embrace this competence when practitioners exhibit a willingness to share
information (Spekman, Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998). Willingness to share information
alludes to an organization’s commitment and the level of trust associated with actually
sharing information. In this research, we extend current thinking and investigate
INFOSHR from an intra-organizational perspective. Therefore, INFOSHR enables
employees within an organization to heedfully interrelate and emphasize alertness (Smart
et al., 2003; Weick & Roberts, 1993).
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Warning capability
Evidence demonstrates that INFOSHR amongst SC participants is essential for
organizations that want to identify and prepare for vulnerabilities (Kleindorfer & Saad,
2005). This occurs as INFOSHR allows practitioners to collect information from multiple
sources and then engage in coordinated decision-making efforts (Sahin & Robinson,
2005).
We put forth that INFOSHR improves WARN and creates a state of alertness
when processes allow employees to share data about threats throughout the organization.
After practitioners identify a threat, INFOSHR permits mangers to communicate
response strategies. Cachon and Fisher (2000) supported this claim and showed how
INFOSHR allows organizations to flow goods through the SC more quickly and evenly.
Further, INFOSHR enables the interdependence and coupling of internal functions.
Therefore, this structural mechanism is an important connectedness practice, which is
common in highly reliable organization (Smart et al., 2003). Thus, we offer the
following:
H2A-Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have
higher warning capability levels.

Recovery capability
Organizations should also use INFOSHR practices to develop their RECOVR by
providing details on how to respond to actual SC disruptions. Practitioners who share
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information about disruption consequences are able to prescribe specific
countermeasures. Managers can first direct responders towards stabilization efforts,
shutting down affected systems or mitigation practices designed to prevent further
damage (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). We hypothesize that customized response tactics are more
appropriate compared to generic efforts, as they enable faster recovery and help minimize
SC damage.
We argue that when organizations identify threats preemptively, practitioners
can share information to develop and deploy an appropriate mitigation strategy. For
instance, in 2002, Dell’s management was evaluating the possibility that 29 West Coast
ports would close due to a pending dockworker strike. Before the labor strike occurred,
managers moved raw materials from Asia to US via airfreight. In this case, Dell uses
information to plan and avoid a SC disruption due to the strike (Breen, 2004).
Additionally, organizations may use the INFOSHR competency also when
reactively responding to a SC disruption. Here, INFOSHR improves practitioners’
decision-making processes. For example, if an organization experiences a quality issue,
shared data about the extent and expected duration of the disruption provides
information on how to speed recovery efforts. This follows the HRT premise that
employees should gather information from multiple sources when making response
decisions. From this perspective, we offer the following hypothesis:
H2B-Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have
higher recovery capability levels.
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Mediated relationship
We further hypothesized that WARN mediates the INFOSHR – RECOVR
relationship. See Figure 3 for an illustration. WARN, as an intermediate step, bolsters the
INFOSHR competency by enhancing communication abilities. We believe that response
agents benefit when practitioners exploit their communication abilities and share
strategic, tactical, and operational information (Bharosa, Van Zanten, Zuurmond, &
Appelman, 2009). Stated differently, practitioners responsible for recovery efforts need to
share information, including information gathered during the WARN processes, in order
to prescribe context specific response tactics. Hence, we predict a mediated effect:
H2C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between information sharing and
recovery capability.

Figure 3: Warning mediates the information sharing-recovery capability relationship.

Relationship between Training and the Organizational SCRM Capabilities (H3A-C)
Practitioners draw on the TRAIN competency to learn about disruptions and
appropriate management tactics. Research indicates that TRAIN enables practitioners to
convert a topic’s conceptual understanding into actual practice. Therefore, TRAIN refers
to formal activities, which facilitate learning (McGehee & Thayer, 1961). From a HRT

215

perspective, organizations derive new knowledge from formal TRAIN activities and
informal socialization activities.

Warning capability
When TRAIN levels are low, organizations are passive to uncertainty and “accept
whatever information the environment gives them” (Daft & Weick, 1984, p 288).
Practitioners feel immune to threats or believe that alternative mechanisms, such as SC
partners, enable them to mitigate the disruption consequences. Active organizations, in
contrast, aspire to protect themselves from uncertainty. Thus, active organizations expect
disruptions to occur and embrace TRAIN as a method to prepare for the inevitable. By
doing so, managers assume that employees can mitigate uncertainty with detection
practices that reduce the probability of occurrence and response tactics that lessen the
disruption’s effect and recovery time.
In the RM context, TRAIN is important both before and after a disruption occurs.
Classroom instruction, practice, and exercising typically occur before a disruption (Ford
& Schmidt, 2000). This pre-emptive TRAIN allows employees to understand the utility
and limitations of existing RM tactics. This occurs as TRAIN provides understanding and
creates a permanent change in knowledge and attitude (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). Hence,
we hypothesize the following relationship:
H3A- Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher warning
capability levels.
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Recovery capability
RM experts also suggest that TRAIN enables practitioners to respond during
periods of uncertainty, such as a SC disruption (Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). However, we
recognize that TRAIN conditions can vary significantly from those experienced during an
actual disruption. Therefore, we agree with previous research and suggest that postdisruption TRAIN is also necessary (Ford & Schmidt, 2000). Practitioners develop
detailed response procedures to address disruption circumstances that have already
occurred. Automotive recalls are actions taken to repair or remove products from the
marketplace after a disruption has occurred. Once a manufacturer identifies a recall,
employees respond by completing repairs or replacing the defective component. The
TRAIN procedures instruct employees on how to correct prescribed problems. This leads
to the following hypothesize:
H3B- Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher recovery
capability levels.

Mediated relationship
We also envision that the WARN construct affects the linkage between TRAIN
and RECOVR. Figure 4 depicts the mediated model. When responding to a SC
disruption, practitioners should apply information about the type of threat. This includes
information obtained from scanning activities, a dimension of the WARN construct. In
this perspective, practitioners seek out signs indicating a pending or actual SC disruption.
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Warning details should inform the organization on how to best respond to and/or mitigate
SC threats. For instance, Oloruntoba (2005) argued that public officials need information
pertaining to tsunamis (or other natural disasters) to raise awareness and improve
logistics coordination. When warning agents communicate information pertaining to the
tsunami’s impact zones ahead of time, officials can preemptively respond by evacuating
the population or prepositioning resources. Reactively, WARN information should
provide details on how to minimize the disruption’s influence and/or shorten recovery
times associated with SC disruptions that has already happened. For example, Zhang,
Chai, Yang, and Weng (2011) found that warning information improves the organizations
ability to execute recalls within a food SC. Specifically, traceability systems use warning
information that enable managers to “effectively and speedily determine material or
production stages having problems” (Zhang et al., 2011, p. 2507). On this basis, we
suggest the following mediated relationship.
H3C- Warning capability mediates the relationship between training and recovery
capability.

Figure 4: Warning mediates the training-recovery capability relationship.
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Moderating relationship of organization size on the training competence (H4A-C)
The human resource literature consistently confirms that firm or organization size
moderates the effects of training on performance (e.g., Guest 1997; Guest, Mitchie,
Conway, & Sheeham 2003; Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen 2006; Lee 2012). Several
theories offer explanations as to why this interaction exists; however, a full review of
these perspectives is out of scope for this research. While this stream of literature about
potential interactions between TRAIN and organization size is informative, most studies
adopt a human resources perspective.
When reviewing the SC and SCR literature, we found that only few researchers
have investigated the abovementioned interaction. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) identified
this gap and encouraged researchers to test moderating (and mediating) effects in the
SCRM context. Thus, we sought to understand whether organization size moderates the
relationship between TRAIN and the two RM capabilities and how.
We hypothesize a positive relationship between TRAIN-WARN (H3A) and
TRAIN-RECOVR (H3B). Using HRT as our theoretical frame, we speculate that TRAIN
activities, such as simulation and practice, prepare the organization for SC disruption. In
essence, training allows practitioners to think about potential threats and consequences
before they occur. This happens as managers establish norms, enable self-direction, and
motivate employees to act (Batt & Moynihan 2006). We believe that these norms and the
motivation to act are characteristics of mindful employees who operate complex systems.
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In the healthcare context, organization size relates to the number of licensed beds
(BEDS) (Kaczmarek et al., 1991; Kaczmarek et al., 1992).We suppose that as BEDS
increases, so does the need for training (TRAINxBEDS). Stated differently, TRAIN
needs increase as managers bring more service products into the hospital. However, we
note that training effectiveness may diminish as organization size grows, because it
would become difficult to deliver a consistent level of training. Based on this logic, we
hypothesized the following moderated relationships: See Figure 5 for an illustration of
the moderated relationships for hypotheses H4A and H4B.
H4A – The effect of training on warning capability diminishes as BEDS increases
(TRAINxBEDS –WARN).
H4B– The effect of training on recovery capability diminishes as BEDS increases
(TRAINxBEDS –RECOVR).

Figure 5: BED moderates the TRAIN-WARN and TRAIN-RECOVR relationships
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We also believe that WARN moderates the mediated relationship between
TRAINxBEDS and RECOVR. See Figure 6 for an illustration of mediated-moderation.
Here WARN serves as an intermediate step between the antecedent competency and the
capability construct.

Figure 6: WARN mediates the TRAINxBEDS-RECOVR relationship.

We suggest that the TRAINxBED –RECOVR relationship improves when
WARN is included in the analysis. As BEDS increases, so does the number of
practitioners available to scan for an identify SC threats. When practitioners identify a SC
threat, they can provide response agents with information, which may help reduce the
probability of a disruption. Additionally, practitioners responsible for recovery activities
may glean information from WARN practices and subvert consequential effects or
improve recovery times by suggesting methods that can be used to respond during
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disruption. We believe some suggestions will stem from TRAIN and practice activities,
which we consider a key WARN antecedent. Using this logic, we offer the following:
H4C- Warning capability positively mediates the moderated relationship between
TRAINxBED and recovery capability.

Relationship between warning and recovery capabilities (H5)
If WARN is properly employed, organizations have information and time to
determine an appropriate course of action. Thus, when practitioners identify a threat
before it occurs, the organization may be able to minimize or even avoid a SC disruption.
In the case of a delayed shipment of raw materials, an alternative vendor may be able to
supply replacement product. When disruption is unavoidable, WARN capabilities allow
managers to muster resources and proactively mitigate consequences. For example, when
experts predict a hurricane, large home improvement retailers preposition inventory to
suppress the storms effect with storm shutters and speed recovery efforts with cleaning
supplies (Lodree, Ballard, & Song, 2012). Therefore, when organizations have high
levels of warning capabilities, they may be able to jumpstart recovery efforts and reduce
the consequences and recovery time associated with a disruption. Hence, we hypothesize
the following:
H5-Organizations with high warning capability levels will have high recovery capability
levels.
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Relationship between the RM capabilities and organizational performance (H1A-C)
We evaluated performance with three perceptual measures: operating cost, out-ofstocks, and service quality. Most practitioners consider out-of stocks and operating costs
as an indicator of business success (Challis & Samson 1996). In addition, researchers use
service quality as a measure of success within the operations management literature when
studying hospital environments (Marley, Collier, & Goldstein 2004).

Relationship between warning capabilities and organizational performance
Organizations with strong WARN should be able to scan the SC horizon and
identify threats before they happen. Peck (2005), for example, illustrated how news
service scanning activities enabled German beverage manufactures and suppliers to avoid
disruption associated with environmental legislation. Early identification provides time in
which the organization can reconfigure tactics and position resources to thwart pending
disruptions.
Further, we believe that once an organization identifies a threat, managers can use
their communication skills to disseminate information about threats to partners. When
organizations enhance their communication abilities, it improves understanding, builds
trust, increases confidence, and reduces the risk exposure (Ritchie & Brindley 2000).
Thus, when practitioners communicate information about risk sources and potential
consequences properly, they are able to mitigate the disruptions effects, minimize SC
downtime, and focus on long-term organizational goals, such as safety and profitability.
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Lastly, in certain situations, practitioners will identify a SC disruption only after it
occurs. Both manmade and natural disasters can occur with no warning. Practitioners in
addition, may miss warning signs altogether. When such disruptions occur, organizations
must work quickly to understand the source and resulting consequences to help managers
develop appropriate response tactics.
When organizations have time and are able to communicate information about
threats, they should be able to reduce the probability, effect, and recovery times of a SC
disruption. Essentially, managers are removing the uncertainty associated with their
operating environment by lowering the overall level of exposure to disruption. With less
exposure resulting from better WARN, organizations should be able to improve
organizational performance. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis concerning
warning capabilities:
H6A-Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher performance
levels.

Besides the direct effect between WARN and PERF, we envision that RECOVR
capabilities mediate the relationship and creates a positive indirect linkage. Figure 7
illustrates this effect. The indirect effect suggests that an organization has both strong
warning and recovery capabilities. However, if only the indirect linkage is present, the
organization needs both RM capabilities to affect positively the outcome construct PERF.
Additionally, the direct effects are present between WARN and PERF, then a partially
mediated relationship exists. We initially hypothesized a direct relationship between
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WARN and PERF (H6A); however, we also suggest that a partially mediated linkage
through RECOVR (H6B). This occurs as practitioner use information gleaned from
WARN practices to enhance the organization’s response capabilities, which improves the
level of PERF. From the HRT perspective, highly reliable organizations develop both
WARN and RECOVR capabilities and cooperatively share information regarding the two
functions. This line of reasoning allows us to hypothesize the following:
H6B- Recovery capability partially mediates the relationship between warning capability
and organizational performance.

Figure 7: Recovery mediates the warning capability-performance relationship.

Relationship between recovery capabilities and organizational performance
Practitioners should use RECOVR to deploy resources and develop tactics to
mitigate the effects of a SC disruption. Highly reliable organizations are able to learn
from environmental queues and adapt to the changing business environment. To this end,
organizations can build and defend their competitive advantage by developing recovery
capabilities.
Pre-emptive recovery allows organizations to reduce the probability of occurrence
and lessen the actual influence. Once an organization understands how a threat will
manifest, managers can reconfigure resources and tactics. This allows organizations to
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either avoid the threat prior to disruption or gather resources for response tactics that
address the consequences that emanate from a disruption.
Reactive RECOVR enables organizations to react to disruptions. The ability to
react quickly is important when a disruption event offers no warning or when
practitioners are unable to foresee an occurrence. During reactive periods, practitioners
evaluate how a threat has manifested and then marshals the appropriate resources to
counteract consequences. For example, in 1989, work crews repaired the eastern span of
the Bay Bridge after the Loma Prieta earthquake damaged it just over a month earlier
(Citizendia.org). California department of transportation (CDOT) executives worked to
determine the quickest way to reopen the earthquake-damaged bridge that transported
thousands of commuters daily. In this case, no one was able to stop the disruption from
happening. Therefore, the best solution was to react quickly and reduce the time the
bridge was unavailable. Using large financial incentives, the CDOT encouraged workers
to repair the bridge. The bridge reopened on November 18, 1989, one month and one day
after the earthquake. From this position, we offer the following hypothesis.
H6C-Organizations with higher levels of recovery capabilities will have higher
performance levels.
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In Table 1, we summarize the hypotheses used within this research. We then
precede the methodology section and describe procedures used to operationalize the
various constructs. Within this section, we discuss specifically the warning and recovery
capability constructs, as these are paramount to our research. Finally, we review our
qualitative and quantitative testing procedures.
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Item
H1A
H1B
H1C
H2A
H2B
H2C
H3A
H3B
H3C
H4A
H4B
H4C
H5
H6A
H6B
H6C

Hypothesis
Organizations with higher levels of internal integration competence will have
higher warning capability levels
Organizations with higher internal integration competence levels will have higher
recovery capability levels
Warning capability mediates the relationship between internal integration and
recovery capability
Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have
higher warning capability levels
Organizations with higher levels of information sharing competence will have
higher recovery capability levels
Warning capability mediates the relationship between information sharing and
recovery capability
Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher warning
capability levels
Organizations with higher training competence levels will have higher recovery
capability levels
Warning capability mediates the relationship between training and recovery
capability.
The effect of training on warning capability diminishes as BEDS increases
(TRAINxBEDS –WARN).
The effect of training on recovery capability diminishes as BEDS increases
(TRAINxBEDS –RECOVR).
Warning capability positively mediates the moderated relationship between
TRAINxBED and recovery capability
Organizations with high warning capability levels will have high recovery
capability levels.
Organizations with higher warning capability levels will have higher performance
levels.
Recovery capability partially mediates the relationship between warning
capability and organizational performance.
Organizations with higher levels of recovery capabilities will have higher
performance levels.

Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
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Instrument Development
We put to use Noar’s (2003) approach to develop the warning and recovery
measures. Initially, we reviewed the literature to identify potential definitions and
measurement items. We also reviewed tangential literature, such as business continuity
management, crisis management, and SC complexity, to identify complementary
operationalizations. See Table 2 for a list of constructs, dimensions and originating
authors.
We employed multiple iterations of item-to-construct sorting procedures (Q-sort)
to purify questions and definitions. Utilizing several samples of convenience,
undergraduate students, graduate students, and industry experts matched measurement
items with construct definitions (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). The Q-sorting process
allowed us to refine measurement items and the accompanying definitions by assessing
the face validity, inter-rater reliability, and construct validity (Menor & Roth, 2007).
For internal integration and TRAIN, the literature provided acceptable starting
points. Few words were adapted during refinement process. For INFOSHR, we adapted
measures from Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan and Ragu-Nathan (2005). However, during the Qsort process, many respondents failed to match INFOSHR questions to the construct
definitions provided. Therefore, we further adapted questions included in the final survey
instrument.
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Construct
Internal Integration
Training
Information Sharing

Warning Capabilities

Recovery Capabilities

Dimension
Integration dimensions of design knowledge intensity
Statistical training and training resources
Statistical training and training resources
Cross training
Exchanging information
Identify and communicate
Early and late warning
Discovery
Monitoring
Communication
Communication
Identify/mitigate threats in advance
Proactive and reactive response
Engaging responses, assets and capabilities
Response agility
Recovery expectations and performance
Early involvement
Practice recovery behaviors
Scenario planning and simulations

Authors
Germain, Dröge and Christensen, 2001
Saraph, Benson, and Schroeder, 1989;
Forker, 1997;
Ahmad and Schroeder 2003;
Li, Rao, Ragu-Nathan, and Ragu-Nathan,
2005
Craighead et al., 2007;
Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998;
Hays and Hill, 2000;
Grover and Malhotra, 2003;
Chen and Paulraj, 2004;
Chen, Paulraj, and Lado, 2004;
Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2009
Craighead et al., 2007;
Olavarrieta and Ellinger, 1997
Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998
McCollough, Berry, and Yadav, 2000;
Koufteros, Vonderembse, and Doll, 2002;
de Jong and de Ruyter, 2004;
Smith, 2011

Table 2: Constructs, dimensions, and originating authors.

Warning and recovery capabilities
For the two organizational RM measures, warning and recovery capability, we
adapted the construct definitions from Craighead et al. (2007). Initially they proposed the
two measures in the risk mitigation context. However, as far as we can discern, Craighead
and colleagues or other authors did not operationalize these constructs within literature.
For WARN, we developed an exhaustive list of potential measurement questions from the
RM, scanning, sense making, and communication literature. For RECOVR, we adapted
measures from business continuity, SC agility, and the crisis management literature. We
utilized these literature streams to insure coverage of the construct domain and centroid
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(Little, Lindenberger, & Nesselroade, 1999). See Appendix A for item correlations. See
survey questions 7-12 in appendix B.

Internal integration
For questions about internal integration, we adapted measures from Germain,
Dröge, and Christensen (2001). Their research studied cross-functional integration to
determine how organizations collect, process, and integrate design knowledge. Like
Germain et al. (2001), we envisioned that connectivity and coupling mechanisms are
necessary to integrate different SC functions. Therefore, we developed our internal
integration questions to address both SC integration activities and mechanisms that
encourage connectivity. See questions 1-3 in appendix B.

Information sharing
We started with the INFOSHR measures proposed by Li et al. (2005) and then
adapted them to address INFOSHR from an internal perspective. Their questions
addressed the external information exchange. We amended questions so they would tap
INFOSHR concepts from both a management and practitioners’ perspective. In addition,
we also tried to gauge the importance of internal INFOSHR. Consequently, we developed
10 questions used within Q-sort procedures. These sorting exercises enabled us to select
three appropriate questions. See questions 16-18 in appendix B.
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Training
Questions pertaining to TRAIN were adapted from Saraph, Benson, and
Schroeder (1989), Forker (1997), and Ahmad and Schroeder (2003). We amended the
Saraph et al. (1989) and Forker (1997) questions to address organization wide TRAIN
initiatives. We also drew statistical TRAIN questions from these articles; however, the Qsorting results encouraged us to drop these questions from the final survey instrument.
Lastly, we developed several questions that addressed cross-training practices. We
adapted these questions from measures designed to tap multiple functions of TRAIN
(Ahmad & Schroeder, 2003). We believe that both TRAIN and cross-training principles
are important within an organization supported by a complex SC. See questions 13-15 as
described in appendix B.
We reviewed several drafts of our proposed model with academic and practitioner
experts. They provided qualitative feedback on both the antecedent competencies and the
proposed RM capabilities. Appendix B lists the final survey questions.

Research Methodology
Expert review
Once we created an initial set of construct definitions and measurement items, we
reviewed the concepts, the proposed model, and the survey instrument with seven
practitioners familiar with SC and RM concepts. This allowed us to establish the
construct or face validity (Anastasi, 1988). Four of the interviewees worked within the
healthcare industry. This includes a procurement director, hospital administrator, retired
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risk executive, and a senior vice president of a non-profit hospital group. The primary
investigator also conducted three interviews with non-hospital procurement experts to
confirm the generalizability of the concepts. Two experts worked for a large retail chain
while the other worked as a procurement director for a large public university.

Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis is the business unit within a hospital. We selected hospital
materials managers and directors as they are likely familiar with the antecedent
competencies and the RM capabilities included in the study. After reviewing the concepts
with interviewees, we believe the target respondents have sufficient knowledge to
complete the survey. Thus, we suggest that data collected will provide enough variance to
test the proposed relationships.

Data collection
We collected pilot data from an evening Master of Business Administration
(MBA) operations management class. These respondents had professional work
experience and had knowledge of procurement and operations activities. The MBA
instructor offered respondents extra credit to complete the pilot survey. From this sample,
we were able to use 54 of 57 responses. We discarded three responses due to large
amount of missing data.
We then collected pre-test data from 49 hospital procurement managers and
directors in July and August 2012. Using an email survey (Qualtrics.com), we collected
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data in two phases. Initially, a vice president at a non-profit hospital organization (name
of organization is withheld for confidentially) sent the survey to 150 procurement
directors. We were able to use 16 of the completed responses. Second, we purchased an
email list of 839 potential respondents from SK&A (SKA.COM). We received 33
completed responses. In this case, we sent each respondent a $25 gift card. The data from
the pilot and pretest informed us about how to adjust the final survey instrument.
We conducted the full survey in the winter of 2012/2013 in three phases. Initially,
we distributed the questionnaire to customers of a non-profit group purchasing
organization (GPO) (name of organization is withheld for confidentially). The GPO sent
out nine hundred and thirty surveys via email without incentives. After reviewing 72
potential responses, we discarded 10 due to major omissions. Therefore, we used 62 or
6.7% of the responses in the final analysis.
During the second phase, we purchased an email list from SK&A (SKA.COM).
They emailed the survey to 1,600 procurement managers and directors working in US
hospitals. With a $10 gift card as incentive, we received responses from 5.5% of the
respondents. After a review, we were able to keep 88 of the completed surveys.
Finally, we mailed a paper survey to approximately 297 hospitals located
throughout the US. In this case, we gave potential respondents a one-dollar bill as an
incentive. We used names and addresses as listed on
http://www.hospitalvendorcredentialing.com. Twelve surveys were returned due to an
incorrect address or because hospital policy forbid employees from participating in
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surveys. Therefore, out of 287 eligible surveys, we received 65 completed surveys
representing a 22.1% response rate.
Using all three methods, we collected 215 total responses reflecting a response
rate of 7.6%. Table 3 identifies the method used and final response rates. While these
response rates may be slightly lower than those of other surveys within OM, we believe
the sample is adequate, as there is limited number of hospitals within the US. According
to the American Hospital Association, there are 5,724 hospitals in the US (AHA.ORG).
Not
Method

Sent

valid

Usable

%

GPO

937

10

62

6.70%

SKA

1600

0

88

5.50%

Mail

297

12

63

22.10%

Total

2827

22

213

7.60%

Table 3: Method Response Rates

Sample size
Following Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) we calculated the required
minimum sample size for this investigation. Based on the Bartlett et al.’s equation, three
factors are necessary to compute the minimum sample size: alpha level (t), an estimate of
the population’s standard deviation (s), and an acceptable margin of error for the
estimated mean (d). This allows researchers to account conservatively for risk. Hence, we
use an alpha level of 0.01. For standard deviation, Bartlett et al. (2001) suggested an
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estimate of 1.167. This estimate is appropriate for a 7-point Likert scale. Third, we
estimated 0.21 as an acceptable margin of error. This number is the product of the
number of options within our scale and the margin of error a researcher is willing to
accept. When using the three input variables in the Bartlett et al.s’ equation, we
calculated no to be 204.925.
=

=

= 204.925 or approximately 205 respondents.

Following Cochran (1977), we adjusted the above equation to account for the
small population size. With 5,724 hospitals in the U.S. (AHA.com), we corrected the
minimum required sample size.
n=

=

= 197.842 or approximately 198 respondents. With 215

responses, we had acceptable amount of data to analyze using the structural equation
modeling software EQS 6.2.

Missing data
We excluded the control variables from the missing data analysis, since we
replaced missing control variables with data from hospitalvendorcredentialing.com
(2013). For the remaining variables, we used EQS version 6.2 to impute missing data.
Out of 3,824 response variables, only 26 were missing. Since this accounted for less than
1%, we tested the data to determine if it was missing completely at random (MCAR).
Using Little’s MCAR test, we found the missing variables to be MCAR (P=0.520). We
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then used expectation-maximization (EM) imputation to estimate the missing variables
(Allison, 2003).

Preliminary analysis
We conducted a preliminary analysis to test for outliers, influential responses,
skewness, kurtosis, and inappropriate responses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Specifically, we tested for univariate outliers by examining the standardized residuals as
well as minimum and maximum values. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics. We used
EM imputation to reproduce missing data points. We rounded a few imputed data up to
the minimum of 1.0 or down to the maximum of 7.0. Two data points exceeded the 7.0
maximum by less than 0.2 points and 1 data point was below the 1.0 minimum by less
than 0.1 points. The only exceptions to the minimum and maximum rules described
above are the four control variables. Both university affiliated (UNIV) and teaching
facility (TEACH) are dichotomous, hospital type (TYPE) was on a 4 point scale (1.04.0), and hospital class (CLASS) was on a 8 point scale (1.0-8.0). None of the control
variables need to rounded.
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NAME

CASES

MEAN

StdDev

Min

Max

Range Skewness Kurtosis

Internal integration 1
Internal integration 2
Internal integration 3
INFORSHR 1
INFORSHR 2
INFORSHR 3

215
215
215
215
215
215

5.17
4.91
4.51
5.68
5.59
5.73

1.35
1.31
1.60
1.21
1.39
1.25

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00

(1.00)
(0.85)
(0.54)
(1.30)
(1.30)
(1.41)

1.04
0.39
(0.52)
2.01
1.41
2.28

TRAIN 1
TRAIN 2
TRAIN 3
WARN1
WARN2
WARN3
RECOVR1
RECOVR2

215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215

5.05
5.42
5.19
5.54
5.58
5.35
5.88
5.96

1.45
1.35
1.37
1.16
1.27
1.51
1.14
1.12

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00

(0.82)
(1.03)
(0.99)
(1.36)
(1.51)
(1.19)
(1.55)
(1.86)

0.24
0.78
0.66
2.85
2.74
1.05
3.82
5.50

RECOVR3
PERF1
PERF2
PERF3
BED
UNIV
TEACH
TYPE
CLASS

215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215

5.78
5.01
5.78
5.83
3.05
1.74
1.60
1.33
2.50

1.28
1.33
1.23
1.20
2.10
0.43
0.48
0.64
1.13

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
2.00
2.00
4.00
8.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
7.00

(1.53)
(1.09)
(1.82)
(1.97)
0.78
(1.12)
(0.42)
2.56
2.27

2.74
1.05
4.07
5.11
(0.74)
(0.72)
(1.79)
6.69
7.31

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Before transformation procedures

For multivariate outliers, we calculated Mahalanobis distances, DFBETAs, and
DFIT values. Response #135 exceeded the Mahalanobis distances, DFBETAs, and DFIT
cutoffs suggested by SC literature. After review, we retained the observation response, as
it only marginally exceeded the calculated cutoff values.
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We also used Mardia’s coefficient to identify observations that exhibit excessive
multivariate kurtosis (Mardia, 1976). Three participants, #89, #106, and #123, had highly
unsual response patterns resulting in extreme values, as measured by the Mardia
coefficient. We removed these participants from further analysis. This left us with 212
observations for the final analysis. The corresponding normalized estimate for the Mardia
coefficient was 32.2574.
Further, we identified four variables, PERF2, PERF3, RECOVR1, and RECOVR
2 that were highly kurtotic. Using PERF2 as an example, 195 of 214 respondents
answered with a 5.0, 6.0, or 7.0. (See Figure 8) Conversely, only 19 respondents
answered with a Likert value of 1.0 to 4.0.While no absolute kurtosis figure indicates
non-normality, Bentler (1995) suggested that large kurtosis values of + three (3) indicate
a leptokurtic distribution, where the data has higher peaks and longer tails than when
compared to normally distributed data. No variables exhibited platykurtic kurtosis (values
of less than –three).
We approached data transformations conservatively (Osborne 2002; Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2007). To improve normality, we transformed the measures by squaring each
PERF1, PERF2, PERF3, RECOVR1, RECOVR 2, and RECOVR 3 data point. Once
transformed, kurtosis and skewness values were within acceptable ranges. See Appendix
C for mean, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums figures before and after the
data transformation process.
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Responses for PERF2
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Figure 8: Distribution of responses for PERF2

Common method bias
Common method bias (CMB) refers to variance introduced into an investigation
by the method of measurement (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Experts
suggest this phenomenon can bias construct parameter estimates (Podsakoff et al., 2012)
or reliability and validity estimates (Bagozzi, 1984).
Podsakoff et al. (2012) suggested addressing CMB during the instrument design
phase. By changing the anchors within the instrument, investigators are able to lessen the
influence of the measurement method procedurally. This helps eliminate common scale
properties (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Besides changing the anchors within our survey, we
used multiple rounds of Q-sorting and several preliminary tests (pilot and pre-test) to
eliminate wording ambiguity.
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Further, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2012) and Lindell and Whitney (2001),
we statistically evaluated the survey with a latent factor where a directly measured item
served as an indicator. Here the bias is controlled for with the communality of the latent
factor (Meade,Watson, and Kroustalis, 2007). In addition, we also used an unmeasured
latent method factor to control for method bias. For this, we added GREEN, a question
about environmentally friendly purchasing habits, to the final survey instrument. The
findings suggested that CMB is not present in our dataset. See Appendix D for details.

Non-response bias
Lambert and Harrington (1990) indicated that non-response bias identifies
differences between respondents and non-respondents. To assess the non-response bias,
we compared early and late respondents. Specifically, we looked at responses we
received by mail, as it was possible to determine when surveys were initially sent and
when respondents returned the completed survey. The evidence indicates that nonresponse bias is not present in this study. See Appendix E for details.

Validation of survey instrument
To establish reliability of the survey instruments, we estimated the internal
consistency using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The reliability coefficients of 0.70
or higher are typically meaningful cutoffs (Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1978). Table 5
shows that the Cronbach’s alpha values for the various constructs exceeded the suggested
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cut-off value and ranged from 0.737 to 0.927. These results suggest that the constructs
exhibit good psychometric properties. We report Cronbach’s alpha as it allows us to
estimate the variance associated with a set of results. It tells us that a construct or a set of
questions is consistently measuring the topic of interest.
Construct
Internal Integration

Training

Information Sharing

Warning Capabilities

Recovery Capabilities

Performance

Std
Loadings
0.914
0.756
0.666
0.829
0.839
0.899
0.722
0.69
0.804
0.844
0.938
0.747
0.908
0.922
0.872
0.641
0.653
0.776

Cronbach's Composite
Reliability
Alpha

AVE

0.812

0.826

0.67

0.888

0.891

0.761

0.776

0.784

0.860

0.881

0.747

0.927

0.930

0.83

0.737

0.740

0.621

0.577

Table 5: Standardized path loadings from CFA and descriptive statistics

Content validity
Content validity describes how well a measurement instrument, such as a survey,
measures the proposed construct domain (Churchill, 1979). When content validity is
high, the instrument is capturing the essence of the construct appropriately. Before we
collected any data, we established the content validity of our survey by linking the
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concepts to existing SC and RM literature. We also asked academic and practitioner
experts to validate the measures during pre-test and pilot stages. Following Dillman
(1978) and Dillman, Smyth, and Christian (2008), we amended questions and the
measurement instrument based on the feedback about the questionnaire’s readability,
structure, and completeness.

Unidimensionality and construct reliability
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the scale’s
unidimensionality and construct reliability. Table 5 reports the Cronbach’s Alpha,
composite reliabilities, and the average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor. To
determine the reliability of each measurement instrument, we evaluated the composite
reliability. All scales had acceptable composite reliability estimates greater than 0.70 (See
Table 5) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). We also calculated the AVE for each construct to
determine the amount of true score variance captured by the latent variables.
Accordingly, each item set should ideally have an AVE greater than 0.50. We do not
report the X2 or fit indices as each was set to the respective maximum or minimum,
indicating a perfect fit. When using CFA perfect, researchers can get perfect fit scores
when their model is “just identified” as it has zero degrees of freedom.

Criterion and concurrent validity
Criterion-related validity indicates how well measurement scales represent the
proposed constructs. To establish criterion-related validity of the constructs, we examined
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the correlation of the scales with warning and recovery measures. We employed
Pearson’s correlation test to determine the relationships between the antecedent
constructs and the outcome variables. Table 6 illustrates the correlations among various
relationships. Each is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Based on the results of the
correlation analysis, we concluded that the antecedent constructs have an acceptable
criterion-related validity.
In addition, when constructs are highly correlated and directionally appropriate,
they are said to have concurrent validity. When reviewing Table 6, we notice that all the
construct appear to be directionally appropriate, as they are all positive and statistically
significant at p < 0.05. Thus, we conclude that our data is concurrently valid.
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Items

#of items

Internal Integration
TRAIN
INFOSHR
WARN
RECOVR
PERF

3
3
3
3
3
3

Internal
TRAIN INFOSHR WARN RECOVR PERF
Integration
0.82 28.67
29.29
34.57
78.39
26.47
0.48
0.87
38.93
35.18
55.02
20.67
0.53
0.67
0.79
38.55
33.35
14.32
0.51
0.49
0.44
0.86
16.03
45.43
0.42
0.48
0.42
0.74
0.91
43.37
0.60
0.55
0.51
0.45
0.54
0.91

Table 6: Correlations1 square root of average variance extracted (AVE)2 and chi-square
differences3
1. Correlations bottom left triangle
2. Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) on diagonal. This converts the AVE
to the standard deviation scale, so it can be compared to correlations located in
bottom left triangle.
3. Satorra-Bentler differences top right triangle (SBDIFF.exe)

Discriminant validity
As the data in our study were not normally distributed, we calculated a SatorraBentler (S-B) difference for each pair of constructs (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). This
resulted in 30 models (15 constrained and 15 unconstrained) that we used to evaluate the
measurement scale’s discriminate validity. Using Bryant and Satorra’s (2012) scaled
difference procedure, we compared a constrained model (correlations between factor
pairs constrained to one (1)) to the unconstrained model (correlations between factor
pairs are allowed to correlate freely).
When running a CFA on the various pairs, we expected a S-B X2 difference of at
least 10.83 (P<0.001) in order to establish discriminant validity between constructs. The
results indicate that each construct represents a unique construct and therefore has
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discriminant validity (See Appendix F for input and output variables for each construct
pair).

Analysis and Findings
Respondent profile
According to the AHA, there are 5,724 hospitals within the United States. Table 7
shows the respondent profiles, including percentage by type of care and hospital type.
When considering type of hospital (bottom right portion of Table 7), 59% of respondents
were from Nongovernment Not-for-Profit Community Hospitals. This differs significantly
from the total population of hospitals. Therefore, we interpret the results cautiously.
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Licensed Beds

<100 Beds

68

33%

101-200 Beds

44

21%

201-300 Beds

25

12%

301-400 Beds
401-500 Beds
501-600 Beds
>601 Beds
Total

18
16
7
28
206

9%
8%
3%
14%
100%

College or University Affiliation

Yes

52

25%

No

154

75%

Total

206

100%

Teaching Hospital
Yes
No

79
125

39%
61%

Total

204

100%

Type of Care 1
Primary health care (i.e. broad
range of ambulant and inpatient
treatments)
122
82%
Secondary care (i.e. partially
specialized) interdisciplinary and
mainly inpatient treatments)
12
8%
Tertiary care (i.e. special clinics,
incl. non-somatic care)
10
7%
Non-acute care (i.e. rehabilitation
chronic care)
5
3%
Total
149 100%
1. First 62 respondents were not asked about type
Type of Hospital 1
Sample
Total Population2
Non-government Not-for-Profit
Community Hospital (religious
affiliated)
18
12% 2,903
51%
Non-government Not-for-Profit
Community Hospital (secular not
religious affiliated)
87
59% 1,025
18%
Investor-Owned (For-Profit)
Community Hospital
12
8% 1,045
18%
State/Local Government
Community Hospital
23
16%
208
4%
Federal Government Hospital
0
0%
421
7%
Non-federal Long Term Care
Hospital
2
1%
112
2%
Other (Prison Hospitals, College
Infirmaries, Etc.)
5
3%
10
0%
Total
147 100% 5,724
100%
1. First 62 respondents were not asked about type of hospital.
2.Hosptial fast facts retrieved from AHA.ORG 3/31/2013.

Table 7: Respondent Profile
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Initially, we evaluated the overall fit of the structural model (i.e., path and
measurement model combined). Using EQS version 6.2 for Windows, we found that the
model fits the data well. Table 8 presents the estimated loading and fit indices: SatorraBentler X2 = 308.52, df = 186, CFI = 0.926, and NNFI = 0.908. Furthermore, the
RMSEA was 0.056 with a 90% confidence interval ranging from 0.044 to 0.067. When
compared to standards established within OM literature, these relative and absolute
statistics indicate acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988).
Path
Internal integration --> WARN
Internal integration --> RECOVR
Internal integration --> WARN--> RECOVR (Mediated)

Unstandardized b
(Standard Error)
0.338 (0.142)
-0.227 (0.765)
2.05 (0.915)

INFOSHR --> WARN
INFOSHR --> RECOVR
INFOSHR --> WARN --> RECOVR (Mediated)

0.050 (0.178)
0.549 (1.065)
0.303 (1.08)

0.043 H2A - Not supported
0.052 H2B - Not supported
0.029 H2C - Not supported

TRAIN --> WARN
TRAIN --> RECOVR
TRAIN --> WARN --> RECOVR (Mediated)

0.314 (0.128)
0.815 (1.193)
1.905 (0.827)

0.335 H3A - Supported
0.086 H3B - Not supported
0.227
H3C - Supported

TRAINxBEDS --> WARN
TRAINxBEDS --> RECOVR
TRAINxBEDS --> WARN --> RECOVR (Mediated)

0.058 (0.045)
-0.441 (0.216)
0.351 (0.278)

0.12 H4A - Not supported
-0.105 H4B - Supported
0.081 H4C - Not supported

6.067 (0.913)
1.398 (1.039)
2.317 (0.790)
0.382 (0.117)
Control Variable
BEDS --> WARN
0.001 (0.035)
BEDS --> RECOVR
0.682 (0.218)
BEDS --> PERF
0.107 (0.321)
Absolute and Incremental Fit

0.677
H5 - Supported
0.173 H6A - Not supported
0.287
H6B - Supported
0.424 H6C - Supported

WARN --> RECOVR
WARN --> PERF
WARN --> RECOVR --> PERF (Mediated)
RECOVR --> PERF

SATORRA-BENTLER-X2
Degrees of Freedom
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI)
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA)
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF RMSEA

Table 8: Coefficients and robust fit statistics.
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Standardized β
Hypthosis tested
0.347 H1A - Supported
-0.026 H1B - Not supported
0.235
H1C - Supported

0.002
Not Supported
0.136
Supported
0.024
Not Supported
Value
308.52
186
0.917
0.056
(0.044 - 0.067)

Internal integration (H1A-C)
The relationship between internal integration and WARN (H1A) was positive and
significant (β = 0.347, p= 0.0184). This suggests that organizations can improve their
scanning and communication abilities by developing internal systems and processes to
connect with other employees and departments. Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) found
similar results when linking internal integration with SC agility. In their study, they
investigated the antecedent competencies that enable SC agility in the mitigation context.
From an HRT perspective, internal integration is similar to the concept of coupling. Tight
coupling enables practitioners to exercise control over operational processes (Roe &
Schulman, 2008). Without control, practitioners would find it difficult to develop highly
reliable organizations.
The path coefficient from internal integration to RECOVR (H1B) was not
significant (β = -0.026 p= 0.7676). This finding surprises us since other risk mitigation
research has shown how internal integration can enhance connectivity and coordination
(Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). While similar, the Braunscheidel and Suresh research
linked internal integration to SC agility, which practitioners used to mitigate and respond
to SC disruptions. We believe our results indicate that when responding to a SC
disruption that responders may need to decouple themselves from existing procedures
and adapt to the surrounding environment. HRT proponents call the decoupling process
latitude for improvisation (Weick, 1987). Improvisation may not be necessary with every
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type of SC disruption; however, when needed, it allows a practitioner to create unique
response tactics.
We also found that internal integration has a mediated relationship with RECOVR
via the WARN construct (H1C). The relationship from WARN to RECOVR was
significant (β = 0.677, p < 0.0001). Therefore, the resultant indirect effect equals
β=0.235. To confirm the fully mediated effect between internal integration and
RECOVR, we followed Selig and Preacher’s (2008) recommendation and conducted a
bootstrap analysis to determine whether the relationship is significant. Using 20,000
bootstrap estimates, we identified a significant relationship. The 95% confidence interval
(CI) ranged from 0.3321 to 3.985 (see Appendix G for distribution of indirect effects).
As the bootstrapping process did not capture zero within the 95% confidence
interval, we acknowledged that the fully mediated relationship (as opposed to a partially
mediated) is significant. Thus, internal integration is positively associated with WARN
which in turn is positively associated with RECOVR.

Information sharing (H2A-C)
Both pathways INFOSHR to WARN (H2A) (β = 0.043, P= 0.7767) and
INFOSHR to RECOVR (H2B) (β = 0.052, p= 0.6072) were not significant. These
findings are surprising, since existing research repeatedly demonstrated that INFOSHR
significantly affects an organization’s RM and risk mitigation efforts (Chopra & Sodhi,
2004; Faisal, Banwet, & Shankar, 2006; Speckman & Davis, 2004). We suspect the
relationships are non-significant due to the context of the investigation. Perhaps hospital
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material managers do not rely on INFOSHR abilities as much as managers in other
industries do. Researchers have previously found that “information sharing is especially
difficult among companies that are remotely located in the supply chain” (Ahn & Lee,
2004, p. 18). During initial interviews, one hospital procurement director indicated that it
was common to locate procurement functions at offsite locations.
As both direct relationships were insignificant, we presumed that the indirect
relationship from INFOSHR through WARN to RECOVR would also be insignificant.
Using the bootstrap methodology, we confirmed that the 95% confidence interval
includes zero values (See Appendix H for the distribution of indirect effects). This
suggests that the indirect effects are non-significant, β=0.029.

Training (H3A-C)
The coefficient between TRAIN and WARN (H3A) was positive and significant
(β = 0.335 p= 0.0157). This evidence implies that managers can train practitioners to scan
for and communicate information about SC disruptions. Sheffi, Rice, Fleck, & Caniato
(2003) confirmed that TRAIN activities, such as simulation and gaming, help
organizations build resilience. When viewed through the HRT lens, training enhances
reliability, which is used to combat SC disruption (Tamuz & Harrison, 2006).
When evaluating the relationship between TRAIN and RECOVR (H3B), we
found that their direct association was not significant (β = 0.086 p= 0.4955). Following
HRT logic, we expected TRAIN activities to support and enhance pre-emptive and
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reactive response tactics. However, the insignificant findings suggest that training alone
will not improve or worsen an organization’s response capabilities. We believe that
because SC disruptions vary widely in makeup and consequences, therefore, practitioners
need more diverse types of training activities if managers expect TRAIN to affect
RECOVR.
For hypothesis 3C, we anticipated the WARN construct to mediate the link
between TRAIN and RECOVR. Our results indicated that a construct within a chain of
events could be important yet have a minimal direct effect on specific construct (Vickery,
Jayaram, Droge, & Calantone, 2003). Specifically, we found the indirect relationship to
be significant (β = 0.086) and fully mediated. We used the bootstrapping methodology to
confirm the significance. See Appendix I for distribution of indirect effects. The 95%
confidence interval (CI) ranged from 0.4046 to 4.146. Since the CI did not include zero,
the results indicated that TRAIN-RECOVR relationship is significant and fully mediated
by the WARN construct.

The moderating effect of organization size on training (H4A-C)
Following the recommendation of Marsh, Wen and Hau (2004), we meancentered both independent and moderating variables prior to creating the interaction
variable. This allows us to avoid multi-collinearity between constructs (Venkatraman,
1989). We then tested the relationship between TRAINxBEDS and WARN (H4A). We
originally hypothesized that training would augment the WARN construct positively
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when moderated by organization size (BEDS). Our analysis indicated that the hospital
size does not significantly moderate the TRAIN-WARN relationship (β = 0.012, p=
0.2053).
In hypothesis 3A, we found that TRAIN significantly and positively affects the
WARN construct. When combined with the insignificant results from H4A, we
concluded that BEDS, a proxy for organization size, does not interact and alter the
relationship. Thus, this seems to imply that WARN related training is important
regardless of organization size.
The path coefficient from TRAINxBEDS to RECOVR (H4B) was significant (β =
- 0.105 p =0.0425). This indicates that the TRAIN-RECOVR relationship does lessen as
organization size increases. To interpret this result, we report simple slopes, as prescribed
by Aiken and West (1992). (See Figure 9)




Simple slope for TRAIN at +1 standard deviations of BEDS = 0.815+(-0.441 * 1*
2.10) = -0.1111
Simple slope for disruption sensing and response capability at mean of recovery
capability = 0.815
Simple slope for TRAIN at -1 standard deviations of BEDS = 0.815+(-0.441 * -1*
2.10) = 1.7411

This evidence suggests that a one-unit increase in TRAIN increases the RECOVR
by -0.1111 units as the number of BEDS increases (larger organizations). At the average
number of BEDS, a one-unit increase of TRAIN abilities marginally improves the
response capabilities by 0.815. Lastly, when a hospital has a small number of BEDS
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(small organizations), a one-unit increase in TRAIN improves the organization’s
RECOVR by 1.7411.

1
0.8

Recovery Capability

0.6
0.4
0.2
Low BEDS

0
-0.2

Med BEDS

-0.4

High BEDS

-0.6
-0.8

Licensed Beds

-1
Original scale 7 Pt

Figure 9: Simple Slopes for TRAIN x BEDS interaction
Lastly, in H4C we proposed that the moderating effect of TRAINxBEDS on
RECOVR was mediated by WARN. In testing the mediated moderation effect
(TRAIN*BEDS) >> WARN >>RECOVR), the point estimate (0.351) is the product of
the estimates for the effect of WARN on the TRAIN*BEDS interaction term (0.058) and
the effect of RECOVR on WARN (6.067) (Tein, Sandler, MacKinnon, & Wolchik,
2004). The standard error of this effect is 5.539 = [(0.0582)(0.0452)+(6.0672) (0.9132)]1/2.
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Thus we conclude that the mediated moderation effect was not significant [0.351 (5.539),
Z=0.07].

However, to illustrate the moderating effects of BEDS, we also calculate the
conditional mediation effects using the simple slopes from the three “a” coefficients and
then multiplying by the single “b” coefficient (WARN >> RECOVR) (Preacher, Rucker,
& Hayes, 2007). The results indicate that TRAIN may indirectly improve RECOVR
within small and medium hospitals. In particular, training activities have a positive
indirect effect (10.56), in hospitals with a small number of BEDS. Likewise, in medium
size hospitals, we find a positive indirect effect, however the overall effect is reduced
(4.94). The impact of TRAIN continues to diminish as hospital size increases. Thus, in
large hospitals we found that TRAIN has a slight negative indirect effect (-0.674).
Overall, these results suggest that as hospital size increases, the mediated influence of
TRAIN on RECOVR decreased.

Warning capabilities to recovery capabilities (H5)
When Craighead et al. (2007) defined warning and recovery capabilities; they
postulated that the constructs were related. Following this thinking, we proposed a
positive relationship from WARN to RECOVR (H5A). After analyzing the pathway, we
found a positive and significant (β = 0.677, p < 0.0001) relationship. This supports
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previous research asserting that warning capabilities, such as prevention and detection,
are antecedents to response and recovery efforts (Price, 2004).

The effect of warning and recovery capabilities on organizational performance
(H6A-C)
When analyzing the relationship between WARN to PERF (H6A), we found a
non-significant effect (β = 0.173, p=0.1799). This finding surprised us, as WARN was
hypothesized to improve both scanning and communication capabilities. With this nonsupportive evidence, we assume that while useful the WARN are costly to the
organization. Stated differently, managers must expend financial and physical resources
to enable WARN tactics. We suspect that some organizations, perhaps entrepreneurial
firms, are able to make use of these competencies. For example, Shepherd et al. (2007)
found that environmental scanning activities helped generate entrepreneurial ideas.
Within an entrepreneurial firm, we would expect scanning abilities to enhance
performance.
When considering the WARN – PERF relationship, we must account for the
RECOVR construct as an intermediary (H6B). The evidence suggests that RECOVR
mediates the relationship and creates an indirect effect (β = 0.287). We confirmed the
relationship using bootstrapping. See Appendix J for the distribution of indirect effects.
This augmented relationship demonstrates that organizations should develop WARN as a
means to enhance performance. However, managers will need to develop both warning
and recovery capabilities to see improvement.
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The relationship between RECOVR and PERF (H6C) is significant (β = 0.424,
p=0.0013). This confirms our thinking that organizations can develop proactive and
reactive response capabilities as a means to improve performance. When designing
recovery capabilities, managers should develop processes that jumpstart response efforts.
Documented processes and a clear chain of command enable first responders to initiate
recovery with a clear line of authority (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002). Yet both the processes
and the supporting hierarchy need to allow practitioners to adapt when necessary.
Responders should apply problem-solving skills and adapt to the disruption within the
confines of their position (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002).

Control variables
We test four control variables within this research: university affiliated (UNIV),
teaching hospital (TEACH), type of care (TYPE), and organization class (CLASS).
While, neither UNIV nor TEACH had any significant effects, both TYPE and CLASS
warranted further investigation (See Table 8). When evaluating both TYPE and CLASS
we found the influence was not meaningful, as it did not change the significance of any
relationships initially identified in the base model.

257

Control Variables
Absolute and Incremental Fit
WARN
RECOVR
PERF

Yes or No
UNIV
0.160 (0.158)
-1.568 (1.202)
0.053 (1.257)

Yes or No
TEACH
0.115 (0.146)
1.031 (1.069)
0.724 (1.142)

4 Choices
TYPE
0.234 (0.093)***
-1.658 (0.567)***
0.777 (0.777)

SATORRA-BENTLER-X2
376.6
374.4306
339.8301
Degrees of Freedom
205
205
205
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI)
0.89
0.892
0.913
ROOT MEAN-SQUARE ERROR
OF APPROXIMATION (RMSEA)
0.063
0.063
0.056
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL OF
RMSEA
(0.053 - 0.073)
(0.052 - 0.072)
(0.045 - 0.066)
Notes: *** Significant to 0.0001; ** Significant to 0.001;

8 Choices
CLASS
0.005 (0.101)
-0.652 (0.351
-1.317 (0.484)**
331.9441
205
0.915
0.054
(0.043 - 0.064)

Table 9: Control variables with Fit, unstandardized betas and standard errors

Conclusions
This research contributes to the SC and RM literature in several ways. First, the
results suggest that by developing a reliable SC, managers can enhance the organization’s
RM capabilities and performance. To achieve improved performance, managers should
design reliability-oriented systems that are decentralized in nature and run by mindful
practitioners who understand and care for the organization.
Second, we developed new measures to assess organizational warning and
recovery capabilities. While originally defined by Craighead et al. in 2007, we
operationalize them within the SC and RM context. Using interviews, sorting procedures,
and confirmatory factor analysis, we developed valid and reliable measures that both
academics and practitioners can use to benchmark and understand an organization’s RM
capabilities. For WARN, our evidence suggests that managers can scan for SC anomalies
and then communicate information about SC threats to partners within an organization.
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Our study also confirmed that RECOVR allows the organization to address SC disruption
both before (pre-emptive) and after (reactive) a disruption occurs.
Third, the findings indicated that several competencies positively affect an
organization’s RM capabilities. For example, both internal integration and TRAIN affect
WARN directly and RECOVR indirectly. Our evidence suggests that managers can
develop organizational structures as a means to combat SC risk. We advocate the use of
these behavior-based RM competencies because they develop the employees and the
organization itself rather than just investing in resources and buffers that may never be
used.
Fourth, we found that both warning and recovery capabilities affect organizational
performance. Our findings indicate a direct connection between RECOVR and PERF.
This suggests that managers can develop response capabilities to mitigate a SC
disruption’s influence and/or lessen the time it takes for the SC to return to a steady state.
This is important, as organizations compete on the speed of their operation functions,
especially in the face of a SC disruption. Ensuring that the organization can quickly
recover from a SC disruption should help the organization retain existing customers and
acquire new customers when the competition is struggling to recover.
Although we found no direct relationship between WARN and PERF, the
evidence indicates an indirect effect when RECOVR serves as a mediator. This signifies
that managers should develop scanning and communication competencies within an
organization, as a method to enhance performance. However, to benefit from the
improved abilities, the organization must develop both the warning and recovery
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capabilities, as WARN depends on RECOVR. Stated differently, warning capabilities
alone without recovery capabilities is not sufficient.
Fifth, the research explored organization size (BEDS) as a moderator of the
relation between TRAIN and PERF. The results show that as the number of licensed beds
increases, the rate at which TRAIN affects PERF diminishes. Stated differently, as a
hospital grows in size, training becomes less effective at improving PERF. This implies
that procurement managers of large hospitals must work harder for TRAIN to influence
an organization’s RM capabilities.

Limitation and Future Research Opportunities
As with any investigation, our research has limitations. First, we collected data
from 215 hospital procurement professionals. Choosing one industry allows us to control
for variation associated with different industries (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, it limits
the generalizability of the findings (Cool & Schendel, 1987; Safizadeh, Ritzman, &
Mallick, 2000). Replicating this research within other industries would add to our
understanding of the values of behavioral-based risk management techniques. Second, we
drew inferences from cross sectional data. Longitudinal data would improve our
understanding of these RM phenomenons and the discussion concerning causality
(Rosenzweig, Roth, & Dean, 2003). Third, we were also concerned with the utility of the
warning and recovery measures. Since this is one of the first studies to operationalize
these constructs, it would be beneficial to strengthen these measures with additional
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testing. Lastly, we were concerned about using single respondents to answer our survey.
This issue has been widely discussed in the literature (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). To
address potential problems, we structured our survey according to the best practices and
tested for common method bias. Additional studies could collect data from multiple
respondents and sources.
During this investigation, we obtained several interesting results that spur future
research. Initially, we envisioned improvement in the WARN and RECOVR constructs.
Using the new constructs in follow-up studies provides additional validity and reliability
testing. Second, while our research looks at structural competencies, future studies should
test other antecedents. Examples include information system integration, managerial
attitudes towards improvisation, and quality management systems. Finally, we used
perceptual measures for organizational performance. While these are helpful for
interpretation and measurement, objective outcomes, like gross earnings, actual profit,
and in-stock level would be more definitive outcome variables. During this research
process, we found that some hospitals regularly publish profit and loss data. However,
many private and non-profit hospitals provide very little information about financial
performance.
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Correlations II1
II1
1.00
II2
0.69
II3
0.60
INFOSHR1
0.34
INFOSHR2
0.33
INFOSHR3
0.39
TRAIN1
0.39
TRAIN2
0.40
TRAIN3
0.39
WARN1
0.43
WARN2
0.41
WARN3
0.38
REC1
0.38
REC2
0.39
REC3
0.29
PERF1
0.50
PERF2
0.43
PERF3
0.44
GRN
0.19
Standard Deviation 1.35
Mean
5.17

II3

1.00
0.29
0.33
0.27
0.33
0.35
0.30
0.44
0.38
0.27
0.30
0.33
0.29
0.31
0.26
0.25
0.28
1.61
4.50

II2
1.00
0.52
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.31
0.35
0.28
0.31
0.37
0.33
0.26
0.30
0.26
0.42
0.26
0.31
0.20
1.31
4.91
1.00
0.46
0.58
0.44
0.49
0.50
0.25
0.23
0.20
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.20
0.13
0.32
0.21
1.21
5.68
1.00
0.58
0.45
0.42
0.36
0.27
0.27
0.21
0.26
0.21
0.28
0.24
0.27
0.32
0.25
1.39
5.59
1.00
0.48
0.44
0.42
0.37
0.39
0.23
0.30
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.18
0.33
0.28
1.25
5.72
1.00
0.66
0.76
0.33
0.39
0.31
0.36
0.32
0.34
0.31
0.23
0.38
0.37
1.45
5.05
1.00
0.76
0.42
0.44
0.37
0.41
0.42
0.39
0.32
0.31
0.43
0.32
1.35
5.42
1.00
0.37
0.38
0.38
0.43
0.39
0.37
0.34
0.28
0.42
0.29
1.37
5.19
1.00
0.80
0.55
0.62
0.64
0.56
0.29
0.25
0.45
0.23
1.16
5.54
1.00
0.71
0.61
0.63
0.62
0.27
0.20
0.43
0.17
1.27
5.58

1.00
0.59
0.55
0.66
0.24
0.15
0.35
0.16
1.51
5.35

1.00
0.86
0.78
0.31
0.36
0.55
0.13
1.14
5.88

1.00
0.80
0.32
0.36
0.54
0.18
1.12
5.96

1.00
0.27
0.27
0.48
0.20
1.28
5.78

1.00
0.54
0.44
0.24
1.34
5.01

1.00
0.65
0.05
1.22
5.71

1.00
0.16 1.00
1.20 1.34
5.83 4.53

INFOSHR1 INFOSHR2 INFOSHR3 TRAIN1 TRAIN2 TRAIN3 WARN1 WARN2 WARN3 RECOVR1 RECOVR2 RECOVR3 PERF1 PERF2 PERF3 GRN

Appendices

Appendix A: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for each item
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Appendix B: Survey questions
Internal integration
1. Within my organization, there are mechanisms in place to encourage internal
integration.
2. I believe different departments within my organization are properly integrated.
3. We have project managers who integrate activities across the organization.
Performance
4. My organization is able to keep operating costs to a minimum.
5. My organization is able to keep out of stocks to a minimum.
6. My organization is able to keep service quality high.
Warning capabilities
7. My organization has procedures to identify threats.
8. Within my organization, there are systems to warn employees about potential
threats.
9. Within my organization, the command center identifies actual disruptions.
Recovery capabilities
10. When a disruption occurs, my organization immediately starts recovery efforts.
11. Once a threat is identified, my organization deploys resources to reduce the
negative effects.
12. My organization’s command center deploys recovery resources to reduce the
effects of a disruption.
Training
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13. Within my organization, employees are cross-trained so they can fill in for others
if necessary.
14. Within my organization, there are employee training resources available.
15. Employees receive training to perform multiple tasks.
Information sharing
16. Most people within my organization believe that sharing information is important.
17. In my opinion, finance shares information with operations.
18. Managers from departments across the organization are expected to share
information with others.
Control variables
19. How many beds does your organization have?
20. Is your organization affiliated with a college or university?
21. Is your organization a teaching facility?
22. What type of care does your organization provide?
a. Primary health care (i.e. broad range of ambulant and inpatient treatments)
b. Secondary care (i.e. partially specialized) interdisciplinary and mainly
inpatient treatments)
c. Tertiary care (i.e. special clinics, incl. non-somatic care)
d. Non-acute care (i.e. rehabilitation chronic care)
23. How would you classify your organization?
a. Non-government Not-for-Profit Community Hospital (religious affiliated)
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b. Non-government Not-for-Profit Community Hospital (secular not
religious affiliated)
c. Investor-Owned (For-Profit) Community Hospital
d. State/Local Government Community Hospital
e. . Federal Government Hospital
f. Non-federal Long Term Care Hospital
g. Other (Prison Hospitals, College Infirmaries, Etc.)
h. Nonfederal Psychiatric Hospital
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics before transformation
Original Data Set: 215 responses before tranformation
NAME

CASES

MEAN

StdDev

Min

Max

Range Skewness Kurtosis

Internal integration 1
Internal integration 2
Internal integration 3
INFORSHR 1
INFORSHR 2
INFORSHR 3

215
215
215
215
215
215

5.17
4.91
4.51
5.68
5.59
5.73

1.35
1.31
1.60
1.21
1.39
1.25

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00

(1.00)
(0.85)
(0.54)
(1.30)
(1.30)
(1.41)

1.04
0.39
(0.52)
2.01
1.41
2.28

TRAIN 1
TRAIN 2
TRAIN 3
WARN1
WARN2
WARN3
RECOVR1
RECOVR2

215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215

5.05
5.42
5.19
5.54
5.58
5.35
5.88
5.96

1.45
1.35
1.37
1.16
1.27
1.51
1.14
1.12

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00

(0.82)
(1.03)
(0.99)
(1.36)
(1.51)
(1.19)
(1.55)
(1.86)

0.24
0.78
0.66
2.85
2.74
1.05
3.82
5.50

RECOVR3
PERF1
PERF2
PERF3
BED
UNIV
TEACH
TYPE
CLASS

215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215
215

5.78
5.01
5.78
5.83
3.05
1.74
1.60
1.33
2.50

1.28
1.33
1.23
1.20
2.10
0.43
0.48
0.64
1.13

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
2.00
2.00
4.00
8.00

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
7.00

(1.53)
(1.09)
(1.82)
(1.97)
0.78
(1.12)
(0.42)
2.56
2.27

2.74
1.05
4.07
5.11
(0.74)
(0.72)
(1.79)
6.69
7.31
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Appendix C (continued): Descriptive statistics after transformation

NAME
IIMC1
IIMC2
IIMC3
ISMC1
ISMC2
ISMC3
TRNMC1
TRNMC2
TRNMC3
BEDMC
BEDXTRN1
BEDXTRN2
BEDXTRN3
WC1SQRD
WC2SQRD
WC3SQRD
RC1SQRD
RC2SQRD
RC3SQRD
PER1SQRD
PER2SQRD
PER3SQRD

Transformed Data Set: 215 responses after transformation
CASES MEAN StdDev
Min
Max
Range Skewness Kurtosis
215
1.35
(4.16)
1.83
6.00
(1.00)
1.04
215
1.31
(3.91)
2.08
6.00
(0.85)
0.39
215
1.60
(3.51)
2.49
6.00
(0.54)
(0.52)
215
1.21
(4.67)
1.32
6.00
(1.30)
2.01
215
1.39
(4.58)
1.41
6.00
(1.30)
1.41
215
1.25
(4.72)
1.27
6.00
(1.41)
2.28
215
1.45
(4.04)
1.95
6.00
(0.82)
0.24
215
1.35
(4.41)
1.58
6.00
(1.03)
0.78
215
1.37
(4.19)
1.81
6.00
(0.99)
0.66
215
2.10
(2.04)
3.95
6.00
0.78
(0.74)
215
0.08
2.88 (12.05)
8.28
20.34
(0.32)
2.32
215
0.42
2.81 (13.51)
9.04
22.56
(0.52)
5.14
215
0.25
2.74 (12.61)
8.57
21.19
(0.27)
3.35
215 31.98
11.25
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.42)
0.06
215 32.79
12.04
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.63)
0.06
215 30.93
13.77
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.44)
(0.59)
215 35.90
11.61
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.61)
(0.02)
215 36.74
11.27
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.74)
0.40
215 35.02
12.53
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.72)
(0.05)
215 26.89
11.66
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.28)
(0.18)
215 34.92
11.75
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.85)
0.68
215 35.45
11.46
1.00
49.00
48.00
(0.88)
0.86
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Item
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S-B Chi2
CFI
RMSEA

InternalIntegration1
Internal
InternalIntegration2
Integration
InternalIntegration3
TRAIN1
Training
TRAIN2
TRAIN3
INFOSHR1
Information
INFOSHR2
Sharing
INFOSHR3
PERF1
Performance
PERF2
PERF3
WARN1
Warning
WARN2
Capabilties
WARN3
RECOVR1
Recovery
RECOVR2
Capabilities
RECOVR3

Factor
0.918
0.739
0.672
0.718
0.721
0.805
0.86
0.833
0.916
0.846
0.929
0.757
0.91
0.922
0.871
0.667
0.713
0.779
219.37
0.913
0.063

0.903
0.68
0.59
0.636
0.673
0.719
0.786
0.759
0.98
0.772
0.878
0.686
0.887
0.874
0.8
0.66
0.751
0.714
165.41
0.944
0.054

0.07
0.06
0.09
0.14
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.09
0.01
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.06
0.08
0.12
0.02
0.00
0.09

With Method Factor Added
Sqd Factor
Trait Loading Trait Loading
Loadings

Without Factor

0.899
0.789
0.635
0.769
0.812
0.867
0.698
0.699
0.783
0.54
0.621
0.814
0.868
0.942
0.743
0.904
0.916
0.862
221.58
0.921
0.062

0.01
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01

Trait Loading Sqd Factor Loadings

With Marker variable (GRN) added

Appendix D: Common method bias: Method factor and marker variable

Appendix E: Non-response bias results
Group Statistics
N

Group
BED
UNIV
TEACH

Mean

15 2.133333 1.3020131 .3361783

2.00

15 3.000000 1.6903085 .4364358

1.00

15 1.866667 .3518658 .0908514

2.00

15 1.800000 .4140393 .1069045

1.00

15 1.677327 .4738894 .1223577

2.00

15 1.800000 .4140393 .1069045

F

UNIV

TEACH

Std. Error
Mean

1.00

Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

BED

Std.
Deviation

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

Sig.
.070

.924

2.072

.793

.345

.161

Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
t

Sig. (2tailed)

df

Mean
Std. Error
Difference Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Lower

Upper

-1.573

28

.127 -.8666667 .5509011 -1.9951365 .2618032

-1.573

26.288

.128 -.8666667 .5509011 -1.9984576 .2651242

.475

28

.638 .0666667 .1402945

-.2207135 .3540469

.475

27.290

.638 .0666667 .1402945

-.2210507 .3543841

-.755

28

.457 -.1226733 .1624807

-.4555000 .2101533

-.755

27.505

.457 -.1226733 .1624807

-.4557703 .2104236
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Appendix F: Satorra-Bentler difference results
Internal integration & TRAIN
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 117.42
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 187.02
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.67
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.75
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 28.6774 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

Internal integration & INFOSHR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 84.21
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 128.03
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.87
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 9.48
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
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Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 29.2955 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

Internal integration & WARN
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 115.78
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 185.77
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 17.96
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.77
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 34.5738 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

Internal integration & RECOVR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 160.98
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 198.59
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 5.46
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 5.9
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 78.3932 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

Internal integration & PERF
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 79.11
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 102.45
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 14.84
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 15.53
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 26.4732 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

TRAIN & INFOSHR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 69.20
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.09
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
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Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 23.74
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 41.94
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.9311 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.00000

TRAIN & WARN
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 144.00
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 304.73
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 20.56
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 28.79
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 35.1817 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

TRAIN & RECOVR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 234.06
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Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 423.15
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 15.56
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 17.30
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 55.0214 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

TRAIN & PERF
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 86.37
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.00
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.22
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.24
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 20.6783 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000005

INFOSHR & WARN
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INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 111.00
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 165.53
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 7.19
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 8.40
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 38.5592 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

INFOSHR & RECOVR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 106.76
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 163.38
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 8.39
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 9.61
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 33.3569 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000
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INFOSHR & PERF
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 68.09
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 125.59
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 21.11
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 25.34
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 14.3272 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000154

WARN & RECOVR
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 83.16
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 182.93
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 36.15
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 52.78
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
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Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 16.0335 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000062

WARN & PERF
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 121.85
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 156.60
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 30.87
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 34.24
Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 45.4306 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000

RECOVR & PERF
INPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the MORE constrained model= 101.09
Normal chi square for the MORE constrained model= 129.92
Degrees of freedom for the MORE constrained model= 9
Satorra-Bentler chi square for the LESS constrained model= 22.64
Normal chi square for the LESS constrained model= 25.95
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Degrees of freedom for the LESS constrained model= 8
OUTPUTS:
Satorra-Bentler Scaled Difference = 43.3730 df = 1
Chi Square probability = 0.000000
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Appendix G: Distribution of indirect effects for internal integration and RECOVR
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Appendix H: Distribution of indirect effects for INFOSHR and RECOVR
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Appendix I: Distribution of indirect effects for TRAIN and RECOVR
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Appendix J: Distribution of indirect effects for WARN and PERF
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